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ABSTRACT
Efforts to encourage healthy  behaviour often fail to bring about sustained 
changes in people’s lifestyles. New approaches to tackling chronic disease 
include the use of financial incentives: rewards paid to individuals conditional 
upon their  achieving some pre-specified target, such  as losing weight or  quitting 
smoking. Incentives may  provide an extra  motivation to adopt healthy  lifestyles, 
and structure behaviour change efforts in ways more conducive to success.
 Health  incentives have, however, provoked controversy, attracting 
accusations of ‘bribing  people to be healthy,’ ‘rewarding bad behaviour,’ and 
‘wasting  taxpayers’ money.’ It  remains unclear  how viable health incentives 
could be as a tool for health promotion; but, even if effective,  their contentious 
nature may still give reason for hesitancy.
 Here, I explore whether  such ethical concerns present us with  convincing 
reasons not to use health incentives. I begin by  looking at the nature of the 
criticisms of incentives in the media, and grouping these arguments into more 
general themes for discussion. I then proceed to consider each of these in turn, 
beginning first with debates about the requirements for the state to act 
efficiently  without overstepping its legitimate sphere of influence. I then move 
on to concerns relating to the potential for incentives to undermine liberty  and 
autonomy. Next, I discuss whether health incentives are unjust insofar  as they 
are undeserved, and how  this relates to agent freedom  and responsibility  for 
adopting healthy  lifestyles. Finally,  I consider  the worry  that using money  as a 
healthcare intervention could corrupt certain values that we care about. In 
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concluding, I seek to give an overall idea  as to the ethical permissibility  of health 
incentives,  and identify  some key  features that are likely  to render  incentives 
more or less acceptable as a means of improving health.
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INTRODUCTION
BEHAVIOURAL ‘CHOICES’ AND HEALTH
One of the biggest  challenges currently  faced by  healthcare providers all over 
the world is how  to combat chronic, lifestyle-related disease. According to the 
World Health Organization (WHO), noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) kill 
more people each year  than all other  diseases combined.  The majority  of these 
deaths are due to cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes,  and chronic lung 
disease. In turn, the likelihood of suffering from NCDs is greatly  increased by 
exposure to four  behavioural risk factors: tobacco smoke, poor diet, insufficient 
physical activity, and excessive alcohol consumption (WHO [2011: vii]).
 In developed nations such as the UK, it is something of a puzzle why  the 
disease burden resulting from  behavioural risk factors is so high. After all, it 
would seem that most individuals have it within their power to choose the less 
risky  behaviours of not smoking, eating healthily, taking a  bit more exercise and 
avoiding drinking too much alcohol. Such behaviours, common sense tells us, 
are surely  accessible to the vast majority  of UK citizens. So too is basic 
healthcare provision from the National Health  Service (NHS). If this is the case, 
then why do so many continue to suffer from avoidable disease?
 Part of the problem could be a  failure of knowledge: people simply  do not 
know that such behaviours are likely  to harm their  health. In  this case, 
education may  be needed to ensure that people understand what behaviours are 
likely  to damage and promote their health. However, although interventions 
designed to promote this kind of knowledge may  succeed in educating 
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individuals, and even in altering intentions about behaviour, they  typically  have 
a much smaller effect on actual behaviour (Marteau et al. [2012]; Webb and 
Sheeran [2006]; Marteau et al [1996]).
 If lack of information and understanding is not the main barrier  to 
behaviour change,  then we might consider a further  two possibilities.  First, 
individuals may  be well aware of the risks of unhealthy  behaviours, but simply 
not  care: information about lifestyle risk factors simply  does not make people 
want to change their behaviour. Second, individuals may  lack the ability  to alter 
their behaviour  effectively: whilst it  might seem that most people have ‘access’ 
to healthy  lifestyles (they  can afford to eat healthier diets,  are free to not smoke, 
to take more exercise and to drink less), in fact, their  capacity  to behave in these 
ways is undermined by psychological, social, and economic factors.
 The first  case is primarily  a  ‘problem’ of motivation.  This is the problem  
as straightforward economic thinking  might present it. Roughly, in order to get 
agents to change their behaviour (swap their unhealthy  habits for  healthy  ones) 
economic thinking might suggest we need to alter  agents’ preferences for  those 
behaviours we are interested in.  To do this,  we must make some behaviour more 
appealing than it  previously  was by  altering the outcomes,  and hence 
desirability, associated with that behaviour.
 The second case is a problem of implementing the will of the agent to 
change her behaviour and requires that barriers to engaging with healthy 
behaviours be removed. These may  include psychological and physical barriers, 
such  as ‘weakness of the will’ and cravings which make it difficult for  the agent 
to act consistently  in line with her ‘healthy’ preferences. Other  barriers may 
relate more to socio-economic, structural factors, and the environment  the 
agent inhabits. For instance, stressful working conditions, being surrounded by 
individuals engaging in unhealthy  behaviours, or the prospect of social stigma 
for seeking to alter  one’s lifestyle may  scupper agents’ efforts to change their 
behaviour.
 From  these two different problems with  effecting behaviour change, we 
may  seek one solution: in both cases, incentives may  provide a way  of changing 
the behaviour both  of those who have little motivation to do so and of those who 
are unable to implement their  healthy  intentions. On the ‘economic’ model, a 
sufficiently  desirable incentive can tip the balance of preferences held by  the 
agent in  favour of the healthy  behaviour. On the ‘psychological’ model, the 
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incentive may  help to structure the agent’s approach to changing her behaviour 
in such a way that she is more likely to succeed.
THE CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF INCENTIVES IN HEALTH
Health incentives may  have wider application  than the behavioural risk factors 
mentioned in the opening paragraphs. There are many  instances where 
decisions made by  the agent have a large impact on her health outcomes.  Some 
of these are intricately  entwined with  one’s everyday  habits,  repeated 
frequently,  and integrated into one’s overall lifestyle (including those risk 
factors relating to diet and exercise). These kinds of ‘complex’ behaviours are 
particularly  resistant to change (WHO [2008]; Marteau et al. [2009a]; Dolan et 
al. [2012]). Other health-relevant behaviours may  be more occasional,  only 
implemented on a single or few occasions,  and less familiar to the agent (such as 
behaviours relating to getting vaccinated or tested for disease).
 My  concern here is with  providing an ethical account of the use of health 
incentives quite generally. This means that  I am concerned with a  whole range 
of behaviours that  could be targeted by  health  incentives, both those ‘lifestyle’ 
behaviours which can have an impact on health, and decisions relevant to health 
that are enacted less frequently. Inevitably, pursuing this greater breadth of 
discussion will restrict  the extent to which I am able to consider specific cases in 
more detail.  It  will, however, be necessary  to examine the ethical implications of 
a given incentive scheme more closely  prior to implementation. This thesis is 
intended to be a ‘first look’ at  the ethics of incentives, and certainly  not the last 
word. Such  an account  can hope only  to provide some indication of the 
permissibility  of incentives quite generally, and to serve as a  framework for 
further consideration of specific health incentive interventions.
 This analysis of the ethical issues relating to the use of incentives is 
situated within a wider  project to consider  the larger question of if and when it 
is right to use health incentives. This research  operates under the auspices of the 
‘Centre for  the Study  of Incentives in Health’ (CSI Health),  and is a collaborative 
project with  a  core team of philosophers, health psychologists and behavioural 
economists, with wider  links to researchers from  other disciplines. Through  the 
psychology  and economics strands of CSI Health, research is conducted into 
how effective incentives are at altering behaviour; what incentives are effective; 
what behaviours are amenable to influence through  incentives; the mechanisms 
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by  which incentives encourage behaviour  change; the ‘spillover’ effects of using 
incentives to alter  behaviour; lay  assessments of the acceptability  of health 
incentives; and more.
 In order to most effectively  contribute to the research objectives of CSI 
Health, as well as to establish some necessary  limitations on scope, this thesis 
will be restricted to considering positive, personal,  conditional, financial, 
health incentives.
 Positive here indicates that incentives should be true ‘incentives’ and not 
‘disincentives’; rewards rather than punishments. As will become apparent in 
Chapter  Four, on occasion this distinction is not easy  to make. For the most 
part, however,  it is relatively  straightforward to focus only  on schemes which 
seek to reward healthy  behaviours rather than those punishing unhealthy 
behaviours.  The same focus on positive rather  than  negative incentives is 
adopted by  the empirical research conducted within the other strands of CSI 
Health.
 Personal identifies those incentives which are paid directly  to the 
individual whose behaviour is subject to change. This rules out incentives paid 
to healthcare professionals for  meeting targets, or to retail organisations for 
selling healthier  products,  and so on. Incentives can operate at  the level of third 
parties, and such incentives would carry  with  them  their own range of ethical 
(as well as empirical) issues. However,  this thesis (and the work of CSI Health 
generally) is not primarily concerned with third party incentives.
 By  conditional I mean to refer  to incentives that are offered prior to a 
behaviour change being enacted, and are given to the individual only  once she 
has successfully  altered her behaviour.  The behaviour change required for  the 
incentive to be paid should be sufficiently  specific, and the conditions for 
determining successful behaviour change should be established when the offer 
of the incentive is made.1 There are schemes which offer  ‘incentives’ intended to 
encourage healthier behaviour, such as providing grocery  vouchers to pregnant 
women in the hope of encouraging healthier  eating. I will not  consider the ethics 
of schemes like these,  where the incentive is not conditional upon a  behaviour 
change.
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1  Often, participants must be weighed, pass  a breath test, or similar in order to show they have 
met the conditions of incentive payment.
 The focus on  financial incentives is rather more flexible: whilst some 
incentive schemes provide cash payment or  other direct monetary  transfers, 
many  use gift vouchers, lottery  tickets, or other kinds of rewards. However, all 
of the incentives considered should have some identifiable monetary  value. This 
would rule out ‘incentive’ schemes where the reward takes the form of praise or 
winning a competition (with no distinct prize) or similar.
 Finally,  I am interested in health incentives. Once again, this still allows 
quite a lot  of breadth in  terms of the behaviours potentially  included, as a 
diverse array  of activities can have an impact on health. For instance, level of 
education and qualifications attained may  influence occupation, income, and 
other factors which are known to play  a role in an individual’s expected health 
outcomes. Moreover,  there are incentive schemes that target education-related 
behaviours such as reading and school attendance, and so which can plausibly 
be understood to have an impact on health. However,  I am more concerned with 
those schemes that are implemented primarily  as a means of improving health, 
and where the behaviour  change and the health effect are more directly 
connected.
 It  is worth pointing out  one further, notable exclusion: that of taxation. It 
has become quite common for states to impose greater  taxes on unhealthy  items 
or activities that they  might wish  to discourage, and similarly  to reduce taxes on 
healthy  things. Tax breaks on healthy  foods, for  example, could act as an 
incentive for  buying them  (saving an identifiable sum of money).  Although 
taxation,  as a  means of encouraging healthy  behaviour, would provide an 
interesting subject for ethical appraisal, I do not consider it in this thesis.
 In terms of the geo-political location of this thesis, I do not set out to 
restrict my  focus too narrowly  on either  the UK or the NHS case. Incentives can 
and have been used quite widely, targeting different populations and provided 
by  a range of institutions (see for  example Nglazi et al. [2012]; Lagarde et  al. 
[2009]; Reilly  et al. [2000]). It is true, however, that this thesis is likely  to have 
most relevance to the use of incentives within the healthcare system of the UK. 
Most of the examples I use come from the UK, and the analysis of media 
reporting of incentives was conducted using UK media sources. This means that 
the issues dealt  with  in  this thesis are directed by  British concerns. This need 
not preclude applicability  to other domains, however, where relevant 
similarities are shared. An exclusion, perhaps, exists where it  is directly  relevant 
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that incentives are provided by  a socialised healthcare system, such  as the NHS 
(in particular, when considering concerns relating to desert,  fairness,  and 
solidarity, for instance). At other times, criticisms and arguments may  be 
applicable in a wider range of contexts.
 Not only  may  the issues addressed in this thesis have a UK bias, but  the 
approach to analysing them will be similarly  coloured by  my  own bias as a 
philosopher  from the UK (in terms of both citizenship and training).  I can only 
accept  this, and regret that  I am ill-equipped to conduct research that would be 
able to better represent the diverse concerns of others (in particular, those 
whose concerns may  go systematically  under-represented in bioethical 
research).
THE ETHICAL CONCERNS RAISED BY HEALTH INCENTIVES
An example of a health  incentive would be a scheme where an individual is 
given £10 worth of grocery  vouchers at  the end of each week that she 
successfully  meets some pre-specified weight  loss target.  This scheme could run 
for a number of weeks,  the weight loss targets might  be altered, and the size of 
the incentive might vary  over  the course of the scheme. In another case, a health 
incentive could involve a  one-off payment, say, £5 in cash  to an  individual who 
returns a completed chlamydia testing kit.
 In Appendix A, I provide a  number of examples of incentive schemes that 
have been operational in the past  or which are currently  active. Throughout this 
thesis, I also use invented incentive schemes as examples to illustrate my  points. 
Sometimes this is useful,  as the ‘real life’ schemes are more limited in variety 
and often  more complex than examples I would wish to use. Although I am 
interested in real world effects, and wish for  the content of this thesis to be 
applicable in practical contexts, it  will sometimes be helpful to work at a  certain 
level of abstraction. Since I do not intend to draw firm  conclusions about any 
particular schemes here, little is lost by  using invented (as well as real world) 
examples.
 Health incentives such as these are typically  quite controversial, and 
often treated with a  mixture of suspicion and hostility. Health incentives can be 
referred to in terms of ‘paying people to be healthy,’ or sometimes ‘bribing 
people to be healthy.’ Emotive language in popular media and academic 
treatments of incentives suggests a level of discomfort  with the idea of using 
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money  as a  direct tool of healthcare intervention (see for  example Shaw  [2007]; 
The Mirror  [2009]). This discomfort may  stem  from a range of factors, 
including misunderstanding as well as a lack of familiarity  with health 
incentives,  and it  may  seem  rather spurious once considered more closely. 
However,  such negativity  may  also result from  more robust moral concerns with 
the appropriateness of using health incentives.
 My  approach  in this thesis will be to offer  a largely  ‘negative’ account of 
health incentives, considering in turn each of a  number of lines of criticism  of 
incentives.  My  project  is to see if incentives can be defended against these 
criticisms, and to consider the extent to which such critiques provide good 
reasons for thinking that  incentives shouldn’t be used as a  method of healthcare 
intervention.  This approach contrasts with providing a more ‘positive’ account 
which would set out to develop an account  of health incentives and provide an 
argument in favour of their use.
 I have chosen to structure the thesis in this way  because I wish  to treat 
health incentives just as another  form  of healthcare intervention, and to assess 
them  as such. Language of ‘paying’ or ‘bribing’ people to be healthy, and a  focus 
on money  and non-medicalised settings, distances incentives from  their role 
within healthcare. However, health incentives are directed quite specifically  at 
improving health. Just as the efficacy  of healthcare interventions should be 
judged against the efficacy  of other healthcare interventions intended to have 
similar effects, the ethical analysis of health incentives should be done in a  way 
compatible with  other forms of healthcare intervention. For the most part, 
healthcare interventions need little positive justification over  and above cost-
efficacy  (relative to other interventions). This will not always be the case, but it 
is likely  that an ethical assessment  of a healthcare intervention will take this 
‘negative’ form.
 Such an approach to analysing the ethics of health  incentives will 
necessarily  be limited in the conclusions it can draw. At most, a negative 
account of this form could conclude that there are no convincing ethical 
objections to the use of health  incentives, which is by  no means the same as 
concluding that health  incentives should or  must be used. What is left out are 
debates about the priority  of tackling particular health problems; rationing 
debates; efficacy  and cost-effectiveness concerns; wider  political significance of 
interventions; and so on. Such factors would need to be considered,  in the 
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context of current healthcare provision, in order to provide a judgement as to 
whether, in fact, health incentives should be used. My  project is more 
circumscribed, and I do not attempt to answer the much more demanding 
question of whether a positive account for incentives can be provided here.
It  may  strike the reader  that this thesis draws upon a rather eclectic range of 
literature,  and, on occasion, seems to venture into the territories of other 
disciplines. There are a number of reasons for  this. First, the range of issues 
with  health incentives (all of them  ethically  relevant) cover a wide range of 
topics.  Although this thesis is far  from a comprehensive consideration of health 
incentives,  I do wish it to be reasonably  broad, and to deal with a good number 
of these issues.
 Relatedly, I have used the popular media as a ‘way  in’ to the arguments 
concerning health  incentives (Chapters One and Two). I have combined this 
with  a more traditional philosophical approach, considering the kinds of 
concerns that typically  arise in relation to the ethics of healthcare interventions. 
By  starting with the media, however, I hope to address some concerns that 
might otherwise be overlooked (or perhaps, more minimally,  to lend such 
concerns slightly  more consideration). Those contributing to the media have 
rather less respect for disciplinary  boundaries than the academy  might have, 
and hence, in considering some of these issues, it has been necessary  to move 
beyond the philosophical literature.
 This piece of research, as mentioned, is also intended to complement the 
wider research of CSI Health. It also makes sense, therefore, to integrate some 
of the strands of research  from health psychology  and behavioural economics 
into this thesis. Untrained in these subjects as I am, I cannot do full justice to 
the complexity  of the scientific theories at work and the research  conducted. 
However,  I think it would be a shame not to incorporate (and at  least 
acknowledge) some of the important work being done in these disciplines which 
is also contributing to the wider question of the appropriateness of using 
incentives to encourage healthy  behaviour. It  is my  conviction that an ethical 
analysis of this sort  will be helpfully  informed by  a sensitivity  to these wider 
issues.
 Finally,  I wish for this research to have at  least some potential for  
practical application. This means that my  approach to considering the range of 
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criticisms of health incentives has always sought  to be responsive to ordinary 
notions of morality  and acceptability. One possibility  for  writing this thesis 
would have been to adopt a very  specific philosophical framework and then set 
about assessing the legitimacy  of health incentives from  this perspective. For 
instance, one might lay  out a theory  of virtue ethics and then look to understand 
the impact that  using health incentives could have on the capacity  for people to 
develop virtuous characters.
 I have not done this. Such a method of researching this subject may  well 
turn out  some interesting results, and provide new  ways of looking at  the issues. 
However,  as a ‘first look’ it  seems to me that it will be more profitable to retain a 
degree of flexibility, and to be rather more relaxed about the kinds of 
philosophical theories used to assess arguments relating to incentives. Further, 
it  would seem a rather arbitrary  choice to select a  single theory  from  which to 
assess incentives, as I have no settled position on what ethical theory  would 
make the most useful starting point for this research.
 That said, I certainly  have more sympathy  with some philosophical 
traditions than others. In my  quest to provide an account of incentives that is 
both plausible and as close to what I feel is ‘right’ as possible, I do seek to 
selectively  apply  theory  which I feel will be most constructive.  Where this is 
done, I have tried to be clear and to provide sufficient  background information 
on the theory  or theories used so as to make the analysis intelligible. The slight 
fudging I indulge in with regard to the theoretical framework of the thesis as a 
whole is intended to avoid alienating readers with a range of different 
philosophical inclinations. I hope I do not lose too much by  way  of philosophical 
rigour in this pursuit of applicability and acceptability.
TRADE-TYPE AND AID-TYPE INCENTIVES
It  is worth saying a little more at this stage about incentives as they  relate to the 
different disciplinary  motivations for  employing them, as mentioned earlier. 
This is the different thinking that I have connected to the economic and 
psychological approaches to behaviour change.  In the first case, we may  think of 
the incentive as an extra inducement to make one behaviour  more appealing 
than it previously  was, in the hope of altering an individual’s preferences and 
getting her to change her behaviour. Where an incentive takes this form, I shall 
describe it as a trade-type incentive, for it acts as an economic trade.
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 In the second case, the incentive acts to support an individual who 
already  wishes to change her behaviour, to successfully  do so. Often, agents 
suffer  from time-inconsistent preferences, and impulsive desires may  override 
more considered, ‘cool-headed’ decisions about  how one would prefer to act. 
Incentives can act here to aid individuals to act  more consistently  with  their 
healthier  preferences. Incentives operating in this way  shall be described as aid-
type incentives.
 This is a distinction that comes in part from different approaches to 
bringing about behaviour change (persuading people to change versus 
supporting them  to do so), and in part from different ways of describing 
incentives (paying people to be healthy  versus a healthcare intervention). At this 
level of specification,  it can be difficult  to distinguish instances of trade-type and 
aid-type incentives: the incentive provider’s intentions may  not be fully 
developed, and agents receiving incentives may  have some but not much 
motivation to alter their  behaviour (meaning it is not  clear  whether incentives 
act to induce or  support  them). It is further unclear if facts about the incentive 
itself can help determine whether it acts as a trade or an aid.
 Yet the difficulty  with  drawing this distinction need not mean it is 
specious, nor  should it undermine its relevance to an account of the ethics of 
health incentives. It may  be more useful to think in  terms of a spectrum, with 
health incentives being more or  less trade- or aid-type. One of the key  features 
distinguishing these different sorts of incentives will be the psychological effect 
on the recipient (whether they  experience the incentive as a  trade or an aid),  yet 
this will be difficult  to assess.  There will, however,  be other more accessible 
indicators that could help determine where an incentive should lie on the 
spectrum.
 As the thesis develops,  so too will this distinction between trade- and aid-
type incentives become more fleshed out, along with  the significance of this 
distinction to an ethical appraisal of health  incentives. It  will not be particularly 
helpful, at this point, to try to say more about this distinction.
STRUCTURE
The discussion in this thesis will proceed as follows.  In the next two chapters I 
will consider health incentives and the media. Chapter  One provides some 
background theory  on the nature of news media content, and how  this might 
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relate to public attitudes regarding incentives. I suggest that there will be value 
to be gained from  looking at the arguments appearing in media  publications 
relating to the use of health incentives. I also note that there will be limitations 
to what the media can usefully  tell us. In  Chapter  Two, I discuss the arguments 
for and against incentives identified in a media analysis conducted by  Parke et 
al. (2011) in collaboration with CSI Health (and included in Appendix B).
 Beginning with  the arguments extracted from the media, I identify  a 
number of more general themes of criticism relating to incentives. It  is these 
themes which  I then take as the basis for the substantive consideration of the 
ethics of incentives in the remaining chapters. These themes relate to the 
efficiency  and efficacy  of health incentives; coercion and other forms of pressure 
placed on the recipient; worries that incentives do not  respect principles of 
fairness and desert; and the potential for  values that we care about to be 
corrupted.
 Thus, Chapter  Three focusses on some issues which typically  arise in the 
arena of political philosophy. I begin by  considering  efficiency  and efficacy  and 
the sorts of requirements that should be made of a  state-provided healthcare 
system. This leads me to discuss the legitimacy  of perfectionist  policies and 
whether  the use of health incentives oversteps the limits of acceptable state 
action. On this theme of political responsibility, I briefly  consider some 
distributive issues relating to incentives,  given that the just  distribution of 
resources in society is one of the main requirements of a state.
 Chapter  Four  refocuses the discussion onto the individual and the 
potential for  health  incentives to have a harmful impact  on recipients. This 
relates to the pressure placed on agents to change their behaviour, and the kind 
of influence incentives exert over  recipients. My  main concern here is with the 
kind and degree of pressure placed on the agent’s will, and whether this is likely 
to undermine her capacity  for  free, autonomous action. I begin this chapter  with 
a consideration of coercion, and the typical features of this form  of influence. 
After developing an account of coercion and applying it to the case of incentives, 
I move on to look at other means of influence: persuasion, manipulation, and 
nudging. I provide an analysis of how incentives can be thought to invoke such 
means of influence over recipients, and the extent to which this should be 
thought  problematic. In  doing so, I introduce some theory  from  social 
psychology  relating to the operation of two separate systems of behavioural 
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control within  humans. Some understanding of such mechanisms of human 
psychology  are helpful for philosophical considerations of autonomy  in general, 
as well as being useful for the particular case of how  incentives influence 
behaviour.
 Chapter  Five responds to concerns that health  incentives are unjust, 
focussing on one particular aspect of justice: the principle of desert. This 
discussion relates to criticisms that agents in receipt  of incentives are not 
deserving of these kinds of rewards. In considering this criticism, I discuss the 
requirements for agents to be thought to ‘deserve’ praise or  blame, and the 
particular form of treatment that follows from  such ascriptions of desert. I 
present some of the psychological and sociological literature which  seeks to 
describe the underlying mechanisms that control lifestyle choices and health-
related behaviour, as well as to explain the trends of health  outcomes seen 
across different  populations within the UK. I argue that this research has 
relevance to the assessment of the responsibility  of agents for  their  lifestyles, 
and the extent to which it is appropriate to blame them for poor lifestyle-related 
health outcomes they may suffer.
 The penultimate chapter  considers criticisms that health incentives can 
corrupt  values we find important in the process of seeking to improve health. 
These criticisms tend to be rather vaguely  characterised, and so I spend some 
time trying to identify  the conditions under which corruption is thought to 
occur, and how and why  it is supposed to occur.  Related to these worries that 
incentives can corrupt are arguments about  the potential for external rewards to 
undermine motivation  and to have a  deleterious impact on desirable (healthy) 
behaviours.  This chapter also provides a brief discussion of some of the claims 
from research within behavioural economics (for  the most part) on motivation 
crowding theory, and the extent to which we should worry  that incentives could 
have perverse effects on health behaviour.
 In the final chapter I summarise the key  points from  the earlier  
discussions,  and draw some overall conclusions about the power  of the 
criticisms of incentives considered here. I indicate how  these general 
conclusions could be developed and applied in more specific cases, but 
emphasise how the particular context of a given incentive scheme, provider, or 
recipient must be taken into account in order to make an assessment of the 
ethical justifiability of a particular use of health incentives.
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ONE
THE MEDIA PART I: THEORY AND PUBLIC OPINION
INTRODUCTION
I wish  to begin this discussion of health incentives by  first  considering what the 
‘ethical concerns’ with this form of intervention include. Hence, in these early 
chapters, I intend to survey  what  criticisms are to be made of incentives.  One 
source of these criticisms is the media: a number of articles have been written 
about the use of incentives to alter  health behaviour, and the potential for 
healthcare policy  to incorporate incentives into treatment programmes. An 
analysis of print media articles about incentives was conducted by  Parke et al. 
(2011), identifying articles reporting on the use of incentives, the ‘for’ and 
‘against’ arguments featuring in  those articles, and how these relate to the 
incentive schemes being  discussed. Further data were gathered on the target 
readership (i.e. whether the media  was directed towards an expert or  lay 
audience) and what sources were used in the articles (for example, government 
spokespeople, incentive scheme participants, healthcare professionals, and so 
forth).
 In the next chapter, I will make considerable use of this media analysis,  
giving a little more detail on each of the arguments extracted from  the media. 
For  ease of reference, I have included a copy  in  Appendix B. 2 The arguments 
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2 As one of the named authors on  the article, I should also briefly  explain  my contribution  to the 
paper, which mainly consisted in assisting with the introductory section, as well  as  some general 
input to the rest of the article at the writing up stage.
identified in the media have a significance of their own (as I will discuss in this 
chapter) and they  also serve as a  starting point  for the subsequent discussion of 
the ethics of health  incentives. The rest of this thesis is not structured around 
the media arguments narrowly, but rather considers more general ‘themes’ that 
relate to (and are largely derived from) these arguments.
 As a  prelude to this, in  the present chapter I wish to look more generally  
at the significance of the media and what philosophical interest  it  holds. First of 
all, I describe how the media may  act as a source of arguments from  which to 
draw upon for  the present ethical analysis. Next, I go on to give some 
description of how the particular forces acting upon media copy  shape its 
content. Specifically, I discuss some of the theory  that proposes how  media 
content comes to resemble public opinion. The potential to use the media  as a 
proxy  for public opinion means that the arguments relating to health incentives 
which feature in the press may be of special interest.
A SOURCE OF ARGUMENTS
The media may  hold an interest  simply  as a source of arguments.  In the case of 
incentives,  the media features a  good deal of discussion and debate about 
whether  or  not the use of health incentives is a wise idea. This means that a 
variety  of criticisms and defences of incentives are made, employing  differing 
degrees of clarity, reason, reliable evidence, prejudice, politics, and common 
sense.
 There are other  ways of coming up with arguments about incentives: one 
could attempt to read all of the relevant academic literature and see what 
arguments have previously  been made that might be pertinent to the case of 
incentives.  Or one could survey  commuters outside Bethnal Green underground 
station  and ask them what they  think of the use of health incentives. One might 
instead begin with some sort of ‘fundamental moral principles’ (justice and 
liberty  might be suitable candidates), and then evaluate incentives as they  relate 
to such principles.
 Different methods will  extract different  arguments, by  accessing 
information from a variety  of lay  and expert individuals with different interests, 
prior  assumptions, reasoning processes, and so forth. Some of these methods 
will seem more appropriate than others. For  example, one might argue that 
picking random  ‘ethical issues’ out of a hat is more likely  to provide toothless 
20
inapplicable arguments than would arise from  consulting professional 
philosophers.  It is often interesting to consider  the forces acting  to introduce 
certain arguments into the debate: political, personal, and business interests 
may play a role, for instance.
 A consideration of health  incentives that was tightly  focused on the 
media would surely  need to provide an account of such  contextual forces. 
However,  my  concern seeks to consider the applicability  of criticisms to health 
incentives and focuses more on the philosophical issues than the sociological 
ones.  My  use of the media as a source of arguments is thus rather more shallow 
than it might be, and the arguments and themes of argument  extracted from the 
media are quite abstracted from this original setting in the subsequent 
discussion I provide. It will, however, still be worth  indicating a few  of the 
reasons for  thinking that starting with the media is a potentially  useful ‘way  in’ 
to discussing the ethics of health incentives.
Alexander Brown suggests that using the public as a source of arguments helps 
to avoid the pitfalls of relying upon the philosopher’s limited imagination:
Although  philosophers are adept at identifying  and clarifying  principles of 
morality, they  can’t  be expected to dream  up every  idea.  Opinion surveys 
may  provide invaluable insights into principles not  yet on  the philosopher’s 
radar.
Brown (2009: 113)
As Brown points out here, extracting the ‘data’ from the public realm  means 
some arguments that are often overlooked by  academic philosophers, but which 
are nevertheless of importance, come to light.
One might approach arguments in the media in two ways:
1.  Media Arguments should be ‘privileged’ above Non-Media Arguments;
2. Media  Arguments should be treated in exactly  the same way  as Non-Media 
Arguments.
I intend ‘privilege’ to mean simply  ‘give special weight to’ or ‘pay  particular 
attention to’.  Claim  2. is based upon an assumption that arguments are of 
significance only  insofar as they  are are well-reasoned, well-founded, applicable 
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to the case in hand, valid, and so on. That is, features of arguments that exist 
independent of their provenance. In this case, there is no sense in treating 
arguments that arise frequently  in the media  any  differently  from  how one 
would treat arguments that never appear in the media.
 Claim  1. holds a different assumption: the provenance of an argument 
does (at  least sometimes) have a relevance to how  we should assess that 
argument.  Specifically, here the suggestion is that  there will be some added 
value to be gained by  paying special attention to those arguments that arise in 
the media  relative to those arguments absent from the media.
 I will argue that  there is something distinct  about Media Arguments 
which relates both to how  they  come into being (why  they  appear in the media 
in  the first place), and to their  subsequent role in the public domain. For 
political reasons, Media Arguments often will be privileged over Non-Media 
Arguments, and this is to some extent justifiable on both pragmatic and 
principled grounds. Given that  we are concerned with evaluating the merits of 
prospective action which will have a number of practical effects on the world,  it 
is worthwhile lending some special consideration to what the media might be 
able to offer by way of a contribution to the discussion of health incentives.
The news media looks like a  promising (and plentiful) source of arguments, with 
a wide range of outlets producing copy  on a range of subjects of public interest. 
It  is, however, worth remembering the process by  which a  body  of arguments 
present in the media develops, as this will affect what is present and what is 
absent. It  is mostly  the actions of journalists and editors which  are responsible 
for determining what stories will get reported and the way  in  which  this is done. 
Depending on the publication,  this may  tend to exclude the most nonsensical, 
wacky, trivial and irrelevant arguments, whilst keeping the relatively  sensible 
and apposite. Alternatively,  journalistic and editorial influence may  have quite 
the opposite effect. Certainly, some outlets typically  favour more frivolous 
stories; tales of celebrity  scandal which lend themselves to attention-grabbing 
headlines and salacious accompanying images.  It  would certainly  be too 
optimistic to suppose that journalism either attempts or succeeds in capturing 
only and all the most pertinent arguments.
 In an ideal world, perhaps, published arguments would be subjected to 
additional scrutiny, challenged and countered, supported and bolstered by 
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engaged readers, interested parties,  experts, and other  journalists. The most 
resilient arguments would withstand the challenges directed at them, and be 
repeated and expanded upon, whilst  the weaker  arguments would tend to 
disappear from the coverage.
 However,  the interests of one providing an ethical account of health 
incentives and the interests of those involved in the production of media will 
often diverge. Attributes of a ‘good’ story  for a journalist may  include being 
emotive, simple to grasp, and polemical. After  all, a  large concern for  the 
journalistic industry  is selling  papers and communicating news items in a 
concise, engaging format.  It  is understandable for  news providers to thus hold a 
preference for stories at the wackier  end of the spectrum, over duller,  more 
measured arguments.  Without being too cynical about the motives of those 
involved in the production of news media, or  creating a caricatured image of the 
readership as demanding ever-more simplistic,  sensationalist media, it  does 
seem  that  inevitably  those stories (and styles of journalism) able to grab 
attention and sell more newspapers will be preferentially  published. This 
tendency  will,  however, be tempered by  the professional duties of those in the 
industry  to present  a  reasonably  accurate, balanced picture, and to report high 
quality stories that are of public interest.
PUBLIC PROMINENCE
In addition to acting as a  ‘selective pool’ of arguments,  the media plays a 
significant role in public life. Those arguments frequently  appearing in press 
coverage gain more exposure than those that are absent.  The very  act  of 
reporting some arguments gives them a status not bestowed upon other 
arguments. The public nature of the popular press means that the state will be 
expected to be aware of, and responsive to, high profile arguments in  the media. 
Government response,  or lack thereof, to media arguments may  be used to 
make general assumptions about leaders’ flexibility  and responsiveness to 
criticism. The extent to which the government acknowledges what arises in the 
media reporting of an issue may  be seen as indicative of the sensitivity  of the 
government to public opinion (or just external opinion) on the matter.
 Consider: it would probably  be unfair for  me to expect Jeremy  Hunt to 
respond to the specific problems I have come up with about his reforms to the 
NHS, as I have never  voiced these concerns to him. I might, however, fairly 
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criticise his lack of response to concerns that have been widely  reported, given 
that he should surely  be aware of those concerns. One way  for me to evaluate 
Hunt’s receptiveness to critical opinion is to look at the alacrity  with which he 
responds to the arguments raised in the media.
 It  is thus important for  policy  makers to be seen to be responsive to 
arguments present in  the media. This relates to the perceived legitimacy  of 
those in positions of power. It  need not relate to the most urgent actual 
concerns people (the public) have about a particular  issue, nor the most 
philosophically  interesting. However, political pragmatism means that 
arguments arising more frequently  in media coverage will likely  come to receive 
more attention from those in power.
A MIRROR AND A MOULD
Another  reason for privileging Media Arguments over  Non-Media  Arguments is 
if media content is representative of public opinion. In this case, by  lending 
special attention to those arguments arising in the media, one is able to elevate 
those concerns more important to the general public. This will have value 
insofar as one wishes one’s analysis to be responsive to the opinions of the 
general public.  However, the extent to which the media tracks public opinion is 
debatable.  I now intend to introduce some of the theory  which describes how 
media content  can act as a proxy  for  public opinion. Later in this chapter  I will 
question the value such ‘public opinion’ holds for ethical analyses such as this.
 Two lines of explanation have been posited for  describing how media 
content and public opinion can come to resemble one another. These are the 
‘mirror’ and ‘mould’ theories which I will briefly  describe below. There is also a 
sense in which we might take public opinion  to be that which is measured by 
media analyses,  opinion polls, and the like.  This social constructivist approach 
will also be discussed following  the Mirror  and Mould sections. This approach 
assumes that ‘Media Opinion’ (public opinion as derived from an analysis of 
media content) and ‘Public Opinion’ (a phenomenon defined by  the mental 
states of individuals) are one and the same.  For  now, however, I shall treat 
Media Opinion and Public Opinion as though they  are two separate, non-
synonymous entities.
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Mirror?
[T]he often  overlooked impact of audiences on media  content suggests the 
ability  of media  to reflect public  sentiment... Media  analysis in  many  ways 
provides a useful alternative to traditional public opinion measures
Danjoux (2007: 8)
Some theorists have explored how  public opinion is reproduced in the media.  It 
is proposed that audiences actively  seek out  media that presents messages that 
are in accordance with their own established views.  This produces an incentive 
for media providers to create content that resembles public opinion. Providers 
seek to establish themselves as “endorsing a particular  set  of values that 
reinforces [the] audience’s self-perception.” (Danjoux [2007: 14]) Additionally, 
advertisers paying for  space in media publications will not  wish to be associated 
with  an outlet  that is at odds with the views of its own customers. Hence, it is 
proposed, media providers create material that reflects public opinion: such 
theorists describe the media as a ‘mirror’ for public opinion.
 A number of authors argue that media providers have become very  adept 
at reproducing public opinion. The success of this mirroring  enterprise, it  is 
argued, is apparent in the tendency  of politicians to use media  analyses, rather 
than opinion polls, to gauge public attitudes (Growing [1994]; Powlick [1995]).
Mould?
Others argue that the media not only  reflects public opinion, but  also plays a 
significant role in moulding it.  Gerbner  (1998), for  example, describes how 
‘cultivation analysis’ can help identify  the influence of television viewing on 
audience attitudes. This is done by  looking at differences in the opinions held by 
‘light’ and ‘heavy’ viewers.3  Gerbner  proposes his research shows that people 
who watch a lot  of television tend to score higher on the ‘mean world index,’ 
which rates to what extent individuals consider  people in general to be not 
altruistic, to be untrustworthy, and to be ‘out for  themselves.’ Heavy  viewers 
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3 What is counted as ‘light’ and ‘heavy’ television  viewing is determined on a  sample-by-sample 
basis, to achieve a roughly  even  three-way split between  those who watch  the least (‘light’) 
television, the most (‘heavy’) and those who watch an  intermediate amount (‘medium’) (Gerbner 
[1998: 181]).
also score more highly  on a ‘sexism scale’ (are more likely  to hold prejudicial 
and negative attitudes towards women, supposedly  due to exposure to more 
stereotyped presentations of women) (Gerbner [1998: 185-186]).
 If media can affect opinion in the way  described by  Gerbner, then those 
creating news media have the capacity  to significantly  influence the opinions of 
consumers.  McCombs and Shaw (1972) describe how  this may  have an impact 
on the reporting of political campaigns:
In  choosing and displaying  news,  editors,  newsroom  staff, and broadcasters 
play  an  important  part  in  shaping  political reality.  Readers learn  not  only 
about  a  given issue, but also how  much importance to attach  to that  issue 
from the amount of information in a news story and its position.
McCombs and Shaw (1972: 176)
In this domain, it  is argued that media reporting is likely  to be the only  source of 
information to which most people have access.4  McCombs and Shaw present 
evidence to support the ‘agenda-setting’ role played by  the media. One example 
is the correlation between “the emphasis placed on different campaign issues by 
the media (reflecting  to a  considerable degree the emphasis by  candidates) and 
the judgments of voters as to the salience and importance of various campaign 
topics.” (1972: 181)
 Alternative explanations for  such correlations include the possibility  that 
both the media and the voters are responding to the same events,  or  that the 
media is mimicking their  audience (recall the mirror theory).  However, the 
authors argue that the lack of availability  of other information outlets makes it 
unlikely  that both  groups are responding to the same events, and that 
“numerous studies indicate a sharp divergence between the news values of 
professional journalists and their  audiences, [thus] it would be remarkable to 
find a near perfect fit in this one case.” (1972: 185)5
 The development and introduction of new  health interventions could well 
be another domain where the media  is responsible for  a  significant proportion 
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4  I suspect that this is increasingly untrue (the McCombs and Shaw study  was published in 
1972), given the growing importance of  online information sources  created by non-professionals 
(Twitter and other blogging sites, for instance).
5  Note that this last criticism, and the response given by  McCombs and Shaw, could equally 
apply to the ‘mirror’ theory of media content.
of the information available to the public.  This ‘agenda-setting’ function of the 
media could therefore be influential in determining the public response to such 
initiatives.
Mixture?
The mirror and mould theories outlined above are not mutually  exclusive: it is 
possible for both these effects to operate simultaneously  to influence media 
content and public opinion.
 Van Gorp (2007) discusses the significance of ‘framing’ in the production 
and reception of media. In this context, ‘framing’ is described as a “bridging 
concept between cognition and culture” (Van Gorp [2007: 2]):
Framing  refers,  on  the one hand, to the typical  manner in  which journalists 
shape news content  within  a  familiar  frame of reference and according to 
some latent  structure of meaning  and,  on  the other  hand, to the audience 
who adopts these frames and sees the world in  a similar  way  as the 
journalists do.
Van Gorp (2007: 61)
On some definitions, frames can be found in  a variety  of locations (such  as in 
people’s minds, or in  the media content itself). Van Gorp emphasises the 
connection frames have with  culture. He argues that shared culture, and thus 
shared cultural frames, play  an important part  in determining meaning and 
what counts as knowledge within a  group. Accordingly, it  is claimed that frames 
can be used to craft a particular meaning for a media story:
[B]ecause frames are  part  of culture,  the actual frame is not encompassed in 
media  content.  The text  and the frame must  be seen  as independent from 
one another.  Both  the attribution  of meaning  to media  content  and the 
connection  with  certain  frames are part of the reading  process...  The 
receivers connect  the framing devices in  a  news story  with  cultural 
phenomena  because they  are already  familiar  with  them. By  implicitly 
suggesting  a  cultural theme,  the frames can  determine which  meaning  the 
receiver  attaches to an  issue...  Because these frames often are unnoticed 
and implicit, their impact is by stealth.
Van Gorp (2007: 63)
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So, media  providers can influence the way  content is interpreted by  implicitly 
associating it with  particular  cultural frames which shape the meaning 
attributed to the content by  the ‘receiver’ (this means the reader, watcher,  or 
listener). This is done through the use of ‘reasoning’ or ‘framing’ devices, 
including  “metaphors, exemplars, descriptions, arguments, and visual 
images.” (Van Gorp [2007: 64])
 Aside from  the frames used by  journalists themselves,  others who are 
featured in media  content (such  as politicians, charity  spokespeople, and so on) 
can seek to apply  ‘advocate frames’ in  order  to shape the way  their messages are 
interpreted. All those involved in the production of media content may  wield 
some influence over the framing, and thus meaning, of that content.
 The power of media providers to direct public opinion is, however, 
limited. Journalists can only  work with the cultural frames in existence: they  do 
not  invent novel frames. It is up to the receiver to associate media content with 
cultural frames, which are only  indicated and hinted at  by  the media  providers 
themselves. Moreover, although frames (as they  exist in culture) are fairly 
stable, the application process is dynamic, and subject to contestation  and 
negotiation on the side of the media  providers and the receivers. Further, it also 
seems that media providers themselves may  not always be so self-aware as to 
consciously  adopt  a particular frame. Journalists are subject to the same 
external influences as the rest  of us, and may  implicitly  grasp at particular 
cultural reference points, and thus encourage the use of a particular frame, 
without realising what they are doing.
Meaning?
In both the mirror and mould theories, it  is assumed that there are two separate 
entities: public opinion as it exists ‘out there’ in  the world, unmeasured and 
independent of attempts to assess it; and public opinion as derived from  media 
content, opinion polls, and whatever  other means we have of gauging it.  The 
former  I will call Public Opinion, the latter  Media  Opinion. As such, the project 
of the mirror  / mould theorists is to explain how Public Opinion and Media 
Opinion come to look so much alike (as it is claimed they  do). The discussion of 
framing also serves to describe the processes acting to bring Public Opinion and 
Media Opinion into alignment.
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 However,  it  is not clear that we know what the Public Opinion is that the 
Media Opinion is claimed to resemble: what is our  ‘gold standard’ of Public 
Opinion, against which we may  judge the similarity  of Media Opinion? Since we 
cannot know Public Opinion without  measuring it, all we can know of Public 
Opinion is what we are able to glean through media  analyses,  opinion polls, and 
so on: those very methods whose application we are seeking to assess.
 It  is argued by  some that the creation, identification, and definition of 
Public Opinion is determined by  our tools of measurement. Osborne and Rose 
(1999) provide a  socio-historical account of how the practice of measuring 
Public Opinion developed,  and how this practice can be understood to have 
created the phenomenon of Public Opinion.
[W]e have to acknowledge that  the notion  of opinion  is the product of the 
particular  procedures by  which  opinion is elicited...  For  clearly  without 
surveys and forms of measurement  we would not  know  of public  opinion  at 
all; we would have no knowledge of what  there is to measure without 
procedures of measurement... More interestingly, we can  observe that 
public opinion is something  that  is demanded by  the very  activity  of asking 
questions in  surveys.  That is,  the existence of questionnaires and surveys 
themselves  promote the idea  that there is a  public  opinion  ‘out  there’ to be 
had and measured.
Osborne and Rose (1999: 387) (emphasis in original)
For  Osborne and Rose (1999: 371) “public opinion exists, at least in the sense 
that it  has a reality  and an efficacy  in the world in  which we live”, and it is this 
‘public opinion’ that is of significance; ‘public opinion’ produced through  a  well-
established research discipline, and which has a pervasive influence on  politics, 
advertising, debate, and so forth.
 In this sense, Public Opinion and Media Opinion are effectively  the same 
thing. The phenomenon we are looking for is created by  the procedures we use 
to measure it, and so the two become synonymous. If we were to accept this 
then we might  take it that  media analyses, as one of the conventional methods 
contributing to the development  of Public Opinion, will be an excellent way  of 
measuring it, and anyone interested in Public Opinion would be wise to pay 
them significant attention.
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 It  seems sensible to say  that there is at least something that  exists,  pre-
measurement, but the reality  of what this is and how we interpret it is heavily 
influenced by  the systems of measurement we have in place. A  telling distinction 
is that drawn between an ‘opinion’ and an ‘attitude.’ The former is “public by 
definition, collective by  design... opinions are things that  people, so to speak, 
project into the public arena”, and moreover  “opinions always themselves relate 
to specifically  public matters”.  Attitudes, in contrast,  are personal things, held 
by  an individual agent, perhaps even to be considered ‘reflexes’ (Osborne and 
Rose [1999: 386]).
 Through practices of Public Opinion measurement individuals become 
proficient  in ‘having opinions,’ and become amenable subjects for public 
opinion researchers.  In this sense,  Public Opinion is something that  exists only 
after  these practices of measurement have become established.  Although 
dependent upon various social institutions for their existence, opinions are 
often not themselves made public. In order to have opinions, we may  need these 
systems of measurement in  place, but it  does not follow that those systems will 
then always succeed in capturing our opinions. Attitudes are something that 
people can hold in the absence of the practice of Public Opinion measurement, 
but will clearly be closely related to opinions.
 We must thus be careful about the terminology  we use when discussing 
these concepts. The phenomenon of Public Opinion, as described by  Osborne 
and Rose (1999) will be very  close to Media Opinion. However, it will not  be 
synonymous with the aggregate of all the opinions held by  members of the 
public, and nor will it  accurately  reflect the attitudes of all those individuals. 
Depending on our reasons for wanting  to know what opinions people hold, we 
may  be more or  less satisfied with the output of media analyses and similar 
tools.
WHY IS PUBLIC OPINION OF INTEREST?
There are numerous reasons why  policy  makers might be interested in public 
opinion. Two such reasons are based on pragmatic and democratic grounds. 
First, it will be pragmatically  useful to know how a new  policy  or intervention is 
likely  to be received by  the citizenry. If a great deal of hostility  is probable, 
perhaps the policy  ought  not  to be implemented at all.  Knowledge of public 
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attitudes may  help politicians to alter policies so that they  are more palatable, or 
introduce them in ways that cause the least upset.
 Second, a democratic government’s legitimacy  is based on the capacity  
for the electorate to express their  preferences through  voting for those they  feel 
will best represent  their interests. Public involvement in policy  is important to 
ensure that elected governments remain sensitive to the attitudes of the public, 
and responsive to (some of) their demands. The practice of voting in  an election 
is itself a  method of assessing Public Opinion, but public involvement in the 
government of the country can go much further than this.6
 Media Opinion will thus not only  provide a useful source of arguments, 
but, to the extent it tracks public opinion,  it may  be of use to policy-makers on 
these pragmatic and democratic grounds. Media Opinion will, however,  have its 
limitations.  As discussed earlier, very  particular processes are involved in 
producing news media, which  shape the discussions taking place and determine 
what arguments relating to incentives will be featured,  and how they  will be 
reported.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
One way  of surveying the arguments relating to incentives is to look at  those 
arising in the news media. I have suggested that the media can act as a ‘pool’ of 
arguments relating to incentives, but that very  particular forces act  to determine 
what arguments make it into media reporting and correspondingly, what 
arguments are left out. Thus, media analyses which describe the contents of 
press reporting  of incentive schemes will give a somewhat skewed 
representation of the possible arguments that might  be made about health 
incentives.
 This ‘skew’ might  have a particular use, however. I summarised some of 
the literature which proposes that Public Opinion and Media Opinion are very 
similar, and on some accounts, the same. Thus, extracting Media Opinion can 
help understand Public Opinion. There are limitations on the extent to which 
Media Opinion might be thought to track Public Opinion, assuming we do not 
adopt a fully  constructivist approach  which takes the two to be equivalent. 
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6  For  an interesting set  of  discussions on  the role of experts and publics in policy-making, see 
Doubleday and Wilsdon (2013).
Imperfect distinctions between ‘publics’ must be drawn, media must be 
processed and interpreted, opinions must be simplified and aggregated into 
more basic viewpoints.
 Despite imperfections resulting from  the processes by  which we extract 
the opinions of individuals from the media, such practices can still help us to 
understand the ‘general mood’ of the public, and provide useful information as 
to how likely  it is that  an intervention will be met with enthusiasm or  hostility. 
Public Opinion expression through media outlets is also a means through which 
democratic processes can operate, and citizens can judge the actions of those in 
power. Media production may  also provide an opportunity  for  those involved in 
creating media content to influence the views of the public, and determine the 
sorts of debates that take place.
 Thus, the media  analysis from  Parke et al. (2011) is interesting both as a 
source of arguments, and as an  indication of Public Opinion. In  the next 
chapter, I will summarise some of the findings from the media analysis, and 
describe the kinds of arguments that  arise regarding incentives. I do not 
structure the remainder of the thesis around these media  arguments strictly, but 
rather, at the end of Chapter Two, I suggest how  these arguments might be 
grouped into more general ‘themes,’ and it  is these themes which I then use as 
the basis for chapters Three to Six.
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TWO
THE MEDIA PART II: ARGUMENTS AND HEALTH INCENTIVES
INTRODUCTION: THE ANALYSIS ANALYSED
This chapter  will  look at the arguments extracted from the media by  Parke et al. 
(2011). A copy  of the full media  analysis is included in  Appendix B for reference. 
First I will introduce the analysis and some of its findings, before looking more 
closely  at the different  arguments identified in the media reporting  on health 
incentives.  The aim of this consideration of arguments in the media is to provide 
a basis for the consideration of ethical objections to the use of incentives to 
encourage healthy  behaviour.  As discussed in the previous chapter, with  some 
caveats,  the media can act  as a pool of arguments, as well as a proxy  for Public 
Opinion. In both these roles,  it may  provide a  useful starting point  for  this 
discussion.
 Parke et al.  (2011) analysed 210 articles which reported on some aspect or  
other of the use of financial incentives to alter  health  behaviour. All of these 
articles appeared either in the print media or online between January  2005 and 
February  2010.  Articles for  inclusion in the analysis were identified using a 
search strategy  that involved inputting different combinations of key  words into 
various databases for  print  and online media. A  full  description of the search 
strategy  can be found in Parke et al. (2011: Appendix  1  [see p. 270 of this 
document]). The articles selected for inclusion were then coded according to a 
number of criteria: the overall tone adopted toward incentives (i.e. favourable / 
unfavourable); the sources referenced (for  example, politicians, charity 
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spokespeople); and the arguments presented in  the article (both ‘for’ and 
‘against’ incentives).
 As reported in the analysis, most  of the articles (58%) adopted a mixed 
attitude towards incentives (were neither  overly  negative nor overly  positive). 
13% of the articles tended to give a more negative picture of incentives, whilst 
the remaining 29% tended to be more positive. The overall positivity  / 
negativity  of the articles varied with regards to the behaviour being targeted by 
the incentive scheme: schemes incentivising weight loss and illicit  drug use 
reduction received more unfavourable reporting, whilst  schemes intended to 
improve the health of pregnant  women received significantly  more favourable 
reporting. In all,  six different types of health behaviour were discussed in the 
articles reporting on incentive schemes: weight  control, health promoting 
behaviour in pregnancy, antipsychotic medication adherence, illicit drug use 
reduction, smoking cessation, and sexually transmitted infection (STI) testing.
 Sources quoted in articles were more often favourable in their  discussion 
of incentives.  Such sources tended to be government spokespeople, public 
health representatives,  services allied to medicine, academics and doctors. 
Sources that were typically  more critical of incentives tended to be opposition 
party  politicians and lobbyist groups (such as the Taxpayer’s Alliance).  Charity 
spokespeople were also quoted in media articles, and tended to be fairly  evenly 
split between support for and opposition to incentives.
 A coding  scheme was developed to identify  the different ‘for’ and ‘against’ 
arguments featuring in the media articles. Each time an argument on the coding 
scheme appeared in  an article it was noted down, and each time a  novel 
argument was found it was added to the coding scheme. This way  a scheme was 
built  that included the different  arguments arising in the articles and their 
frequency. In total, 34  different arguments were identified: 15 ‘for’ and 19 
‘against.’
 The articles were also categorised according to which type(s) of health 
behaviour they  discussed (out of weight control, behaviour in pregnancy, 
antipsychotic medication adherence, drug use reduction, smoking cessation, 
and STI testing, plus some articles which discussed incentive schemes in 
general).  The frequency  of different arguments and the sources included can be 
cross-referenced with the health  behaviour  being targeted by  incentives in each 
case.
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THE ARGUMENTS
The full list  of 34 arguments, with definitions and examples, is provided in the 
appendix of Parke et al.  (2011: Appendix 2 [see pp. 271-275 of this document]). 
The different  arguments, along with the number  of times they  feature, and how 
many different articles they appear in, are given below:
‘For’ Arguments:
Positive Evidence
(130 times; 82 articles)
Financial Burden
(50 times; 34 articles)
Not Novel
(10 times; 10 articles)
Best Interests
(124 times; 94 articles)
Last Resort
(45 times; 32 articles)
Improves Inequality
(9 times; 6 articles)
Prevalence
(117 times; 78 articles)
Benefits Society
(26 times; 19 articles)
Positive
(8 times; 8 articles)
Money Saving
(79 times; 54 articles)
Innovative
(19 times; 15 articles)
No Harm
(3 times; 2 articles)
Disease
(63 times; 47 articles)
Other Organisations
(11 times; 9 articles)
Praise
(2 times; 2 articles)
‘Against’ Arguments:
Better Spent 
(111 times; 61 articles)
Wrong Message 
(19 times; 16 articles)
Health Harm 
(12 times; 7 articles)
Not Long Term 
(46 times; 24 articles)
Encourage 
(18 times; 14 articles)
Dr-Patient Relationship 
(9 times; 9 articles)
Misuse 
(39 times; 29 articles)
Unethical 
(18 times; 13 articles)
Cash Won’t Work 
(6 times; 4 articles)
Bribe 
(33 times; 27 articles)
Responsibility 
(16 times; 11 articles)
Political 
(4 times; 3 articles)
Rewards Unhealthy 
(30 times; 20 articles)
Nanny State 
(12 times; 8 articles)
Universal 
(4 times; 2 articles)
Negative Evidence 
(29 times; 19 articles)
Giveaway 
(10 times; 7 articles)
Stigma 
(1 time; 1 article)
Criticism 
(21 times; 18 articles)
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Parke et al. propose that each of these refers to a distinct argument made in 
relation to health incentives.  I will briefly  go through  each of the arguments in 
turn to give a little detail of what each is about.  Some of these arguments look 
like they  share connected themes. For instance, Negative Evidence and Cash 
Won’t Work both seem to be making a  claim about the efficacy  of incentive 
schemes (or  lack thereof).  Other arguments are concerned with a variety  of 
other features, including justice,  or  with the autonomy  of participants in 
incentive schemes.
 I will seek to draw out some of the themes running through and 
connecting the different  arguments. Often, the discrete arguments as they 
appear  in the media,  as identified in the media  analysis, can be interpreted in 
different ways. As such, a particular phrase could be interpreted as criticising 
(or praising) incentives on more than one basis. In discussing more general 
themes, the significance of close interpretation  of each argument is diminished. 
It  also removes some of the repetition that may  result from discussing each  and 
all of the (sometimes overlapping) media arguments. The effect is also to lessen 
the significance of the provenance of the arguments (i.e.  as appearing in the 
media), and so too,  the extent to which the benefits of looking at such 
arguments (the link to Public Opinion in particular) are seen. However, the 
gains in terms of philosophical coherence, unity  of discussion, and space saving 
I think will compensate for these losses.
 In subsequent chapters, I will expand upon these themes and structure 
the ethical analysis of incentives around them. In this chapter, I mean only  to 
outline the media arguments, rather  than to offer an opinion on the strength or 
otherwise of particular arguments.  Thus, the main ambition of this chapter  is 
mostly  descriptive (though  it also involves a fair  amount of interpretation), 
rather than normative.
In the following, each argument heading is followed by  the definition and the 
press quote as given by  Parke et al. (2011: Appendix  2) to illustrate what is 
meant by that argument.
‘FOR’ ARGUMENTS
36
Positive Evidence
Theory  or  empirical evidence which  suggests the effectiveness of incentives, 
also personal stories of success and ‘experts’ who believe the schemes will 
work.
‘Such schemes  have been used in the U.S. with  research showing 
participants  stay drug-free for twice as  long as  those not taking part in 
incentive schemes’ BBC (website), June 2008.
The most prominent claim  made in this argument relates to the efficacy  of 
incentives: that  incentives actually  work. This can be extended to say  something 
about efficiency, which will depend upon how much it costs to achieve a 
particular outcome through the use of an intervention. If incentives are 
efficacious, then they are potentially an efficient means of improving health.
 This argument  could also involve an implicit claim  about well-being: 
incentives may  be judged effective if they  are shown to produce improvements 
in  the well-being of the participants. This is going further than is implied in this 
argument,  which only  needs some way  of judging efficacy  and need not relate it 
to well-being (for instance, it could be weight loss or life expectancy  or  similar). 
However,  improvements in  well-being are often the implicit, downstream goal 
of health interventions,  and measures such as weight loss and life expectancy 
are often used as a proxy for well-being.
Best Interests
Incentives help people  to do what is in  their  best  interests,  including 
mentions of the health benefits to the individual.
‘The one-off payment is  intended to  help pregnant mums stay fit and 
healthy in the run-up to the birth’ South Wales Echo, April 2009.
The well-being-related theme is more apparent in this argument. Support for 
the Best Interests argument derives from the claim that  people who receive 
health incentives will be made ‘better off,’ which is roughly  the same as 
identifying an increase in well-being.
 Health benefits are mentioned explicitly  as a way  in  which people may  be 
made better off by  incentives, and good health is typically  thought  of as an 
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important  contributor to well-being (health may  also have intrinsic value 
distinct from  its contribution to well-being). However,  incentives could also 
contribute to ‘best interests’ in other ways. Acting in one’s best  interests implies 
acting rationally  and with  an appropriate awareness of the likely  outcomes of 
one’s behaviour. As such, this argument could be praising interventions which 
help people behave rationally, and follow goal-directed, long-term, well-
considered behavioural choices. Such features are often thought important for 
autonomous action.
Prevalence
The prevalence of the health issue is cited.
‘The UK is  in the grip of an obesity epidemic with a quarter of all adults 
and one in five children now obese’ Daily Mail, January 2008.
Although this argument does not make reference to why  incentives are 
preferable to other sorts of intervention directed towards similar ends, it 
emphasises the significance of those ends. One claim  being made here is that 
there are certain  diseases that  have a huge impact on population health, and the 
implicit claim is that such  diseases are deserving of attention. Incentives are one 
possible way of combatting these diseases.
 The significance of the target  disease is also relevant to the potential 
impact of successfully  treating it,  in  terms of efficiency  and economics. 
Targeting diseases of high prevalence will potentially  be an efficient way  of 
allocating scarce resources (assuming that by  combatting such diseases the 
disease burden of society  is reduced more effectively  than by  targeting less 
prevalent ones).
Money Saving
Incentive schemes will save money in the long run, they are cost effective.
‘The trust says  the plan could save  the NHS thousands  of pounds  by 
preventing conditions such as heart disease’ BBC (website), October 2008.
This argument is explicitly  proposing that incentives are cost-effective. This 
means that incentives will be effective at reducing disease for  a  sufficiently  small 
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cost (measured in relation to the best  alternative intervention, or  the cost of not 
treating the disease, or  suchlike). In particular, this argument mentions the long 
term  benefits incentives may  convey, presumably  because they  typically  target 
chronic disease resulting from  lifestyle-related behaviour.  Thus, incentives can 
prevent people from developing diseases that would be costly to treat.
Disease
Disease related to the health  behaviour  is mentioned,  or  more general 
health problems relating to the health behaviour are mentioned.
‘Low  birthweight babies and premature  deliveries  are much more 
common in mothers who smoke’ BBC (website), February 2008.
Once again, this argument is centred around the premise that some disease are 
highly  influential, both in their direct and their indirect effects on individuals. 
This does not specifically  support  the use of incentives to treat those diseases, 
but  rather promotes the use of interventions generally  that  will combat  those 
diseases.
 These claims also relate to efficiency  and well-being: if the diseases 
targeted are highly  significant then the potential impact of interventions 
targeting them  is increased, as is the potential to improve population well-
being.
Financial Burden
Incentives will help relieve some of the financial pressures on the recipient.
‘The financial stress associated with impending motherhood can now  be 
eased by a £190 cash boost for women due to give birth on or after April 6’ 
Belfast Telegraph, January 2009.
This argument seems to relate to well-being in that it  proposes that providing 
incentives to people will make them  better  off by  furnishing them with extra 
resources.  However, it speaks specifically  to the capacity  of incentives to make 
those who are particularly  unfortunate better off. This has significance for ideals 
of equality,  fairness, and distributive justice. There may  be some additional 
‘good’ to be derived from  incentives if they  are capable of ameliorating the 
39
suffering of the worst off in society, and in doing so reduce the gap between the 
wealthiest and the poorest.
Last Resort
Ideal as a last resort, for the hard to engage, disadvantaged and vulnerable.
‘Financial incentives  might be a treatment option for a high-risk  group of 
non-adherent patients  with whom all other interventions  to  achieve 
adherence have failed’ BBC (website), January 2007.
This argument could also relate to fairness and equality, in that it  suggests 
incentives could help a specific group who are often left unaided by  other 
interventions. It could also involve a claim about  well-being: that incentives 
have the capacity  to further improve well-being by  helping a particular 
population of individuals for whom other approaches have failed.
 This argument also makes a  negative claim, which is that other  
interventions have not worked. Part of the support for incentives here is derived 
from the promise they  may  hold as an alternative to other, ineffective 
interventions. It is not necessarily  that  incentives have been shown to be 
effective, but that other interventions have proven not to be.
Benefits Society
Benefits to the rest  of society,  not  just the participant  in  the incentive 
scheme.
‘If it works to  keep people in treatment there would be  considerable 
benefits to the public’ The Daily Telegraph, January 2007.
This argument involves claims about well-being and efficacy. First, using 
incentives to help treat  some individuals may  not  provide only  them with 
benefits, but also others. Making people ‘better  off’ is effectively  improving their 
well-being. Thus incentives could raise overall levels of well-being in society. 
There could also be benefits distinct from well-being that are achieved through 
incentives.  Community  values,  such  as solidarity, may  be hinted at here. Such 
things are not easy to quantify in terms of well-being.
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 As with the Prevalence and Disease arguments,  Benefits Society  
emphasises the scale of the problem and the impact a solution could have. Once 
again, this does not speak directly  to incentives as an intervention, but to all 
effective interventions targeting these same problems.
Innovative
Incentive schemes are a new and innovative idea.
‘This is a very important aspect of Scotland’s  battle for better public  health 
and it is worth being brave and innovative’ The Herald, June 2006.
In and of itself, it is not clear why  an innovative,  different approach  should be 
superior  to more conventional approaches. However,  if it is the case that 
previous approaches to tackling the same problems have failed then it  may 
speak in favour of an intervention that it  is novel, rather than a tweak on 
previous,  failed methods. This incorporates something of the negative-style 
argument that arose in Last Resort: incentives may  not be positively  supported, 
but their alternatives can be actively criticised.
 From  a political,  public relations point of view, innovation may  represent 
a positive, imaginative approach to problem-solving. Thus, distinct from  the 
virtues of an intervention with regards to its efficacy  at improving health, 
apparently  innovative interventions may  be particularly  appealing to healthcare 
providers.
Other Organisation
Other  organisations are looking  to follow  suit with  health  incentive 
schemes, or  other  organisations are advocating  the use of incentive 
schemes.
‘The Welsh Office said it was interested in pursuing a similar scheme’  BBC 
(website), June 2008.
The simple statement that others are interested in incentive schemes does not 
provide a supportive argument for the use of incentives,  but it might indicate 
that those organisations have been convinced by  other arguments. One might 
trust the judgement of these other organisations and choose to rely  on their 
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judgement of incentives, and thus to follow  them in  choosing to support the 
intervention.
Not Novel
Incentives are not  a  new  and controversial idea, but  an  already  established 
practice.
‘Professor Priebe argued that financial incentives  to influence healthy 
behaviour already existed,  such as  higher taxes on cigarettes and alcohol’ 
BMJ, October 2009.
It  is interesting that both novelty  and lack of novelty  are presented as favourable 
features of incentive schemes in  the media. This nicely  illustrates how important 
framing can be to the presentation and interpretation of media reporting. One 
can argue both  that incentives are a new idea and that they  are not,  and that this 
is a good thing and that it isn’t.
 Not Novel could be an argument that seeks to reassure those who think 
incentives have the potential to create harmful effects that are normally  absent 
from more conventional interventions. In particular, stressing the prevalence of 
incentives in everyday  life could mitigate the suggestion that incentives are 
overly  interfering with individual free choice or that they  are destructive of 
autonomy in any new or unusual way.
 This argument could also seek to show that the extensive use of 
incentives in other instances should be taken as evidence of their  success. This 
is similar to how Other Organisations sought to show that the adoption  of 
incentive schemes by  others implied that those others were convinced by  the 
arguments in favour of incentive schemes. If we trust  the judgement of those 
who use incentives, we should ourselves use incentives.
Improves Inequality
Incentives may help to close the gap in health inequalities in our society.
‘The scheme by Tayside  Health  Board aims  to  break  the link  between low 
income and high levels of nicotine dependency’ The Herald, June 2008.
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This argument is directed towards ideals of fairness and equality, suggesting 
that it is a  good feature of a health intervention if it is able to counteract forces 
that exaggerate the gap between the wealthiest  and poorest in society.  The 
summary  description from Parke et  al.  repeated above refers to health 
inequalities,  but it seems the Improves Inequality  argument could also refer  to 
inequality  more generally, given that there is such a well-established link 
between socioeconomic factors and health (see Chapter  Five). If incentives can 
reduce the gap in  health  outcomes between the most  and least deprived, they 
may also reduce inequalities in other areas.
Positive
A  more positive way  of relating  to patients, it  is more honest and can 
improve the doctor-patient relationship.
‘It provides  a  much better and positive  way of relating to drug users  than 
sometimes we have done in the past’ BBC (website), January 2007.
This argument could be making a  claim about well-being, namely,  that there are 
benefits to recipients that derive indirectly  from the method of the intervention, 
rather than just from  its intended outcome effects. Improvements in the doctor-
patient relationship could also be given currency  as a  means by  which  well-
being can be boosted.
 Alternatively, incentives could promote values other  than well-being. 
Perhaps the provision of incentives involves treating people in  ways that are 
respectful and which augment rather  than detract  from  agent autonomy. The 
reference to the doctor-patient relationship is also interesting, and there may  be 
values associated with this interaction that are worth promoting in their  own 
regard, such as trust, professionalism, and loyalty. These values may  not be 
captured in terms of improvements in well-being.
No Harm
No harm can come to people involved in incentive schemes.
‘There is  no  harm  intended or caused - the service users  can revoke the 
offer at any time’ The Metro, July 2007.
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This is another  argument that seems to make a negative, rather than a  positive 
claim. No Harm does not  give us reason to think that  incentives will necessarily 
be beneficial, but reassures us that at  least  they  won’t make people worse off. 
This could be a defence given against criticisms that people could be harmed by 
an intervention such as this. No Harm  could be a  defence against claims that 
incentives would have detrimental effects on  well-being, or  that they  are are 
coercive, freedom-limiting, destructive of autonomy, or  a variety  of other 
criticisms, including those featured in the media and discussed later in this 
chapter.
Praise
Praise for incentives without any reasoning given.
‘Others feel it’s an effective way to cut the problem’ The Mirror, July 2009.
There is little to be said where the claim that incentives are a good idea is not 
supported by  any  form of reasoning! However, the example quote given above 
to illustrate Praise does reference efficacy, and so arguments of this sort may  be 
involved in generalised praise of health incentives.
‘AGAINST’ ARGUMENTS
Better Spent
The money  being  spent  on  incentive schemes could be better  spent 
elsewhere, includes mention  of the cost  of the schemes and references to 
taxpayers’ money.
‘Is NHS cash going to  be channelled into  dance lessons  and vouchers for 
fatties  when people need cancer drugs and better end-of-life  care?’  Belfast 
Telegraph, November 2008.
The most  obvious claim  in the Better Spent argument is one relating to 
efficiency: this claim places money  central to the discussion of the 
appropriateness of health interventions. Explicitly, the claim is that  incentive 
schemes are not an  effective way  of achieving the outcomes we desire 
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(primarily, better health).  As such, there might be other  ways of spending  the 
same money that will achieve greater results.
 There might be other motivations behind such a claim. The ‘better’ in the 
description is ambiguous. There may  also be a claim  about what we should care 
about. For instance, it  could be that although spending money  on incentives to 
tackle lifestyle related disease would reduce the overall disease burden on the 
nation, or  produce the greatest gains in  well-being, it would actually  be ‘better’ 
to target other (causes of) disease.
 The literature on attitudes towards risk is enlightening here. There are a 
huge number  of factors influencing how people perceive risk (see Slovic 
[2000]), and some of these could be at  work here. For instance, people tend to 
be more averse to small risks of catastrophic events than larger  risks of less bad 
events. Also, people are keener to avoid risks over  which they  have no control: 
this is thought  to partially  explain why  people tend to think more money  should 
be spent on rail safety  than road safety  (Wolff [2005]). The main point to take 
from this literature is that the probability  and severity  of risk does not have a 
linear relation to people’s desire to avoid risk. Thus, it is perfectly  plausible 
(likely, in fact) that similar attitudes will be at work in the case of avoiding risk 
of disease: some risks will be avoided with more urgency  than others, out  of 
proportion to their likely effects on well-being.
 Some disparities between expected utility  and preferences for  funding 
particular interventions could relate to the perception of the recipients, as well 
as the nature of the disease or risk. If we consider that those targeted by 
financial incentives are somehow blameworthy  for the diseases they  suffer then 
we may  consider them less deserving of help. Thus, it may  be thought ‘better’ to 
spend money  on treating a patient with  childhood leukaemia than on incentives 
to encourage a lifelong smoker to quit (consider the quote above which sneers at 
the idea of ‘vouchers for fatties,’ in comparison to treating cancer patients).
Not Long Term
The scheme won’t offer  any  long  term  solutions,  it  does not address the 
roots of the problem.
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‘This is  no kind of long-term  solution - a temporary financial incentive 
won’t stop people putting the weight back on once they have got the  cash’ 
Daily Mail, January 2009.
Again, the Not Long Term argument seems to be primarily  a claim  about 
efficiency. This time, it is proposed that incentives will not have the kind of 
sustained effects that will lead to significant health  improvements. If this is the 
case, then incentives may not be economically efficient in the long run.
 There could also be criticisms against short-termism, regardless of the 
economic effects. So, it  could be seen as uncaring to implement healthcare 
interventions that one knows will only  work for a brief period. For instance, 
some incentive schemes target pregnant smokers. Even if these schemes only 
have a  fairly  short period of efficacy, they  may  have defined health  (and 
economic) benefits (in particular,  for the unborn child). However, it may  be 
seen as cynical to offer an intervention to help women quit smoking,  when really 
one is aware that the recipients will probably  start again once the incentive is 
removed.
Misuse
People may  abuse the system,  fraud may  be a  problem.  Or, the rewards may 
be misused by the recipient.
‘But they are expected to  be free to spend the cash as  they see fit, even on 
unhealthy products  like cigarettes and alcohol’  Birmingham  Post, 
September 2007.
Some sort of efficiency  claim  could be at  work here once again. If people cheat 
in  order  to get rewards without any  simultaneous behaviour change then money 
will be lost. Moreover, there could be a secondary  efficiency  effect, whereby 
those who earn rewards spend them on ‘unhealthy’ things, meaning any  good 
achieved by  the intervention is undermined, and the incentive scheme fails to 
achieve health improvements and thus economic benefits.
 If individuals end up indulging in unhealthy  activities as a result of the 
rewards received through incentive schemes, there will not only  be a negative 
effect on the efficacy  of such schemes to improve health,  but on the well-being 
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of the participants. One might worry  that recipients of health  incentives are not 
really made better off if they are likely to put the rewards to ‘bad’ use.
 There also seems to be a claim  relating to desert. Incentive schemes could 
provide an opportunity  for undeserving people (those willing to cheat and steal 
from the NHS) to gain some extra money, at the cost of taxpayers. Such  an 
effect would run contrary  to our  usual ideals of people getting what they 
deserve.
Bribe
Incentives coerce patients into making decisions they  may  not  otherwise 
have made.
‘The option of being paid to take a drug treatment could unduly influence 
people’s decision making over whether the treatment is  right for them’ 
BMJ, October 2009.
The primary  concern involved in this argument seems to relate to the well-being 
of participants. If incentives distract people from thinking about the important 
aspects of a treatment (such as side-effects), then those individuals may  be more 
likely  to make poor decisions, or ones they  will later  regret. This tends to 
assume that individuals themselves know what is in their  best  interests,  and 
that interference is (at least generally) undesirable.
 A related worry  could be one regarding the freedom  or autonomy  of the 
participant.  Incentives may  interfere with  an individual’s capacity  to make a 
decision based on preferences she holds that are consistent with her  self-
identity, general outlook on life, long-term plans, ‘better self’, and so on. One 
aspect of this is freedom from a coercive,  external influence (feeling pressured 
by  those offering incentives to abide by  their  wishes to comply). This, in turn, 
may  detract from well-being (one is made worse-off if subjected to coercive 
influence). Autonomy  may  contribute to well-being as well,  though it is also 
often thought to be valuable distinct from any  contribution it makes to well-
being. Thus, coercing people to act in ways that will improve their health (and 
well-being) may  simultaneously  detract from  their  well-being by  smothering 
their freedom  and eroding their autonomy. Damage to these values may  have 
further evils associated, distinct from well-being losses.
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 Finally,  the Bribe argument could relate to social norms and the 
corruption of things we value. It might be considered inappropriate to use 
money  in this way, to encourage people to be healthy. Many  people have a  ‘yuck’ 
response to the idea  of exchanging money  for health, with some notion that 
these are incommensurable goods. Financial incentives may  thus be thought to 
destroy  something we value about being healthy, being cared for by  medical 
professionals, social norms, or similar.
Rewards Unhealthy
The unhealthy or undeserving are rewarded whilst the healthy miss out.
‘Why is  this  society so  hell bent on rewarding the least deserving?’ 
Aberdeen Evening Express, January 2007.
Desert, again, is important to this argument. The claim  seems to be that those 
who are candidates for health incentives are blameworthy  in some way  for their 
predicament, and thus undeserving (or less deserving) of help, at  least in the 
form of financial incentives. This desert claim may  be extended to become a 
more general claim about justice: the payment of incentives to a particular 
group(s) of people could create a disparity  at the population level which 
conflicts with our ideals of justice.
 There could also be efficiency-related consequences from interventions 
that  ‘reward the unhealthy’ if such interventions encourage unhealthy 
behaviour, rather than encourage the opposite.
Negative Evidence
A  lack  of evidence to support  the effectiveness of the incentive scheme, or 
evidence that shows the schemes to be ineffective.
‘There is  however little research  that shows that a financial incentive, 
combined with nutritional advice, is enough to persuade mothers from  the 
most deprived areas to  change their lifestyle’ News-Medical  (website), 
September 2007
Efficiency  seems to be a  feature of this argument,  with the claim that there is not 
clear  evidence to show that  incentive schemes will be significantly  effective. 
48
There may  also be a  degree of scepticism about  the evidence that does exist. 
Although some schemes appear  to show an effect, these may  not be sufficiently 
reliable indicators to make one think incentives really  would be successful at 
improving health. Often, incentive schemes are pragmatic interventions set up 
by  healthcare providers, with  the aim of improving health, rather than of testing 
the efficacy  of incentives.  As such, it can be difficult  to infer  conclusions about 
how effective incentives are from the results of these schemes. 7
Criticism
An incentive scheme is criticised without any reasoning provided.
‘Drug workers  described the proposals as  ‘ridiculous’’  Daily  Mail,  January 
2007.
There is little that  can be said to extend upon this ‘argument’ as no specific 
claims are made. This perhaps indicates a general hostility  towards health 
incentives,  which may  be based on any  number of different reasons, none of 
which are mentioned.
Wrong Message
Rewarding healthy  behaviour  sends out the wrong  message. Being healthy 
should be its own  reward,  incentives shouldn’t  be the motivation.  Rewards 
undermine intrinsic motivation. 
‘Staying healthy should be enough of an incentive for people to  come in for 
testing,  they shouldn’t need to be bribed by the opportunity to  win high-
end electrical goods’ Milton Keynes Citizen, July 2009.
Efficiency  could be a  motivator  for this argument once more. The suggestion 
that ‘rewards undermine intrinsic motivation’ implies that,  whilst  incentives 
might provide some motivation for  behaviour  change, any  benefit they  have 
could be reversed by  a loss of ‘intrinsic’ motivation. A secondary  efficiency-
related effect could arise if social norms are changed such that people come to 
expect incentives in exchange for healthy  behaviour. In  time, this could be very 
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7 See House of Lords (2011: 45-51) for a discussion  of  some of the considerations and difficulties 
associated with evaluating behaviour change policy interventions.
costly  if incentives become more and more relied upon as a  means of 
encouraging healthy behaviour.
 It  may  also be implied that one form of motivation is better than another. 
So, even if intrinsic motivation is lost  when rewards are introduced, the overall 
degree to which  people are motivated to change their behaviour could still be 
sufficient to justify  incentives on economic efficiency  grounds. However, one 
might claim  that it  is better to be motivated by  intrinsic desires (to be healthy, 
say) than extrinsic rewards (incentives).  There may  be different reasons for 
thinking this: perhaps it is more satisfying for  individuals to act on intrinsically 
derived desires than extrinsically  planted ones, or  it could be thought more 
compatible with autonomous agency.
 The concern about corruption seems to arise here as well: the idea that 
money  is an  inappropriate motivator for healthy  behaviour,  and people should 
want to be healthy  just because there is value in being healthy  itself, not because 
there will be associated rewards.
Encourage
A  perverse effect of incentive schemes may  be that  they  encourage people to 
adopt the unwanted behaviour.
‘We have to  be  careful we don’t appear to be encouraging people to take up 
smoking in order to reward them for giving up’ The Metro, February 2009.
Again, efficiency  is an obvious concern in the Encourage argument. As 
mentioned in relation to the Rewards Unhealthy  argument, if incentives have 
the perverse effect of encouraging unhealthy  behaviour, perhaps because 
individuals are tempted to actually  take up unhealthy  behaviours in order to 
earn rewards for subsequently  quitting those behaviours, the system  will lose 
money. Incentives may thus fail to be an effective way of improving health.
 In addition to this, one might  also worry  about individual well-being. 
Incentives that encourage unhealthy  behaviours could do more harm than good 
in terms of affecting people’s health and well-being.
Unethical
Where the ethics of the scheme are raised without any further explanation.
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‘Three quarters  of respondents  said they had concerns  about using 
financial incentives, most of whom  said the  practice would be unethical’ 
BBC (website), January 2007.
As with the Criticism argument, it  is not  really  possible to say  much more about 
this criticism. ‘Unethical’ is too broad an argument to prove a fruitful source of 
further  analysis. Clearly, articles using this argument are referring to something 
to do with the ethics of using incentives,  but this could relate to any  number of 
things.
Responsibility
People should take responsibility  for their  own  health, it  is within their  own 
control.
‘I question very much whether the  NHS should be  directing its  resources to 
weight loss - something within people’s control’ Daily Mail, January 2009.
The Responsibility  argument could be pointing to an efficiency-based criticism 
of health  incentives. If it is within people’s power  to change their  health 
behaviour without the action of rewards then this would presumably  be cheaper 
and more efficient. Thus, one might criticise the use of health incentives on the 
grounds that  they  are unnecessary, and instead we should focus on getting 
people to live more healthily without the aid of incentives.
 Some form of autonomy-related claim  could be involved here as well. 
Perhaps there are certain aspects of a person’s life that should be determined by 
the individual herself, and something like the lifestyle she chooses to adopt 
could be one such thing. It might be better that  people are left to take 
responsibility  for their  own health, even if this means the outcomes, in terms of 
disease, are less good.
 Another  issue that  arises here is one regarding the role of the state and 
the extent  to which a government can legitimately  interfere in the lives of its 
citizens. The kind of interference involved in  the introduction of health 
incentives might be a step too far  in terms of the state influencing how people 
live their lives.  The role of the state is clearly  related to the need to respect the 
liberty and autonomy of individual agents.
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 Finally,  an important aspect of the Responsibility  argument is apparent if 
we think that people may  be more or  less deserving of healthcare. Some argue 
that those who are responsible for  their poor health are less deserving of the 
help they  might need to improve it. The claim that many  receiving incentives 
suffer  illnesses it  is within their capacity  to avoid could be the basis for asserting 
that such interventions are less deserved than other interventions that could be 
funded instead.
Nanny State
Incentives cited as another  excess of the nanny  state, the government’s aim 
to right every wrong.
‘Time and again this  molly-coddling government thinks  it can right what 
is fundamentally wrong with our lives’ Sunday Mirror, January 2008.
Concerns relating to both the role of the state and autonomy  seem apparent in 
the Nanny  State argument.  In this instance, the focus is more on health 
incentives as an example of the state having too great an involvement in 
people’s lives and decisions about how to live.  There need not be something 
specific about the way  health incentives influence behaviour: it is perhaps 
simply  offensive that the government thinks it is within its remit to influence 
behaviour at all.
 Within this argument might also be a question about  the intentions and 
motivations underlying the state’s interference with the lifestyles of citizens. 
Perhaps there are questionable perfectionist values behind the government 
wishing to encourage exercise and discourage smoking,  ones that make a claim 
about the best way  of living, and which could contradict  liberal assumptions 
that there are many  different things one may  value as part of a  ‘good life’,  and 
this should be left to the individual to determine.
Giveaway
Rewards are handed out too easily.
‘What is  this  great country coming to? Free gifts and handouts  for junkies 
and failed asylum seekers’ The Sun, July 2007.
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The issue of how deserving recipients of incentives are arises again here. The 
claim seems to be both that people are not  required to do anything sufficiently 
deserving in order to be rewarded, and that people who are likely  to be 
rewarded tend to already  be less deserving than the average person (this 
certainly seems to be the case in the quote provided by The Sun).
 Efficiency  could also be a worry  here: if rewards are provided without 
sufficient demands being met, this could result in a  loss to the NHS, or  the 
economy  more widely. The argument is not particularly  apparent or clearly 
explicated in  the Giveaway  criticism, but the suggestion that rewards are 
provided ‘too easily’ could imply  that it  is acceptable to reward people, but that 
more needs to be required from  them  in exchange for  the provision of 
incentives.
Health Harm
The behaviour  being  encouraged may  have negative health  consequences on 
the participant, including drug side-effects.
‘The mental health charity MIND says that paying people  could coerce 
people into  taking drugs that are known to have serious side  effects’ BMJ, 
October 2009.
The main concern expressed by  the Health Harm argument seems to be one 
about the well-being of the recipient of incentives.  There will sometimes be 
potential harmful effects with any  treatment programme, and sometimes these 
risks will be realised. Those seeking to change people’s behaviour would have to 
be very  cautious not to bring about harmful consequences. In particular, there 
may  be unintended consequences of incentives which result in  harm to the 
recipient.
 There may  also be a worry  that incentives could cause people to fail to 
fully  appreciate the potential harms of a treatment or  behaviour change (if they 
are so focused on the reward that they  are distracted from  considering all of the 
potential effects). Informed consent is an important procedure in medical 
ethics, and incentives might seem to hinder this, if consent is based more upon 
a desire for incentives rather  than a good understanding of the likely  outcomes 
of the intervention. Apart  from having an impact  on the participant’s well-being, 
there could also be more subtle effects relating to feelings of regret or loss of 
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autonomy, where individuals suffer harm as a result of participating in  an 
incentive scheme.
Doctor-Patient Relationship
Incentives may  have a  detrimental  effect  on  the doctor-patient relationship, 
or  other  relationships between clients and professionals.  The relationship 
should be about joint decision making.
‘It undermines the therapeutic  alliance the doctor and patient have - 
something crucial for long-term  health care’  Medical News Today 
(website), August 2007.
Corruption appears to be a  concern here: that the inappropriate involvement of 
money  in  a  situation where it ought not to be a factor  is destructive of certain 
things we value. One might argue that  money  should have no role in the 
interaction between a doctor and her  patient, and that the introduction of 
explicit  rewards turns this interaction into a  ‘transaction’ and damages 
something in the quality  of the relationship. For instance,  trust may  be an 
important  feature of these kind of relationships, and money  could undermine 
this.
 One might also worry  that the offering of incentives by  healthcare 
professionals could feel like an imposition on the recipient, as if the doctor is 
pressuring the patient to behave in a  particular way. It might  be objected that 
such  an influence of a doctor  over her  patient is inappropriate.  Although such 
an effect could occur in  the absence of incentives, it  could be that incentives 
exaggerate the feeling that a physician is trying to steer  the patient’s reasoning 
in some way.
 The relationship between doctors and patients may  be valuable for  a 
number of reasons, and it  is fundamental to a well-functioning healthcare 
system. The destruction of the doctor-patient relationship could have 
detrimental effects on the ability  of the NHS to provide good healthcare. As 
such,  there are efficiency-based reasons for wanting to preserve and protect the 
doctor-patient relationship from destructive forces.
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Cash Won’t Work
Money won’t cause a behaviour change in people.
‘If it were just a  question of money, they  would have stopped eating years 
ago.  After all,  if they ate less,  they would be richer’  The Daily  Telegraph, 
January 2008.
This argument seems to express scepticism about the reliability  of the theory 
and empirical evidence motivating the use of health incentives. Distinct from 
the Negative Evidence argument, Cash Won’t Work does not point to evidence 
that undermines claims that  incentives are effective.  Rather, it seems to indicate 
an intuitive disbelief that incentives could possibly  bring about behaviour 
change.
 There may  also be a concern that incentives simply  won’t be an efficient 
way  to improve health. This would be the case if incentives occasionally  bring 
about the desired behaviour change, but on a population level are not a solution 
to the problems of obesity, smoking, and so on.
Political
Just another political exercise.
‘We could be  concerned if incentives  were  used by poor-performing 
treatment services  to  mask problems  and hit government targets’  BBC 
(website), January 2008.
The motivations and intentions of those offering incentives come into question 
here.  One might be concerned with  the reliability  of evidence suggesting 
incentives to be effective if one suspected those seeking to promote incentives 
had ulterior motives. Similarly, one might be concerned for the well-being of 
recipients if those providing incentives were not  doing so with  the best interests 
of the recipients in mind, but rather with the intention of appearing to be doing 
something of worth.
 Recall the ‘Innovative’ argument in favour  of incentives. This implied that 
a positive feature of incentives could be that they  appear new and imaginative, 
and thus have public relations benefits,  even if they  are actually  ineffective. The 
Political criticism seems targeted at these sorts of superficial motivations.
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Universal
The drawbacks of universal benefits as opposed to targeted ones.
‘Why wasn’t it aimed at those women more in need,  rather than being 
given to everyone, irrespective of their income?’ The Times, April 2009.
The Universal argument  points to worries about fairness: a  desert-related 
concern that it  is problematic to treat people as they  do not deserve to be 
treated. In  this case, the suggestion is that some of those receiving incentives are 
not  deserving of them (perhaps when compared to others). This also relates to 
concerns about distributive justice, whereby  we want to ensure that resources 
are distributed fairly  at the population level. Providing incentives to everybody, 
regardless of their  current wealth,  could allow distributive gaps to widen even 
further, compounding injustices.
 Another  point of contention related to Universal is the efficiency-based 
concern that  providing incentives to everybody, rather  than targeting them 
towards the most needy, might not be the most efficient way  of improving 
health.
Stigma
Negative effects on  the individual, including  stigmatisation,  loss of 
autonomy and loss of dignity.
‘As  well as risking further stigma of people suffering from mental illness’ 
The Times, September 2007.
The argument that incentives could stigmatise those in receipt of them seems 
mostly  to be a worry  about well-being: that those receiving incentives will suffer 
harm  as a  result. The description also explicitly  mentions dignity  and autonomy, 
and these could relate to well-being as well, or  might have intrinsic value in 
their own right (which could be destroyed through stigmatisation).
 A further  justice worry  could come into play  here if it turns out that  those 
already  in an unfortunate position (the most deprived in society) are the very 
individuals whose misfortunes are compounded by  the additional effects of 
stigmatisation.
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GENERAL THEMES AND PRINCIPLES
In the forthcoming analysis of incentives,  my  focus will be on the criticisms of 
incentives,  rather than on those arguments which support their use. This is 
partly  in order to restrict discussion to a manageable size, but it  also seems 
more pressing to consider  those claims that propose reasons as to why 
incentives must  not  be used.  A primary  consideration for  any  health 
intervention will be its likely  efficacy. Thus,  if an intervention is efficacious and 
affordable, that will provide the bulk of the justification needed in order for its 
implementation. It will then be a question of whether there are good reasons for 
not implementing it.
 In order to restrict the scope of this analysis, I shall set aside the question 
as to whether  there is sufficient reason to implement incentives. Much of the 
work needed here relates to the efficacy  and implementability  of incentives, and 
requires expertise that I lack. Hence, my  discussion focuses on those ethical 
arguments that suggest incentives should not be used.
 I now wish to identify  certain themes that run through the Media 
Arguments. Often,  these arguments are made in response to specific health 
incentive schemes, and arguments relating to similar underlying themes,  or 
deriving from concerns about the same moral principles, are often repeated in 
different forms. So, a particular argument may  make an explicit claim  about  the 
likely  efficacy  of incentive schemes,  but could also incorporate assumptions 
about the fairness of such schemes. In  this way, the different  arguments tend to 
incorporate numerous, overlapping claims.
 If we consider the three most frequently  made arguments against the use 
of incentives, Better  Spent, Not Long Term, and Misuse, they  all make, or can be 
interpreted as including, some reference to the efficiency  (or efficacy) of 
incentive schemes. As do the arguments Negative Evidence, Wrong Message, 
Encourage,  Responsibility,  Giveaway, Doctor-Patient Relationship,  Cash Won’t 
Work,  and Universal. Unsurprisingly, the (cost-) effectiveness of health 
incentives is something which arises frequently  in the media. Those criticising 
incentives often directly  reference their  (supposed) inability  to effectively 
change behaviour, or they  reference features of incentive schemes that will lead 
to downstream inefficiency.
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 Related to the importance of efficiency  is the capacity  of health incentives 
to promote well-being. Well-being generally  refers to whatever  it is that makes 
one’s life go well, and is often used as a measure of the contribution a healthcare 
intervention can make. As such, well-being (or some proxy  for well-being) will 
be crucial to the efficiency  of an  incentive scheme. The arguments Misuse, 
Encourage,  Health Harm, Doctor-Patient  Relationship,  Political,  Stigma, and 
Bribe can be interpreted as making the claim that incentives will either fail to 
bring about improvements in  the well-being of the recipient, or that  they  will be 
detrimental to the well-being of recipients or the wider  public, either through 
their direct or indirect effects.
 The next theme that  can be identified relates to ideas about justice and 
fairness.  Often these claims relate to the desert of the individual being offered 
incentives.  The argument Better Spent could involve claims about fairness, if 
‘better’ is taken to refer to those who are more deserving, for  example. Misuse, 
Rewards Unhealthy,  Giveaway, Universal, and Stigma also relate to concerns 
about justice.
 Another  theme which  a number of arguments draw upon is that which 
references harms resulting from  limits to freedom imposed by  incentives. The 
clearest  example of this would be the case of coercion, where recipients are 
effectively  forced to act in a particular way. Milder forms of freedom-limitation 
that fall short of full-blown coercion could still be undesirable, as will other 
harmful effects on the recipient  that could result from incentives. Arguments 
referencing these sorts of issues include Bribe,  Responsibility, Nanny  State, 
Health Harm, Doctor-Patient Relationship, Political,  Stigma, and Wrong 
Message.
 Whereas the previous theme references harms to the recipient that could 
arise from incentives,  another theme arising from  the Media  Arguments are 
harms to society  in general, arising through the degradation of values we hold. 
Often this is described in terms of ‘corruption,’ whereby  the introduction of 
money  can ‘corrupt’ the values and norms previously  operating in  a given 
context. The kinds of values of concern include trust, dignity, solidarity,  and 
respect. Arguments that seem  to make reference to this theme include Bribe, 
Wrong Message, Health Harm, and Doctor-Patient Relationship.
 There will undoubtedly  be further  themes that could be extracted from  
the Media Arguments described, and it  is quite likely  that some of the 
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arguments which I have not linked to a particular theme could be so linked, 
even if this is fairly  tenuous.  It is the themes I have described here that will form 
the basis of the chapters to follow, and which will make up the substantive 
ethical analysis of incentives.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I have provided a few paragraphs for  each of the arguments extracted from  the 
media to give a  little explanation of the nature of those arguments. In so doing, I 
have sought to extend slightly  the analysis of these arguments provided by 
Parke et al., and explore what kinds of claims are involved in each of the discrete 
arguments identified in the media analysis. There seem to be a  number  of 
recurring  themes, relating to things that we value such as efficiency, fairness, 
and well-being.
 I propose to structure the remainder of the discussion of the ethics of 
health incentives around these more general themes, rather  than the particular 
Media Arguments. These arguments require interpretation and, as is apparent 
already, they  refer to similar, overlapping concerns about  incentives. It  will 
hopefully  be more efficient and clearer  to consider the slightly  abstracted,  more 
general themes,  than working through each argument in turn, and inevitably 
repeating what has previously been said.
 I hope this analysis will maintain some connection to the concerns 
arising from the media. As discussed in the previous chapter, Media Opinion  is 
of interest not  only  as a source of arguments, but as an indication of the kinds of 
concerns that are of particular  relevance to members of the public. It is worth 
recalling from  the previous chapter the importance of framing, which can 
influence how media is received by  the public, and which may  also be influenced 
by  public attitudes. This can  be very  important in affecting how  acceptable a 
novel health intervention turns out to be.
 In particular, incentives can be seen as either payment for desirable 
behaviour, or as a psychological aid to help people adopt  healthier behaviours. 
As described in  the introduction, this trade-type / aid-type distinction can 
influence how incentives are assessed along different ethical dimensions. Some 
arguments appearing in the media, and those arising  in  the discussion to come, 
will be more applicable to one or other of these conceptions of incentives.
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 The trade- / aid-type distinction is an example of a  case where the 
particular presentation of the discussion of incentives in the media is important, 
and not  just the ideas behind it. A disadvantage of abstracting from the media in 
the way  I intend is that contextual information about how  the arguments are 
presented is lost. For  instance, in the brief discussion of the arguments above,  I 
hope to have shown that some arguments which seem to be making claims 
about efficiency  could also involve ideas about moral desert and fairness.  It  is 
interesting that  claims about desert are sometimes smuggled into what appear 
to be arguments about  efficiency, and this is perhaps indicative of the sorts of 
arguments that are thought to be appropriate to make.
 Despite these disadvantages, I believe it will  be more productive to 
structure this discussion in terms of the more general themes, rather  than 
sticking strictly  to the arguments extracted from the media. I shall, however, 
refer back to the Media Arguments where appropriate. The themes explored in 
the chapters to follow (summarised below) are derived from  the claims raised in 
the Media Arguments.
The remaining chapters will consider: 
i) Notions of efficiency, and how healthcare interventions might  be assessed in 
terms of their capacity  to produce desirable outcomes at little cost. In this 
chapter I will also discuss well-being, and how this is often used as a 
‘currency’ for  assessing the success of healthcare interventions. Many  of the 
arguments mentioned above made reference either  explicitly  or  implicitly  to 
the efficacy  of incentives, and to claims about additions to or detractions from 
well-being that would result from the use of incentives;
ii) Coercion, and the pressure potentially  placed on recipients’ wills by  the offer 
of incentives. Coercion, and other methods of influencing an agent’s 
behaviour, can harm the subject  by  limiting her  freedom and capacity  for self-
determination. This chapter will thus cover  some of the concerns raised about 
the recipient of incentives: that her interests must be protected; 
iii) Fairness concerns, specifically, desert arose in a number  of arguments 
relating to incentives, and shall form  the basis of Chapter Five. In the process 
of considering desert, I also provide some discussion of responsibility  and the 
process of praising and blaming agents for their actions; 
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iv) Corruption of values. This relates to the claim that the use of incentives, 
particularly  money,  degrades things that we value in the context  of health and 
healthcare provision. Trust,  solidarity, health  itself,  dignity  and respect arise 
in  the Media Arguments and are the sorts of things that are typically  thought 
to be threatened by the use of health incentives.
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THREE
HEALTHCARE AND THE STATE: EFFICIENCY, PERFECTIONISM, AND 
DISTRIBUTION
INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter,  I introduced a number of arguments relating to 
incentives that have featured in  the media and were identified in an analysis by 
Parke et al. (2011). I then grouped these concerns together into broader themes 
of criticism which  relate some of the individual arguments to one another  at  a 
more general level. In this chapter, I focus on those concerns that tend to come 
under  the sphere of political philosophy: issues to do with how the state treats 
its citizens; what objects ought to be promoted through state action; what level 
of interference in citizens’ lives by  the state is acceptable,  and so on.  Such issues 
are sometimes backgrounded in discussions of medical ethics. However, these 
kinds of political issues are crucial to public health  ethics and the debates about 
healthcare provision (Coggon [2012]).
 The issue of efficiency  is forefront in debates about public spending on 
healthcare.  Indeed, the way  the state uses the resources it receives from the 
taxpayer is generally  of great interest  to the public,  and any  perception of 
wastefulness on the part of the state is unlikely  to be tolerated. It  is 
unsurprising, then, that efficiency-related arguments are the most frequently 
arising arguments in the media analysis concerning health incentives. That 
incentives will save the NHS money  is one of the best  things to be said in their 
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favour; that incentives are a hopeless waste of money  is the most damning 
criticism.
 I do not  focus solely  on efficiency, narrowly  construed, here. I argue that 
‘efficiency’ is a composite notion, involving three broad and overlapping 
elements. I think this is true of complex calculations of efficiency  in general, but 
is particularly  the case when considering healthcare. First, there is a conceptual 
element: what  is the scheme we should use to value healthcare interventions? 
When should healthcare be considered ‘effective’? Second is the calculative 
element: how  much good outcome does a health intervention produce? What 
costs are associated with running it? How does the cost-effectiveness of one 
intervention compare to another? Finally, there is the element involving 
judgements which situates all of this prior theorising into the context of state 
action more generally: does this health intervention promote the aims of the 
state? How much funding should be provided to different interventions?
These different elements often get  run together when talking about ‘efficiency.’ 
Further, it may  be difficult,  as well as unhelpful, to always seek to sharply 
distinguish these elements of concern regarding efficiency. For  consider, in 
developing a concept of effectiveness we will need to have in  mind what is of 
value to us (why  we should care about this sort of ‘effectiveness’). This concept 
must then feed into what is to be measured,  so it  will be important to 
understand the constraints of our powers of measurement. We may  need to 
accept  that we cannot  directly  measure the effectiveness of an intervention, but 
we can adopt some proximate measures. At this stage it becomes important to 
recall the gap between what is referred to by  the conceptual version of 
‘effectiveness,’ and what we are actually able to measure.
Elements of Efficiency
Conceptual - specifying the kind of outcomes which will indicate 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ effects.
Calculative - measurements of the outcomes of an intervention, 
generally quantified and translated into a common unit.
Contextual Judgements - considerations of the significance of the 
efficiency  of different schemes and other  values in the context  of the 
legitimate sphere of state action.
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 Similarly, when considering the value of efficiency  we should consider  
what it will be desirable that the state promote, and how our concept of 
efficiency  can usefully  guide policy. This assumes that efficiency  will be a 
desirable quality  in  state action, meaning that, when we develop a concept of 
efficiency  and methods of measuring it, we must ensure we are developing 
something we believe the state ought to be in the business of promoting.
I cannot answer the question of whether incentives are, or  one day  will be, an 
efficient method of improving health, and I do not attempt to do so in  this 
chapter (nor  this thesis). I provide some discussion of the conceptual and 
calculative elements of efficiency  in the first sections of this chapter,  considering 
the uses and drawbacks of well-being as a way  of valuing health, and the 
translation of healthcare effects into QALYs (Quality  Adjusted Life Years) as a 
method of quantifying efficacy.  Methods of calculation and quantification 
(whether or  not QALYs are used) generally  require specific expertise suited to 
those trained in  economics and the social sciences and is not something that I 
attempt here.
 After introducing these elements of efficiency, I consider  how criticisms 
(in particular, those in the media), which are apparently  directed at the 
‘inefficiency’ of incentives, relate to concepts and calculations of efficiency. 
Further research would be needed to uncover exactly  what those whose 
criticisms of incentives appear  in the media  actually  mean when they  say  ‘cash 
won’t work’ or  that money  spent on incentives could be ‘better spent.’ In the 
absence of this research, I provide some suggestions as to what these kinds of 
criticism  might be referring to. I argue that much of the controversy  around 
whether  any  given healthcare intervention is efficient  or not refers least of all to 
the calculative question, and more to the conceptual and wider question of what 
the state ought to do.
 I then move on to discuss this broader  concern of what the state ought to 
be doing when it comes to healthcare. This question becomes increasingly 
pertinent as the ethical issues surrounding  healthcare provision shift  from  an 
emphasis on the clinical setting to concerns relating to public health ethics, 
preventative healthcare, the promotion of health at  the community  level and 
interventions outside ‘medicalised’ settings of hospitals and GP (General 
Practice) surgeries.
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The role of the state in terms of healthcare provision may  seem  rather  separate 
from the concern with  efficiency  that motivated this discussion initially. I do not 
think this is the case: the conceptual and normative elements of efficiency  are at 
least as important as the calculative process. When trying to assess whether an 
intervention is efficient,  and what this means as to whether we should use it  or 
not,  much of the answer will depend on questions about how we should value 
the outcomes of the intervention and how we should balance these values 
against others which state action may impact upon.
 I thus broaden the discussion at this stage to consider some of the 
debates from  political philosophy  as they  relate to healthcare provision. This is a 
vast topic, and not  one I am  able to consider in full here. I restrict my  discussion 
to two issues. First, the question of liberty,  which  I flesh out in terms of whether 
the state ought to adopt a  perfectionist or neutral approach to promoting 
conceptions of the good in society.  Second, allocative issues regarding how the 
state ought to distribute resources between different  individuals and groups 
under its care.
 Both these issues seem particularly  central to an ethical analysis of health 
incentives,  and to assessing whether  this form  of intervention falls within the 
state’s legitimate sphere of action, with acceptable consequences for  society. 
Initially  at least,  incentives look like a  way  of promoting a particular  way  of life - 
a ‘conception of the good’ - which may  be controversial and fall outside the 
remit of state operation. Incentives also involve the provision of monetary 
resources to recipients, and so their distributive effects go further than more 
conventional healthcare interventions.
 I argue that health incentives are not precluded on an account of state 
action which assumes moderate perfectionism  to be justified. Health incentives, 
insofar as they  operate as a  form of healthcare intervention, promote an 
uncontroversial good (health) and do so without placing unacceptable pressure 
on citizens to accept that good. I suggest  that the extent of perfectionism 
required to legitimate health incentives is no greater  than would be required for 
many  other interventions aimed at encouraging healthy  behaviour, including 
those using information provision and persuasive arguments to influence 
people’s behaviour.
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 In discussing distributive issues, I suggest how incentives might look on a 
number of different accounts of distributive justice.  In the absence of empirical 
evidence as to the real world effects of incentives on resource distribution, I 
suggest that incentives need not be incompatible with the distributive principles 
discussed. These principles do not cover  all of those proposed within differing 
accounts of political theory, but they  represent a sample likely  to be influential 
in the operations of western democracies.
EFFICIENCY
Efficiency  is like motherhood and apple pie; no one can  admit to being 
against it.
Harris (1997: 671)
Efficiency  is often taken as an unalloyed ‘good thing,’ which we should always 
aim  to maximise. Indeed, generally, the streamlining  of a process to make it 
more efficient  and to increase the outputs achieved from  a set of inputs will be 
preferable to the alternative of failing to do so, and thus wasting resources.  Yet 
it  is not difficult to think of instances where an obsessive focus on efficiency  and 
maximisation has resulted in undesirable consequences. Consider the 
production of animals and animal products for the food industry, where the 
pressure to be economically  efficient  has lead to the increasing intensification of 
farming and deplorable living conditions for  some livestock: battery  chickens 
provide a vivid example of productivity trumping animal welfare.
 In the case of egg production, the pressure driving efficiency  is,  roughly, 
to produce as many  eggs as possible. Clearly, efficiency  needs to be balanced 
against other things of importance,  such as animal welfare and product quality. 
It  is also important to ensure the measure of efficiency  (the outcome, such as 
number of eggs in this example) is the right one. For instance, simply 
maximizing egg production with little thought to housing conditions could 
result in poor animal hygiene and potentially  poor  quality  eggs. In this case 
productivity, profitability, and thus ‘efficiency’ may fall.
 The requirements of efficiency  will depend upon the context: the aims of 
stakeholders, the market,  the harms and benefits resulting from externalities, 
and so on. I may  find my  friend’s method of making tea infuriating because she 
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always waits until the kettle has boiled before getting a mug and placing a  tea 
bag in it  (a job which could have been performed whilst  the kettle was heating 
up, saving valuable seconds).  Clearly, my  concern is with  minimising the time it 
takes to make the tea. Yet, if one of my  friend’s primary  goals in this activity  is 
to irritate me, then her actions are highly efficient.
 Thus, the value of efficiency  resides in the value of its net output. The 
value (benefit) of outputs must  be balanced against  the cost  of inputs and cost 
(or disvalue) of other outputs (externalities). Efficiency  is judged where this 
balance is optimal (no more valuable output  could be achieved without suffering 
disproportionate disvalue elsewhere).  Obviously,  the correct balance will 
sometimes be fiendishly  difficult to identify  and disagreement is inevitable in 
some cases.
 Healthcare is one such  case. In part,  this is because it is very  difficult to 
measure the values and disvalues of inputs and outputs of healthcare,  which  has 
such  far  reaching effects,  often obscured from  view. Yet, more fundamentally,  it 
is because we do not always know  how to value these effects: how  to quantify 
the good of health, the bad of disease,  the worth of life,  and so on. There is no 
obvious answer  to this, and I do not  propose to provide one here. Instead, I will 
provide a brief discussion of what  is currently  the most influential theory: that 
which proposes the value of healthcare lies in its ability  to promote well-being. 
In order  to permit  measurement of value and comparisons between different 
interventions, the ‘QALY’ (Quality  Adjusted Life Year) has been developed. This 
is a method of quantifying the value of healthcare and helping policy  makers 
decide how healthcare resources should be rationed.
Well-Being and the Value of Health
The diverse benefits and harms associated with  healthcare, health,  and disease 
make it  difficult  to cross compare different actions and interventions.  Those 
tasked with  making such evaluations seek to discipline these disparate values 
and disvalues, converting them into a  more manageable format. Pragmatically, 
then, it is useful to conceive of a single ‘master value’ which can  act as a 
universal currency  and the single outcome of interest. Some propose that well-
being meets these criteria. Philosophical theories which propose that well-being 
is the only non-instrumental holder of value are described as welfarist.
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 Well-being, on its most general characterisation, is whatever it is that 
makes an individual’s life ‘go well.’ This may  involve pleasurable experiences, 
having one’s desires satisfied,  achieving certain objective goods, flourishing in 
life,  or  other objects, experiences, and relationships.  A great many  theories have 
been developed,  which place different  emphases on potential contributors to 
well-being (recent notables include Griffin [1986]; Sumner  [1996]; Kraut 
[2007]; and Haybron [2008]).
 Some version or other of well-being is increasingly  becoming the 
dominant value in healthcare. At least, well-being is generally  taken as the most 
distal value,  which may  still be promoted through  the promotion of other,  more 
proximal values (pain relief, life preservation, and so on). Healthcare is no 
longer (if it  has ever been) only  about curing disease and alleviating pain,  but 
rather, is about facilitating ‘health and wellness,’ such  that  agents can optimise 
their well-being.
 In this case, well-being will obviously  stretch beyond healthcare, as many  
other factors will influence how well one’s life goes (safety  and security,  wealth, 
social relations, to name a handful).  Thus, well-being lays claim  to the 
attentions of state action across all departments.
 Yet, there is plenty  of scepticism  directed towards this appealing vision of 
well-being as a  master  value. Some object that the very  notion of well-being 
does not make sense,  and that  it is mistaken to think there is only  one non-
instrumental good. Following from this, the exclusive pursuit of well-being may 
be undesirable. It is often argued that  there are many  things of value which 
cannot be captured in terms of their  contribution to well-being, including 
loyalty, trust, liberty,  aesthetic beauty,  and treating people justly. Even if we do 
sometimes  act with the promotion of well-being in mind, it seems that most  of 
the time, we do not.  Scanlon (1998) argues that, when thinking about ourselves, 
we rarely  act with  the express intention of promoting our  own well-being. It is 
only  when we think about how we should benefit  others that we sometimes use 
something like well-being as the primary goal.
 Even if a single value like well-being is adopted, measurement may  still 
be very  tricky. For example, where well-being is said to reside in having one’s 
desires satisfied (or one’s informed or rational desires),  it will be difficult to 
judge when this occurs successfully.  Further, it will not  be plausible for policy 
initiatives to closely  track the desires of individuals in order  to promote 
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subjective well-being,  as collecting accurate information about this would be 
vastly  labour consuming, as would finely  tailoring policies to promote a whole 
range of individual interests.  Policies must, to some extent, be broader than 
this, though they  may  have sensitivity  for  personal desires built into their 
structure.
 Knowing what objective contributors to well-being will generally  include 
will be useful.  It is also reasonable to assume that  a number  of these things will 
be the same across different  individuals. In fact, at the practical level, it may  not 
matter  too greatly  whether  we assume a welfarist or  non-welfarist position 
about value. It looks like there will be significant overlap between those 
objective goods thought valuable because they  instrumentally  contribute to 
well-being, and those objective goods thought intrinsically  valuable on non-
welfarist  accounts. In the case of healthcare,  for  instance, there is reason to 
think that  well-being motivated and value pluralist policies will promote similar 
outcomes. Both are likely  to prioritise healthcare that prolongs life,  relieves 
pain,  restores mobility, diminishes distress, and so on. Assumptions that such 
effects will be ‘good’ in some way  need not  rest on the truth  of welfarism but on 
common sense understandings about what is valuable to human agents.
 We might know roughly, then,  what sort of things we want  to promote 
through  healthcare: what the outcomes of efficient action should be. The 
difficulty,  of course, comes with  the ‘hard cases,’ when trading  off between 
different good and bad outcomes must happen, and where opinions about what 
is good and how good it is vary widely.
QALYs
Once we have decided what sort of outcomes efficient healthcare will  provide, 
we still need a methodology  for specifying the magnitude of the values of these 
outcomes to facilitate decision making. To this end, processes of translation and 
quantification may  be adopted. In  the UK, the organisation central to this 
process in healthcare is the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE).
 NICE plays an advisory  role in determining what treatments are provided 
by  the NHS. It is worth saying a little about the processes of valuing healthcare 
at this stage to inform  later  discussion, although I shall try  to keep this 
summary brief.
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Our  evidence-based guidance and other products help resolve uncertainty 
about  which  medicines,  treatments,  procedures and devices represent  the 
best quality care and which offer the best value for money for the NHS.
NICE (2012)
One of the tools NICE uses in determining what  will represent the ‘best  value for 
money’ is the Quality  Adjusted Life Year (QALY). Different treatments can be 
evaluated in terms of how many  QALYs they  are likely  to contribute; that is, 
they  are assessed in  terms of both the number of years they  will  add to 
someone’s life, and the quality  of life the individual will experience during those 
years. This is an effort  to capture what we value in terms of both the quality  and 
the length of life.
 However,  the notion of a QALY, how they  are calculated, and how they  
are put to work in determining healthcare provision is widely  debated (Nord 
[1999]; Nord et al [2009]; Moller  [2011]; Dolan and Kahneman [2007]; 
Drummond et al [2009]). Quantifying the value of healthcare interventions may 
involve ‘objective’ judgements about the potential for  treatments to extend life 
and relieve symptoms, as well as procedures for eliciting people’s preferences 
regarding living  with certain conditions. These methods are effectively  a  way  of 
calculating  the well-being gains produced by  an intervention. As we have seen, 
though, it  is not clear that  well-being is the only  thing of value, and it may  be 
inappropriate to take it as the sole aim  of healthcare provision or  government 
action more generally. Moreover, even if well-being were taken as the justified 
end of all state action, methods of quantification (and ‘QALYfication’) may  not 
be good ways of measuring how much well-being an intervention creates.
 Hausman (2006: 254) points out that asking people to choose between 
different health states is unlikely  to generate well-being values: “Since people 
care about other things than their own well-being,  and since their  expectations 
are often incorrect, evaluating health states by  preferences among health states 
will not coincide with an evaluation in terms of well-being.”
 We may  discard well-being and argue simply  for healthcare to follow  
preferences.  Preference elicitation, however, is problematic for further reasons. 
Hausman argues that preferences about health states are nonbasic, and “reflect 
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fundamental values as well as judgments about the character and consequences 
of health states in particular environments...  In measuring preferences among 
health states, health  economists are eliciting  complex value judgments, which 
may be correct or incorrect. They are not measuring gut feelings.” (2006: 273)
 Menzel et  al.  (1999) provide a useful overview  of some further difficulties 
with  QALYs. For instance,  patients suffering from a particular disease tend to 
rate their  quality  of life as higher than those asked to predict what  their  quality 
of life would be were they  to suffer  from that disease (1999: 13). Further 
weaknesses include failure to properly  incorporate the unique value of 
treatments which save life; the limited potential for actual patients to have 
increased health prospects (because of age and other features); the feeling that 
treatment  should be prioritised towards those who are worse off generally; 
problems with discounting for  future health gains and losses; and the 
maintenance of hope that treatment will be provided for rare illnesses or 
varieties resistant to the most commonly  effective treatments (Menzel at al. 
[1999]).
 Far from being a purely  objective exercise of measurement, calculating 
QALYs (or  any  procedure that  seeks to inform efficient healthcare provision) 
involves numerous value judgements. I described three elements of efficiency: 
specifying a conception of efficiency  (what will count as ‘effective’); calculating 
the contributions to efficacy  made by  different interventions; and judging how 
the state should act within a general requirement for efficiency, which must be 
balanced against other goods. I have provided some discussion relating mostly 
to these first two aspects. I hope that it is clear  that there is much overlap 
between the debates involved in the construction of the notion of ‘efficiency’ and 
the methods of calculating the efficiency  of healthcare interventions. Neither of 
these elements are benign and value neutral, nor incontestable in nature.
 I do not have much by  way  of a constructive theory  to offer  here. QALYs 
seem  unsatisfactory  for some of the reasons mentioned above, as do efforts to 
value everything in terms of well-being. Perhaps a strategy, such as that  hinted 
at by  Hausman (2006), where the reasons supporting agents’ preferences 
(rather than the ‘raw’ preferences themselves) are used to inform valuations of 
health states. It  still  seems hard to get  away  from  the problem that it  is difficult 
to predict how we will experience health states, and to take account of the very 
different situations of the individuals who will actually be in need of healthcare.
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 Interventions, such as health incentives,  with wide-ranging effects will be 
difficult  to evaluate, whatever  the outcome measure is taken to be. Benefits will 
take the form of health  (though these will be time-delayed, uncertain and 
variable) as well as contributing to other aspects of life such  as ability  to work, 
raise a family, enjoy  leisure pursuits, and so on. Capturing all the effects 
resulting from a single intervention can be extremely tricky.
JUDGEMENTS OF ‘INEFFICIENCY’
As described, ‘efficiency,’ in some form or another, arises frequently  in the 
media criticisms of health incentives.  It  is worth noting that efficiency-based 
reasoning is also one of the most frequently  employed arguments in support of 
health incentives. The argument of the critics is that  incentives are a ‘waste of 
money,’ or  that money  spent  on health incentives could be ‘better spent’ on 
alternative interventions. The contrasting, supportive argument is that  health 
incentives represent ‘good value of money.’ It  is important to consider  what 
such  claims may  relate to. My  intention here is a philosophical one of providing 
a rough framework that  judgements about the efficiency  of incentives could fit 
into, rather  than a sociological one of analysing what judgements people 
actually are making about incentives.
Incentives may  be judged as (in)efficient in relation to interventions aimed at 
combatting the same sorts of disease,  or in relation to healthcare interventions 
targeted at different  diseases, or  in  relation to government spending more 
generally.  Efficiency  judgements in each of these cases will involve very  different 
sorts of reasons.
 In the simplest case, where comparisons and judgements of efficiency  are 
made most easily, one incentive scheme may  be judged as more or less efficient 
than another  scheme. A scheme that  offers cash  rewards may  cost the same to 
run but result in greater  uptake than a  scheme that offers grocery  vouchers, for 
example. 8 In this case, the efficiency  claim may  be relatively  straightforward: 
controversies about how cost-effectiveness analysis is conducted (such as QALY 
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8  This is  imagined, and further  factors than  simply cost of running the scheme and number of 
people taking it would would need to be considered to judge efficiency even in this simple case.
calculation) are less sharp, because the disease and intervention are very 
similar, and the outcomes can be judged in the same way.
 Slightly  more complex would be the comparison between an incentive 
scheme and a different sort  of intervention targeting the same disease. For 
instance, an incentive scheme offering rewards to individuals who receive the 
HPV vaccination may  be compared to an informational intervention which 
sends letters to individuals in the target population,  outlining the risks of HPV 
and encouraging them  to receive the vaccination. Here, one might measure the 
uptake of the vaccination and the cost  of running the intervention  in each case, 
and make a  judgement about which is more cost-effective. Still, the calculation 
and comparison seems reasonably  straightforward,  though the informational 
campaign may  offer benefits aside from  increased uptake of vaccinations, such 
as increased understanding of sexually transmitted infections like HPV.
 When the outcomes being assessed begin to differ, efficiency  calculations 
become much harder and more controversial.  When the benefits resulting from 
kidney  transplantations must be compared to the benefits of providing  a 
particular drug to manage type II diabetes, or the emergency  treatment of a 
child hit  by  a car, different values begin to conflict.  To describe one of these 
treatments as ‘more efficient’ than another  is not a straightforward claim  in the 
least.  Presumably, few people would forgo providing lifesaving treatment to a 
child in order to divert more money  into slightly  cheaper diabetes medication, 
even though it  would be plausible for  a well-being  maximising strategy  (such as 
by calculating QALYs) to require the latter treatment be favoured.
Arguments that incentives are ‘inefficient’ could represent a  comparison being 
made between health incentives and a closely  related healthcare intervention. 
This ‘like with like’ comparison may  enable reasonable efficiency-related 
judgements. I cannot provide further evidence which  could inform  this (largely 
calculative) claim. At this stage, it  is not established whether or not incentives 
represent a viable form  of health intervention. Some research shows 
effectiveness,  but the effects are sometimes small and the long-term  effects are 
not  known (Sutherland et al. [2008]; Ranganathan and Lagarde [2012]; Burton 
et al. [2010]; Lussier  et al. [2006]; Prendergast  et al. [2006]; Cahill and Perera 
[2009]; Paul-Ebhohimhen and Avenell [2007]).
73
 Yet, as efficiency  judgements move away  from comparing very  similar  
interventions, there is more scope for debate about the concept of efficiency 
being used. Different  interventions will  have different outcomes, both intended 
and unintended, and these will impact  health, well-being, and other things in 
diverse and often unpredictable ways. Debates about how we should value these 
different outcomes become highly  involved and a greater understanding of the 
issues is required to judge relative efficiency.
 There is a great deal of variety  in the format incentive schemes may  take, 
relating to the behaviour targeted for change, size of incentive, type of incentive, 
frequency  of payments, length of scheme, provider of incentives, and so on. 
These can all affect the costs and outcomes of a scheme and so the scheme’s 
efficiency. Non-comparative claims about ‘inefficiency’ will be difficult to 
support unless there is clear  evidence that incentives generally  have little or  no 
impact on behaviour, or  tend to have negative effects on health (not supported 
by current evidence).
What, then, should we make of claims in the press that incentives are 
‘inefficient’ and a ‘waste of money’? It seems probable that  most such  claims will 
not  be based upon an excellent understanding of the outcomes of various sorts 
of incentive schemes, how such outcomes should be valued, and how incentive 
schemes then compare to other healthcare interventions or examples of state 
intervention.  This is not  because of an inability  to grasp the importance of such 
features, but rather, because when people express their  opinions they  are rarely 
well-developed in this way.
 More likely, heuristics will play  an important role in these kind of 
judgements. This could be as simple as some form  of backward reasoning: asked 
what I think of the state paying incentives to encourage healthy  behaviour  I may 
think ‘I don’t like the sound of that.’ Rather than expressing this in terms of the 
intuitive dislike which it  is,  I may  grasp at an explanation: saying ‘I think they’re 
a waste of money’ comes easily to mind.
 The process may  be more considered: I may  think of the sorts of things I 
associate with  healthcare interventions (things that seem likely  to change 
behaviour). Of particular  importance may  be what I think is likely  to change my 
behaviour. Because I think of myself as a sensible, rational human agent I 
expect that  reasons and information about  the risks of unhealthy  behaviour will 
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influence me, even though evidence suggests it has little impact on lifestyle 
(WHO [2008]). Given the medical context I may  expect ‘medicalised’ 
interventions to be effective (pills, injections, operations). I may  also think the 
right  attitude is very  important: wanting to change one’s behaviour, caring 
about one’s health, and having the willpower to resist temptation.
 None of these heuristics I have imagined are likely  to lead one to think 
that incentives will be effective.  Other heuristics may  provide more optimism 
about incentives: the idea that people frequently  act in order  to gain money, for 
instance. It does not matter too much for  my  point what heuristics act, and in 
which directions,  but merely  that it is plausible that heuristics are influential 
here, rather  than a good understanding of the forces contributing to 
(in)efficiency. Thus, many  of these judgements may  not be based upon good 
reasoning and familiarity with the evidence.
 I think there is also another important factor to consider when trying to 
understand the claims about inefficiency  in  the media. I have suggested an 
effort is made to say  something about calculative efficiency, and that this will 
often be a poor estimate because people do not typically  have access to good 
information about the effects of healthcare interventions, and because poor 
markers of efficiency  may  be substituted in the absence of this evidence.  It also 
looks like people could substitute judgements about  the third element of 
efficiency  - how it should be used to guide action - into the place of evidence. 
Where the response to incentives is ‘I don’t  like the sound of that,’ the next 
logical move is ‘I don’t think they  should be used.’ Thinking that incentives 
should not  be used may  be adopted as a heuristic for their being  inefficient or 
ineffective in some way.
 Many  off-putting and salient  images exist around incentives (often 
printed alongside media articles): greedy  fat people eating too many 
hamburgers and promiscuous youths too lazy  to take sexual health tests.  Certain 
diseases have historically  been wrapped up with stigma and a lack of 
understanding, particularly  when they  tend to affect  certain (already 
stigmatised) minority  groups,  or when they  are associated with activities that 
have a  negative image. Value judgements about  how we should behave, what 
obligations the state has towards its citizens, and what kind of healthcare 
interventions are appropriate,  can be important considerations when assessing 
incentives and healthcare provision more generally. However, the fact that such 
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judgements ought to play  a role in  evaluating efficiency  does not mean that 
instinctive judgements, based on little understanding of the relevant issues and 
evidence, will be helpful.
 Next, I want to discuss the extent to which it is appropriate that the state 
interferes with people’s lifestyles in an effort  to improve health, and I frame this 
in  terms of debates about perfectionism  and state neutrality. This begins to 
move away  from  what  we think of as ‘efficiency,’ but I include this discussion 
here as health  incentives typically  seek to influence aspects of people’s lives that 
operate ‘outside of medicine,’ as well as targeting people who are currently 
healthy, in order to prevent ill health. I think the questions of how we should 
value health and healthcare, and what the government ought to promote in 
providing healthcare for its citizens are intimately related.
THE BOUNDS OF HEALTHCARE PROVISION AND THE STATE
To consider efficiency  fully  requires looking beyond a narrow focus on the 
calculative aspects of cost and effectiveness. Once we try  to understand what 
makes efficiency  desirable we begin to grasp how  important  a theory  of the 
value of health  and healthcare is. Further, we need to know  how the state ought 
to promote these values, and what the limits of state action are. In the UK, the 
majority  of healthcare is provided by  the NHS, and so the question of the 
legitimacy  of health incentives in part just is the issue of whether it  is legitimate 
for the state to provide health incentives. The accepted aims of the state will 
inform  the role of a state-provided healthcare system, and will define the limits 
of state action.
 The limits of legitimate state action are constantly  up for  debate, with 
more libertarian thinkers pushing  for a smaller government with less 
involvement in  people’s lives, whilst proponents of a more interventionist role 
for government arguing that sometimes the liberty  of individuals needs to be 
limited to ensure a better life for others (often, the worst  off). Concepts of liberty 
vary  and incorporate sufficient  complexity  so as to allow  similar  interventions to 
be considered both liberty-constraining and promoting. Thus, simply  adopting a 
broadly  libertarian or liberal position does not fully  determine one’s position on 
particular interventions. This can be helpful, as Sunstein (1998) points out, as it 
allows those with  apparently  incompatible positions at the theoretical level to 
nonetheless agree on practical actions.
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Individuals may  or  may  not  have a ‘right’ to minimal healthcare provision, 
though such provision may  be justifiable on other  grounds (see Buchanan’s 
[1984] discussion). In  the UK, healthcare has been provided free at the point of 
use to citizens through the NHS since 1948,  initially  funded by  National 
Insurance payments, later by  all  tax  paying citizens through general taxation. A 
system of state provided healthcare allows for nationally  coordinated healthcare 
provision which enables strategies such as countrywide immunisation programs 
to be effected and other large scale public health interventions. Such 
programmes would probably  be more difficult to achieve were healthcare 
provided by independent private organisations.
 Socialised healthcare also protects the worst off in society, providing 
access to healthcare according  to need rather than ability  to pay. The existence 
of the NHS, and the provision of some degree of healthcare is generally  well 
accepted in the UK, and the NHS is often treated as a central component of 
British cultural identity. However, the amount of money  that should be spent on 
the NHS, the extent and range of healthcare provided, and its management and 
structure is much contested. Maintenance and reform of the NHS is often a hot 
topic for party political debate.
 Healthcare providers are increasingly  having to confront the harm posed 
by  diseases resulting from  lifestyle choices.  What someone eats for breakfast; 
whether  she cycles to work or  plays sport; how many  cigarettes she smokes each 
week; if she practices safe sex; decisions she makes about getting vaccinated or 
having her children vaccinated; where she lives; what job she does; are just a 
few of the things that can impact on an individual’s health outcomes.
 Once somebody  is suffering  ill health (partly) as a result of choices she 
has made about her  lifestyle - for instance, someone who develops type II 
diabetes due to obesity  or injures her  leg  in a skiing accident - then healthcare 
will be provided to restore her  to health so far  as possible. Healthcare 
interventions at this stage are relatively  uncontroversial (although there will be 
plenty  of debate about the best sort  of healthcare to be provided, as well as 
debate over  care given to individuals ‘blameworthy’ for their  ill  health; see 
Chapter  Five). It is often preferable to prevent ill health in the first place,  both 
for the individual, those her health impacts upon, and the healthcare providers.
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 The nature of a  lot of the risk factors for chronic disease means that they  
are bound up with what appear  to be personal decisions an individual makes 
about how to live her life. It  is often considered inappropriate for the 
government to interfere with  such  areas of people’s personal lives. And yet, 
altering the choices people make about  lifestyle is a logical point  at which 
healthcare could operate. The current government’s push for more localism 
extends to the provision of healthcare,  including measures targeted at reducing 
preventable disease. Some of this responsibility  will be devolved to “a new, 
dedicated and professional public health  service”: Public Health England. Due 
to begin operating from April  2013, Public Health  England will oversee and 
provide guidance for  local governments’ efforts to improve public health. (HM 
Government [2010: 52])
It  seems naive to suppose that ‘healthcare’ should be restricted to hospitals and 
GP surgeries, when some of the most important  healthcare interventions may 
take effect as part of citizens’ everyday  behaviour. The assumption that the state 
should stay  out of people’s decisions as to how to lead their lives looks difficult 
to reconcile with healthcare interventions intended to alter those very lifestyles.
 There are two significant objections to interventions seeking to alter  
lifestyle in order to improve public health. The first  of these is the threat to 
individual liberty  posed by  intrusive interventions; the second is the charge of 
perfectionism  that  might be leveled at a  state which seeks to promote a 
particular form  of lifestyle over others.  These concerns are connected, and I 
shall discuss them both below.
LIBERTY
In considering liberty,  we might consider both the imperative that liberty  as an 
intrinsic good be safeguarded, and that liberty  might be instrumentally valuable 
in  other ways. This could alter the way  in which the promotion of liberty  is 
approached. If liberty  is valuable as an instrumental contributor to well-being, 
self-expression, respect, and so forth,  it will be wise to accept some trade in 
liberty  when doing so will better  promote those other  goods, and it will not be 
worth sacrificing things like well-being in the name of liberty. If,  however, 
liberty  is an important good on its own then trading it for  well-being and other 
goods may be counter productive.
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 Unless we adopt a  strong welfarist position or similar, it seems most 
sensible to assume that liberty  is both instrumentally  and intrinsically  valuable. 
Having the freedom  to act as we like (for  the most  part) is ordinarily  something 
we strive for  and would wish to protect,  even where that means we may 
experience less pleasure, poorer health, and reduced well-being overall. Liberty 
is also valuable instrumentally, as it will often contribute to our ability  to 
experience pleasure and so on. Neither treating liberty  as merely an 
instrumental contributor to well-being, nor as a non-tradable (perhaps master) 
value, will provide a satisfactory account of how we ordinarily value liberty.
 It  is also worth noting the important distinction drawn between ‘positive’ 
and ‘negative’ liberty, as described by  Isaiah Berlin  (1969). Whilst negative 
liberty  covers freedom from  interference, positive liberty  is a richer  notion that 
describes the ability  of an agent to control her own life course and act in  line 
with  her considered reasons. This latter, positive form of liberty,  overlaps with 
autonomy, although distinctions can be drawn between the two concepts. In this 
section, I will be more concerned with the former, negative type of liberty  that is 
enabled when individuals are left  free from external interference from  other 
agents. Positive liberty  will be more important in the next section in which I 
discuss the importance of debates about perfectionism and neutrality  in political 
philosophy  to evaluating state healthcare interventions such as incentives. The 
two forms of liberty  are clearly  linked, however, and so whilst  being aware of the 
different ways in which liberty  may  be important (and in which its importance 
may be limited), I shall not press this distinction too hard.
The extent to which a  particular  healthcare intervention affects liberty  requires 
careful consideration, as it may  simultaneously  promote and detract from it. 
Further, because liberty  contributes instrumentally  to many  other  goods, 
impacts on liberty  can have wide-ranging effects: sacrifices in  liberty  may  be 
acceptable in order to protect or promote some other good.
 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has designed an ‘intervention ladder’ 
to illustrate progressively  more intrusive healthcare interventions. The ladder 
begins with “Do nothing or simply  monitor  the situation” and progresses up to 
“Eliminate choice” at the top (Nuffield Council on Bioethics [2007: 42]). For 
each ‘rung’ on the ladder, interventions become increasingly  intrusive, and 
more impactful on individual liberty.
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 Using incentives comes about halfway  up the ladder,  implying that  a 
greater  degree of benefits to the individual / public must be conferred in order 
to justify  incentives as opposed to doing nothing or providing information, but 
not  as much good is required as would be needed to justify  interventions that 
would restrict or eliminate choice.
 This seems, however, a rather simplistic way  of considering the 
relationship between intervention, liberty, choice and justification. 
Intrusiveness, and specifically  impact on  liberty, may  not map cleanly  onto the 
different categories presented here. Consider: a pharmaceutical company  may 
reduce production on a drug that has been surpassed in effectiveness by  another 
drug, meaning the option of taking the first drug is less available to me. 
Restricting or eliminating this choice (provided the new  drug works as well or 
better  for  me) is not  intrusive or harmful to my  liberty, as I am  left with an 
equally  valid alternative action. Further,  if the old drug was found to have 
dangerous side effects then removing it from  the market would protect me from 
something that could harm my liberty.
 Restricting choice may  also just appear unimportant. Whilst it  matters 
very  much that I am  able to access drugs that work,  reducing the number of 
types of shampoo from  which I can choose seems less important  in terms of 
freedom  just because the choice is less significant. It will matter more if I end up 
with  a very  restricted choice,  but so long as there are still plenty  of shampoos 
available to me it doesn’t seem to matter  a  great deal (since I don’t  have 
particularly  strong feelings about shampoo). Thus, the relationship between 
freedom  of choice and valuable freedom is complex. More choice does not 
always mean more (valuable) freedom.
One worry  about incentives is that they  might coerce the agent by  making her an 
‘offer  she can’t refuse.’ This could infringe upon liberty  if the state was strongly 
pressuring agents to act in a particular way  through the use of incentives.  A 
slightly  more subtle infringement of liberty  could arise if incentives somehow 
cause the agent  to act in ways not consistent with her view of herself as self-
determining, or  in accordance with  her preferred preferences,  or in some other 
way  that causes cracks to appear between the agent’s will and her actions. 
Methods that manipulate or  seduce agents to behaviour in particular ways may 
have these effects.
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 In the next chapter I consider  the capacity  for incentives to influence 
agents in these ways.  I consider coercion, persuasion,  manipulation, and 
‘nudging’ as ways of influencing behaviour and discuss the extent to which 
incentives might employ  these methods, and how problematic that is in relation 
to individual liberty  and autonomy. Liberty, in the sense currently  under 
discussion, is most  under threat where the agent  is coerced (as coercion severely 
restricts the agent’s capacity  for free choice). Yet, as I argue, it is unlikely  that 
incentives would coerce, and there are steps which could be taken to avoid the 
risk of coercion.
 If incentives do not force,  coerce, unduly  pressure, or make unavailable 
in  some other  way, valuable alternative choices for  the agent, then they  should 
not  be regarded as freedom limiting  in a strong sense. In a weaker sense, if 
incentives are effective in changing behaviour  then they  have altered something 
about the agent, and so are at least mildly  interfering with the agent’s actions 
(and / or her psychological state).  Again, these affects on individual psychology, 
preferences and behaviour are taken up in the next chapter.
I have already  discussed how efficiency  will only  be a suitable goal of state 
action if an appropriate concept of what will count  as ‘efficient action’ is 
adopted, desirable outcomes are carefully  selected, and useful ways of 
measuring the value (and disvalue) of outcomes can be developed. Liberty,  in 
both its political and personal senses will play  an important role in determining 
state action: what the duties of the state are within its commitment to provide 
an efficient healthcare system  to its citizens,  and what the limits of its actions 
should be.
 The next sections will consider how incentives fit into debates about 
perfectionism, neutrality  and state action, and the distributive effects of using 
incentives to encourage healthy behaviour.
PERFECTIONISM AND STATE NEUTRALITY
Perfectionism in politics involves the development of an account of the human 
good, and making the promotion of this the legitimate aim  of state activity. 
Within this general description of a political theory, perfectionism has many 
variants. These correspond to different conceptions of the human good, the way 
81
it  might best  be promoted, the appropriate balance between the good aimed for 
and other important principles, and so on.
 Perfectionist politics has been criticised as elitist, as there is a tradition 
within perfectionism  which seeks to develop just a few of the most extraordinary 
examples of human achievement, to the neglect of lesser  degrees of ‘perfection’ 
in  a greater number  of individuals. Further, goods taken to be worthy  of 
promotion tend to be those virtues or  ways of life exhibited often by  the 
minority  of individuals who have enjoyed relatively  fortunate circumstances in 
life.  Hence, perfectionism is sometimes perceived as deeply  inegalitarian. 
However,  perfectionism  need not require resources to be directed towards the 
greatest achievements of human good; satisficing, egalitarian, and prioritarian 
accounts of perfectionism  may  represent  opportunities for perfectionist political 
theory to preferentially direct resources towards the worst off.
 Those opposing perfectionist state policies uphold that states ought  to 
obey  a principal of neutrality, and not favour  specific conceptions of the good 
over others. This may  require states to intervene to protect those whose 
particular conceptions of the good are disadvantaged by  the way  things are, or 
to refrain from  interventions that would promote certain other conceptions of 
the good. Neutrality  is defended as the only  way  of appropriately  allowing 
citizens to be respected as free agents, and to avoid unfairly  advantaging or 
disadvantaging agents on the basis of diverging conceptions of the good life.
 Perfectionism and neutrality  indicate legitimate spheres of action for  a 
state. ‘Lockean libertarians,’ such as Nozick (1974) (as described by  Scheffler 
[1992]), insist that  this is very  small,  allowing only  for  the provision of basic 
rights and protection from harms. Defenders of neutrality  could allow a more 
interventionist state, if it is considered appropriate that the state intervene to 
ensure fair opportunities are available to those with differing conceptions of the 
good life. So, the adoption of a perfectionist / neutral position on state action 
does not necessitate a more / less interventionist state.
 Different grounds have been offered for  the principle of state neutrality, 
including but not limited to the need to show respect for  persons,  to facilitate 
personal responsibility,  to protect and promote autonomy, to create a neutral 
ground for  debate, and as the only  sensible way  to behave given our  ignorance 
about what form of the good life is best.  Opinion is still divided: many 
philosophers have discussed the necessity  for some degree of state neutrality  for 
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a liberal society  (see, for  instance, Dworkin [1985]; Larmore [1987]; Rawls 
[1988]; Ackerman [1980]), whilst others argue neutrality  is not  appropriate 
(Wall [1998]; Raz [1986]; Sher [1997]; Mason [1990]).
The difficulty  for supporters of health incentives could arise from  either 
neutrality  or perfectionism. If neutrality  is defensible and the use of incentives 
to encourage healthy  behaviour  represents an objectionable instance of non-
neutral state intervention, then incentives will be illegitimate. However,  a 
theory  of perfectionism may  object to incentives on the grounds that they  do not 
promote the correct conception of the good life.
 I find convincing those arguments which reject highly  demanding 
formulations of state neutrality  and endorse moderate versions of 
perfectionism. Such theories tend to point  out a number  of problems with 
strong notions of neutrality, whilst  insisting that a  highly  interventionist, 
freedom-limiting state that  promoted controversial conceptions of the good 
would be extremely  undesirable and illegitimate (Wall [2001]; Mason [1990]; 
Chan [2000]).
 One problem with neutrality  is that of justification: if neutrality  is 
grounded in  a  principle of liberty, or  autonomy, or respect for persons, as it 
often is,  then  it  seems that the neutralist must  acknowledge these are ‘goods’ 
worth promoting. In  acknowledging this, the neutralist has already  adopted a 
minimal degree of perfectionism. This does not seem wrong, and the moderate 
perfectionist  would point out that  things like liberty, autonomy, and respect  are 
uncontroversial goods, and that it is right for the state to promote them.
 Further, one can argue that the duties of the state go beyond the mere 
positive responsibility  for any  harm it  causes, but it  is also negatively 
responsible for harm it allows through not acting when it might easily  have done 
so (Wall [2001]). This deserves a much more nuanced discussion than I can 
provide here, but it  seems that the neutralist would have to make some 
argument for why  the prevailing environmental conditions should generally  be 
left unaltered, given that freedom  of agents might just as easily  be undermined 
through non-intervention as through intervention.
 The difficulty,  then, is to select those goods which contribute 
uncontroversially  to all conceptions of the good life,  and then to promote them 
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to the exact extent that people are free to pursue their own specific conceptions 
of the good, aided but never hindered by state action.
 This is probably  impossible, but we can at least aim  for  an approximation 
of such a  state. Given that  there will always be disagreement between 
reasonable people about the specific features of a good life,  it  is vital that the 
state not adopt anything that looks like a ‘comprehensive doctrine,’ which 
specifies and ranks all of the different contributors to a  good life in terms of 
importance. Rather, it may  promote certain agency  and prudential goods,  whilst 
not dictating what  individuals’ preferences ought  to be when making 
comparative valuations between these goods (Chan [2000: 11-14).
The provision of health incentives fits with  this moderate version of 
perfectionism: health is an uncontroversial good which contributes to (almost) 
all of the many  and varied conceptions of the good life; the state is both 
positively  responsible for the impact on health of its actions, as well as 
negatively  responsible for certain health-related consequences of its failure to 
act.  It  will, however,  be up to individuals to determine how  much  weight to 
assign to different goods, and how  highly  to value health in relation to other 
prudential and agency goods in determining what sort of a life they wish to lead.
 At this level of generality, health incentives (along with other  non-
coercive healthcare interventions) seem consistent with the state fulfilling its 
responsibility  to protect and promote the interests of its citizens, whilst 
remaining  sufficiently  neutral as to respect  all individuals properly  as self-
determining, independent agents. But  what  about when we consider the 
specifics of incentives: offering money  to people who quit  smoking; grocery 
vouchers to those who lose weight; lottery  tickets to everyone who receives a 
certain vaccination? Perhaps these schemes overstep the mark and promote 
Prudential goods contribute to the good life, and include things like 
having a supportive relationship with one’s family  or deriving 
pleasure from sporting activities.
Agency goods are features of the agent, virtues and dispositions, 
which constitute the good life, such as honesty, respect,  courage, and 
so on. I believe we can add being in  good health to the list of 
prudential goods.
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specific ways in which people can achieve good health that deny  them the 
respect to determine such things for themselves.
 I suspect, in discussing  behavioural interventions such as health 
incentives,  there is a tendency  to overestimate the significance of some of the 
lifestyle behaviours which incentives seek to alter. That is, there is a  danger  of 
exaggerating how significant  to someone’s sense of self-identity  the composition 
of her  typical breakfast is, or  that she tends not to get tested for  STIs. Although 
many  of these behaviours (or  decisions about these behaviours) happen in the 
privacy  of our own homes,  it is not  necessarily  the case that  they  are therefore 
fundamental to who we are as people, and that altering them is to alter 
something important about ourselves.
 This will not always be true: there will be examples of gastrophiles, 
dogmatic smokers, principled objectors to vaccinations, and so on. Such people 
could perceive certain of their  lifestyle behaviours as fundamentally  important 
to who they  are and their own efforts at  pursuing their  conceptions of the good 
life.  In these cases, perhaps the state ought not to encourage alternative ways of 
living.
 Health incentives have two significantly  redeeming features here: first, 
they  are almost certainly  non-coercive, nor  influential in liberty  or  autonomy-
incompatible ways (as I shall argue in the next  chapter).  Thus,  incentives can be 
refused with relative ease,  and those for whom  certain (incentive-promoted) 
behaviours are incompatible with their  conceptions of the good life are unlikely 
to be much disadvantaged. Second, incentives which take the aid-type rather 
than trade-type form  are supportive of individuals’ own conceptions of the good 
life (or at least, with how agents want  to behave, even where this is not a 
significant aspect of their conceptions of the good life). If it is possible for 
incentives to be restricted to this aid-type form, and targeted at those who 
would welcome them, incentives are unlikely  to undermine individuals’ 
conceptions of the good life.
 These features mitigate the negative impact offering health incentives 
could have on individuals whose lifestyles aren’t compatible with  the conception 
of the good life favoured. Living in a society  which values a conception of the 
good different from one’s own may, yet,  be disadvantageous.  As such, it is 
important  that  perfectionism is moderate so that  the imposition on those 
individuals whose conception of the good differs is not too great. The 
85
uncontroversial nature of health as a valuable good also helps to deflect  such 
concerns.
Some will disagree with the position of moderate perfectionism  which I have 
adopted, and used as a  reference by  which to evaluate incentives. There are 
arguments to be made that the state ought to remain more neutral between 
conceptions of the good life than health incentives allow, or  that  perfectionism 
is acceptable (demanded, even), but  incentives promote the wrong conception 
of the good life.  I do not think either  of these arguments will  be very  promising 
unless a  radically  different structure of the state is adopted to the one we 
currently  accept, and a number  of ordinary  intuitions about what counts as an 
acceptable healthcare intervention are rejected.
 In relation to the claim that incentives are not neutral enough, consider  
the difference between incentives and information provision and medical 
advice.  Both information provision and medical advice can and are used to 
encourage healthy  behaviour. Insofar as there is some ‘healthy  behaviour’ which 
is promoted, clearly,  the state must adopt a  non-neutral position. Taxation on 
‘unhealthy’ products and activities also acts so as to disadvantage those who 
engage in them, and benefit those who avoid them. It would seem  that, were we 
to endorse a stronger  version of neutrality  that insisted healthy  behaviours (as 
identified by  the state in conference with  healthcare professionals) must not  be 
encouraged, then we would have to reject a whole swathe of other interventions.
 Alternatively, it might be argued that incentives are not in line with 
certain forms of perfectionism. I am thinking here particularly  of those more 
traditional, Aristotelian theories which place an emphasis on  the development 
of a  virtuous character. Incentives, if they  bypass mechanisms of development 
whereby  individuals exercise willpower,  restraint, commitment, and effort in 
applying themselves to the task of making healthier  their  lifestyles,  may 
preclude agents from developing properly  virtuous characters.  This kind of 
criticism  relates to particular  conceptions of how one develops a moral 
character (see Burnyeat [1980]).
 I think suspicion is due where arguments assume ‘doing it the hard way’ 
is preferable, and where the process is presented as more important than the 
successful outcome. First,  this kind of perfectionism  seems open to the 
objection that it  is promoting a more controversial good than mere health, 
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specifying how one ought to act  and what  motivations one must adopt in 
seeking to achieve good health. Further, it  is likely  that such an argument is 
seeking to promote behaviour that many  individuals will simply  not  be able to 
achieve: should we deny  those who wish  to lose weight access to support groups, 
low fat  foods, discounted gym  membership, and fitness apps that  might help 
them  to succeed on the basis that it will be more beneficial for  willpower 
development if these aids are absent? We must accept our own psychological 
structure which means that the vast majority  of people will be more successful 
in  achieving lifestyle changes if they  focus on short  term, achievable goals, and 
receive immediate rewarding feedback when they meet these goals.
 Aid-type incentives, targeting as they  do those who wish to alter their  
behaviour but cannot do so without assistance, do not obstruct people from 
developing good characters. Individuals who can (and wish to) adopt healthy 
behaviours without incentives will do so, whereas those who would fail are 
supported by  incentives (where they  are effective) to succeed. It is also worth 
noting here that ‘self-efficacy’ - the extent to which an agent believes she is able 
to alter her behaviour - is important in whether or not  people succeed in 
behaviour change attempts (Bandura [1978]; Bernier  & Avard [1986]). Thus, 
success (whether aided by  incentives or otherwise) could help to develop an 
agent’s sense of self-efficacy,  and the cumulative effects of succeeding in smaller 
goals can enhance the likelihood she will succeed in larger, future goals.
 The provision of incentives is not a ‘quick fix’ for lifestyle behaviour  
change. A good deal of effort will still be required for agents who have developed 
unhealthy  habits to alter  them. We should not describe the use of health 
incentives as ‘bypassing human agency,’ ‘denying the opportunity  for  moral 
maturation,’ or  ‘infantalising’ people, when such criticisms are based on a 
mistaken conception of the influence of incentives and human psychology.
A final response to charges relating to perfectionism and neutrality  might be 
proposed: that offering health  incentives does not qualify  as promoting a 
particular conception of the good life.
 If this claim is supportable, then incentives cannot be criticised on the 
grounds that they  are offensively  perfectionist. However, I shall not discuss this 
here.  I believe there is enough to be said in defence of health incentives as part 
of a  moderately  perfectionist state to render this argument unnecessary.  Let it 
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suffice to say  that the definition of ‘conceptions of the good’ and the 
identification of policies which would count as promoting such conceptions is 
disputable. Health incentives may, for instance, be considered as promoting a 
particular conception of social justice (if healthcare is considered an area of 
state action governed by  justice requirements). States are neither  able nor 
required to remain neutral on issues of social justice,  even according to liberal 
theories espousing neutrality  with regards to the good life (Nagel [1991]).  Such a 
move rather shifts the problem to the realm of what state policy  is justified in 
order to establish a just society, and objections to incentives and the promotion 
of healthy  lifestyles might simply  be reformulated so as to attack incentives 
within this domain.
DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTHCARE RESOURCES
As discussed, healthcare provision that seeks ‘efficiency’ by  maximising a single 
outcome (such as QALYs) may  go very  wrong. I have discussed how  state action 
must be sensitive to particular  limitations and requirements, and that we must 
engage with questions about the extent of appropriate state interference in 
order to know what ‘efficient healthcare’ will involve. Liberty  in both its 
psychological and political senses is important here, and in  this chapter  I have 
focused on the debate relating to perfectionism and neutrality.
 Another  centrally  important feature of political philosophy  as relates to 
healthcare is the just distribution of resources. Maximising strategies will fall 
prey  to the distributive criticism of utilitarianism, as such theories ignore the 
personal aspect  of value: it  matters not only  that there is good, but  it  matters 
who  has that  good. The ability  for health incentives to combat health 
inequalities will be an important consideration in terms of their overall 
desirability (Health England [2009]).
 It  is not obvious what a  fair  distribution of healthcare will involve. Some 
might argue that it  is important that agents take responsibility  for their  own 
behaviour, and that healthcare should only  be provided where it  is deserved in 
some sense. This is a commonly  raised criticism  of incentives, which are 
perceived as ‘rewarding bad behaviour.’ I consider this concern for fairness in 
the next chapter, where I also discuss some relevant  evidence relating to the link 
between socio-economic factors and health  outcomes. There are a number of 
other principles that  may  guide distributive justice, for instance, the Difference 
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Principle proposed by  Rawls (1971/1999),  principles proposed by  various 
formulations of Egalitarianism, Utilitarian (maximising) strategies, Libertarian 
(non-interventionist) principles, and others.
 The framework of the healthcare system, its methods of delivery,  and the 
sorts of interventions provided will determine the allocation of healthcare (and 
health) amongst the population, as well  as factors about recipients that 
influence their  uptake of healthcare resources. Health incentives may  have 
specific effects on this distribution, particularly  as they  not only  affect  the 
distribution of health, and the economic benefits that good health may  provide, 
but  they  also directly  deliver economic benefits to agents in the form of cash, 
vouchers, lottery tickets, and so on.
 Rather than discussing in depth the virtues and drawbacks of different 
principles of distributive justice, I will discuss how incentives fit with a selection 
of different principles of distribution. This discussion will inevitably  be limited 
in  scope, as I do not wish to spend too long  introducing each  principle. Further, 
it  will be limited by  evidence: there is not sufficient information to understand 
exactly  (or even approximately) how  incentives will affect the distribution of 
healthcare and health outcomes in the population. I will thus focus on the 
general aims of providing incentives, to consider whether  these are compatible 
with  certain distributive principles,  rather  than the outcomes of incentive 
scheme provision. My  discussion will thus be necessarily  rather speculative and 
general. What I aim to show  is that incentives could actually  fit  with a  variety  of 
accounts guiding the distribution of healthcare.  Thus, incentives should not be 
considered excluded by  most of these accounts,  although that could change if 
they proved to have effects that contradict those principles.
 Before beginning this discussion, it  is worth pointing out that the 
problem of identifying the appropriate outcome and finding a good way  of 
measuring that outcome extends into distributive debates.  It will be necessary  to 
carefully  select  the good that is to be distributed fairly, and to develop a method 
for assessing how  this good is distributed, in the same way  as these processes 
are required in order to judge effectiveness and efficiency.
Rawlsian Liberalism
The key  feature of distributive justice in  Rawlsian Liberalism is the Difference 
Principle (Rawls [1971/1999: 65-66]), which is intended to ensure that those 
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worst off in  society  (with the fewest resources) are prioritised when it comes to 
distributing  resources. This principle asserts that  inequality  is permissible only 
where it is to the material benefit of the least advantaged. Thus, Rawlsian 
Liberalism expressly  contradicts maximising principles like welfarism  which 
permit  the most advantaged to benefit further, even at the cost of the least 
advantaged (so long as there is an overall gain in well-being).
 It  is important to note that  Rawlsian justice is a feature of institutions. 
The institution that treats people fairly  (according to the Difference Principles, 
as well as Rawls’s other principles of justice) will by  definition produce a  just 
distribution. The goods Rawls is concerned with are the ‘primary  goods’; “things 
that every  rational man is presumed to want... the chief primary  goods at the 
disposition of society  are rights,  liberties,  and opportunities, and income and 
wealth.” Rawls also includes self-respect as a primary  good, along with  “health 
and vigor, intelligence and imagination”. These last  four are, Rawls states, 
“natural goods; although their possession is influenced by  the basic structure, 
they are not so directly under its control.” (Rawls [1971/1999: 54])
 Those institutions providing healthcare will impact on a number of these 
primary  goods and hence will have a  significant impact on distributive justice. 
Health incentives form  one practice within the institution providing  healthcare, 
so we must question whether their  affect on the distribution of primary  goods 
follows Rawls’s principles of justice, in particular the Difference Principle.
 Health incentives need not be explicitly  directed at  the worst off to the 
exclusion of the better off: people who have plentiful access to primary  goods 
may  still be eligible to receive incentives in return  for  quitting smoking, getting 
vaccinated, or any of the numerous other behaviours that could be incentivised.
 However,  there are reasons for thinking incentives would sometimes be 
consistent with a broadly  Rawlsian distributive justice.  First, the kind of 
unhealthy  lifestyles incentives are deployed to change are more prevalent in 
deprived populations, and so healthcare is likely  to be prioritised towards the 
less advantaged generally. Second, insofar  as incentives target people lacking in 
health (or likely  to lack health in the future) then they  are compensating for  a 
(real or potential) deficiency  in that primary  good. Third,  incentives also 
provide monetary  or  quasi-monetary  redistribution, and so where the first two 
points hold, the effect of incentives to direct more primary  goods towards the 
least advantaged will be exaggerated. There may  be further benefits resulting 
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from improved health, in that people may  have greater opportunities,  liberties, 
improved self-respect, and so on.
 The extent to which such effects of redistribution and prioritisation of 
healthcare toward the least advantaged will result from the provision of 
incentives is unclear: there are many  complex and interacting factors to take 
into account  and a lack of empirical evidence (Voigt  [2012]). It is possible that 
incentives could have a deleterious impact on inequalities.  For  instance, 
wealthier  individuals typically  make more use of healthcare services, and so may 
take advantage of health  incentives to a greater extent than poorer individuals 
(Bains et al. [2000]). Such  an effect is likely  to be an issue for  any  healthcare 
intervention, however, and incentives are not exceptional here.
 Incentives targeted toward poorer  populations will be more likely  to be 
consistent with Rawlsian justice. This may  be achieved by  explicitly  excluding 
more privileged individuals from access to incentive schemes; by  selectively 
promoting schemes in more deprived areas; or by  incentivising behaviour 
change that is more likely  to be relevant  (and beneficial) to more deprived 
individuals. As mentioned, many  incentive schemes will tend to selectively 
target more deprived individuals or those lacking in primary  goods, because the 
unhealthy  behaviours targeted are more prevalent  in those populations (see 
Chapter Five for more discussion of these trends).
 Those incentives which target behaviours which are only  weakly  linked to 
socio-economic factors may  not help combat inequality. Also, there could be 
cases where incentives become available for a behaviour that more advantaged 
individuals would perform anyway  (receiving a vaccination or disease screening, 
for example). Introducing incentives for such behaviours could benefit  more 
advantaged individuals even without changing how they would behave anyway.
Luck Egalitarianism
Distinct from  ‘strict’ egalitarianism, ‘luck’ egalitarianism  seeks to equalise 
differences in access to resources, rather than between outcomes. Luck 
egalitarians argue that  inequalities arising from preferences and choices of 
individuals are acceptable, whereas those arising from  circumstances and luck 
are not. A variety  of theories may  be described as broadly  ‘luck egalitarian,’ 
though many  of the authors of these theories do not identify  themselves as such 
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(prominent examples being Dworkin [1981a, 1981b, 2000] and G. A. Cohen 
[1989, 2001]).
 On the luck egalitarian account, the state ought to compensate 
individuals for  (economic) disadvantages they  suffer  as a result  of bad luck, but 
individuals should bear  responsibility  for  any  disadvantages (or  advantages) 
resulting from  their own choices. Dworkin distinguishes between ‘ambitions’ 
and ‘endowments’ here, the former referring  to the choices we make, the latter 
to things over which we have no control.
 Considerable theoretical work has gone into the development of various 
accounts of luck egalitarianism: it  is decidedly  tricky  to distinguish natural 
talents for  which  individuals are not responsible, and those which result  from 
choices and application for which individuals are responsible, and for which 
they  can lay  claim  to the resultant rewards. It is also difficult to see how  a 
practical scheme of compensation could be developed. Despite these problems, 
luck egalitarianism is still appealing to many  due to its efforts to track the 
intuition that disadvantage ought not to reflect brute bad luck. I will not go into 
further  detail on these complexities here, but there is a plentiful and growing 
literature,  some of which  is directed specifically  at the distribution of healthcare 
resources and health (see also Arneson [1990, 2000]; Sher [1997]; Segall 
[2007]; Dworkin [2003]; Cohen [1989].
 How, then, do incentives look on a  luck egalitarian account? The question 
of pertinence here is the relative contributions or  mitigations incentives make to 
the distribution of resources according to endowments (or luck; things outside 
the agent’s control) and ambitions (or choices; things within the agent’s 
control).
 It  might initially  seem  that  health incentives are doomed to fail according 
to the luck egalitarian project: they  explicitly  target  individuals who are likely  to 
suffer  the negative consequences of their  choices (the lifestyles they  have 
adopted).  Insofar  as incentives direct more resources towards those who have 
made poor choices (and fewer towards those making prudent choices) then they 
are unlikely  to result in a  luck egalitarian distribution where an individual’s 
resources reflect her ambitions but not her endowments.
 In fact, as mentioned, it is sometimes very  difficult to separate the 
consequences of luck from  those of choice, and so to determine what should be 
compensated for  and what should not. Luck egalitarianism is also a difficult 
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position to reconcile with many  of our  intuitions about healthcare.  What,  for 
instance, should we do about the woman who chooses freely  to ski, aware of the 
risks, and then suffers an injury? Should we refuse to set  her  leg on the grounds 
that she ‘chose freely’ and must bear the consequences?
 It  is unlikely  a luck egalitarian would insist on the neglect of victims of 
such  ‘option luck’ (those who suffer  the unfortunate, though foreseeable, 
outcomes of their  choices).  Segall  (2007) provides a  defence of criticisms based 
on this unintuitive aspect of luck egalitarianism, pointing out that luck 
egalitarianism can incorporate other  principles to guide right action, such  as 
solidarity, which will  command that we empathise with the plight  of the skier 
and help her out.
 If incentives do sometimes benefit  those who are only  suffering because 
of their choices we might still, it  seems, think this compatible with some 
varieties of luck egalitarianism. Moreover, individuals making bad choices may 
not  be making free choices in the way  required for them to be considered 
responsible (where responsibility  would render them  no longer entitled to 
compensation for  the disadvantages they  suffer as a result). I discuss the 
connection between free choice, responsibility, and desert in Chapter Five.
The Capability Approach
This account identifies valuable outcomes in the core concepts of ‘capabilities’ 
and ‘functionings.’ The latter  are ‘beings and doings,’ including, for example, 
being in good health. Capabilities,  in contrast,  refer  to the opportunities for 
these functionings, so having access to basic healthcare would be a capability  for 
the functioning of being in good health. The motivating force behind the 
capabilities account arose from  a particular concern with global justice and the 
conditions of deprived populations in  developing countries, with the two 
principle architects being Nussbaum  and Sen (1993) (see also Sen [1990,1999, 
2009] and Nussbaum [2000, 2011]).
 As with the luck egalitarian account, capabilities theory  focusses on 
seeking to neutralise unequal influences on people’s access  to resources rather 
than on the outcomes (the actual distribution of resources). As such, the 
emphasis is placed on capabilities rather than functionings: what matters is that 
people have equal access to the different capabilities that may  make their lives 
go well. On the luck egalitarian account, a concern with responsibility  leads to 
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the requirement that the actual distribution of resources be controlled, as far as 
possible, by  choice. On the capabilities account, the concern is with  well-being 
and freedom: individuals must be allowed to follow their own life-plans to 
pursue functionings that will contribute most to their well-being.
 Another  important feature of capabilities theory  is the prioritisation of 
those functionings which enable primary, or  basic, capabilities. This makes 
sense, as certain  capabilities are necessary  for  a whole range of other 
functionings. For example, lacking access to basic healthcare will make a whole 
range of other functionings inaccessible, such as access to work,  opportunities 
to raise a family, and so on.
 I have focused on the UK context of health  incentives,  mostly  for  
pragmatic reasons, and the particular  healthcare system of the UK has specific 
implications for the structure and delivery  of incentives. This also narrows focus 
with  regard to the kind of behaviour  changes likely  to be useful in the UK 
context, and the kinds of ethical concerns that  arise in western democracies. Yet 
health incentives can and are used elsewhere in the world (see, for example 
Nglazi et al [2012]; Ranganathan and Lagarde [2012]; Giuffrida and Torgerson 
[1997]) Many  of the issues from the UK context are transferable (obesity  is of 
global significance, for instance).  Yet, in  the context of global justice, the 
provision of incentives to encourage healthy  behaviour  to relatively  wealthy 
British nationals might  be a poor use of resources,  considering the benefits such 
resources could bring to those far more disadvantaged elsewhere in the world.
 On a more localised reading, this theory  demands that  the most 
fundamental capabilities be ensured (invariably  this will also mean targeting 
disadvantaged groups,  as those are the populations most likely  to lack such 
capabilities). As discussed, without a careful analysis of the empirical evidence 
(more of which  is needed) it is difficult to judge to what extent  incentives do 
preferentially provide healthcare to the more deprived.
 An interesting feature of incentives, in terms of the capabilities account, 
is their  disputed impact on freedom: incentives may  be seen as consistent  with 
ensuring  agents are free to choose how to act, or they  may  be seen as 
compromising this freedom. This links into the discussion of liberty, 
perfectionism  and neutrality  earlier  in this chapter,  as well as the discussion of 
coercion and other  influences on behaviour in the next chapter. Where 
incentives restrict choice and pressure individuals to act in  ways inconsistent 
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with  their own preferences, they  will look undesirable on the capabilities 
account.  In contrast, where they  have the effect of supporting the agent in 
making well-reasoned decisions, and bringing  her actions into line with  her 
stable preferences, incentives will look much more appealing.
 These opposing effects of incentives will depend not  just on the 
theoretical account provided (how  incentives can  be ‘spun’), but on features of 
specific schemes. It looks like incentive schemes which target individuals who 
already  have a wish to alter  their  behaviour  (for instance, smokers who wish  to 
quit) will be more likely  to act in this supportive role (in the manner of aid-type 
incentives). Incentives which are broadly  targeted will be more likely  to push 
some individuals in  ways inconsistent with their  wills (particularly  in the case of 
trade-type incentives). Further, where incentives are at risk of having this latter 
effect, those which move beyond the limits of moderate perfectionism  that I 
have described, and pressure people to adopt controversial conceptions of the 
good life, will be the least acceptable on the capabilities account.
Communitarianism
Communitarian values emphasise the situational ties of the individual to other 
members of her community, in  contrast  to the typically  individualistic focus on 
much liberal political theory. Without dismissing influential values such as well-
being, communitarianism generally  proposes that seeking to promote individual 
well-being by  reinforcing individual human rights will not achieve success. 
Rather than abstracting the interests of the individual from  those of the social 
group within which she exists, communitarianism  emphasises the importance 
of those values which contribute to the good of the group as a  whole. This line of 
thinking encourages us to foster those values which encourage interdependence 
and fellow-feeling.
 Often regarded as a response to the domination of Rawlsian liberalism, 
and the preoccupation with  autonomy  of much political and moral theory  (see 
for example MacIntyre [1981, 1988]; Sandel [1998, 2012]; Walzer  [1983]) 
Communitarianism focuses instead on values such as solidarity,  mutuality, and 
reciprocity  (Prainsack et al.  [2011]). This move away  from  individual preference 
satisfaction towards the promotion of society’s interests as a  whole requires 
some shared understanding and agreement about what is adopted as the 
common good.
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 The welfare state is conceptually  underpinned by  these kind of 
communitarian values: Weale (1990: 477) argues that “the immediate occasion 
for the development of welfare states was not a concern with  equality  but, 
rather, with...  social solidarity”. Distributive forces that follow  these initial 
motivations for the welfare state ought to fall into line with communitarianism.
 There is a sense in which incentives might be open to criticism  from the 
communitarian standpoint. This relates to the worry  that those receiving 
incentives are acting in their own best interests,  selfishly, with  little thought to 
what impact it will have on society. If people who adopt unhealthy  lifestyles do 
so with  a callous disregard for  the significant burden this will place on the NHS 
then responding  to their behaviour with rewards and incentives may  be 
inappropriate. This is clearly  linked to criticisms relating to desert  and 
responsibility (see Chapter Five).
 However, evidence from  medical sociology  and health  psychology  
suggests that social, environmental and economic factors have a  large influence 
on lifestyle choices,  and thus, on health  (see Chapter Five for a fuller  discussion; 
Marmot et al. [2010]; Marteau  [2010]).  The healthcare problem created by  the 
prevalence of unhealthy  lifestyles may  thus be framed as a  social problem, and 
not  one of individual responsibility. Rather than increasing the pressure on the 
individual to ‘make the right decision’ and ‘take responsibility  for her actions,’ 
the communitarian approach would be to seek to redirect  these socio-economic 
influences away  from facilitating unhealthy  behaviours and towards healthier 
lifestyles.
 Aid-type incentives start from  a position of seeking to correct  for internal 
and external influences that  encourage unhealthy  behaviours, helping agents 
who wish to alter their lifestyles to successfully  do so. So far  as this counteracts 
the pernicious effects of deprivation, whilst acknowledging the power of these 
effects (and, similarly, not expecting agents to demonstrate unrealistic levels of 
willpower), incentives may be compatible with communitarian thought.
 For  the most part, however, I suspect communitarians would be hostile 
to incentives. Sandel (2012), for  instance, shows a  good deal of suspicion 
towards incentives of various sorts. Much of Sandel’s criticism uses a rhetoric of 
corruption and coercion (discussed in Chapter  Six),  but this can, in  part, be 
attributed to a communitarian vision where incentives shouldn’t be needed: 
individuals who are properly  on board with  a solidaristic system  of healthcare 
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ought to remain healthy  for  reasons other than the prospect of personal gain. 
The problem with incentives, on this account, is that they  imply  the motivation 
is the financial reward itself,  rather  than the other  benefits that  will arise from 
adopting healthier habits.
 In the case of trade-type incentives,  where the individual is moved to 
alter her  behaviour  for  the most part by  the offer of an incentive, this objection 
may  have some purchase. Yet the supportive, aid-type incentives need not  be 
seen in this way, and may  operate in a way  perfectly  compatible with  a concern 
for the social good. Further, as we are considering the distributive effects of 
incentives,  it  is not clear  that those who do not require incentives to adopt 
healthier  habits (those with reasonably  healthy  lifestyles in the first place) do so 
out of feelings of solidarity  or  similar  anyway. Thus, it  is not clear that 
incentives distribute resources away  from individuals with solidaristic, 
communitarian values, nor  that they  promote an individualistic ideal of 
healthcare.
 A nuanced account of incentives can, I think, fit with a  communitarian 
conception of how the state ought to distribute healthcare resources. However, I 
also think it  would be overly  optimistic to expect communitarian thinkers,  on 
the whole, to accept incentives as consistent with communitarianism.
This section has sought to briefly  outline a number of principles of distribution, 
informed by  different political theories, and to consider  health  incentives in the 
light of these theories. My  aim was twofold: first, I have explored some of the 
distributive effects incentives could have. Second, I have indicated how 
incentives might be consistent or inconsistent with the normative 
recommendations of these different theories.
 For  the most part, I have argued that incentives can be made compatible 
with  all of the theories discussed here. Perhaps the greatest stretch comes when 
we consider the ideals of communitarianism, but even in this case I have 
suggested that  a more nuanced understanding of incentives shows them  to be 
not  inconsistent with valuing solidaristic relations within a community. I do not 
think this result is a  product of philosophical trickery, and nor  do I propose that 
it  is enabled by  the lack of differences between these different political theories 
(they  are quite distinct). Rather,  it is because health is recognised as such an 
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uncontroversial value, and the state provision of healthcare is justified on all  of 
these accounts.
 There will be some political theories which  deny  that the state ought to 
interfere to provide healthcare to its citizens. In that I have neglected to discuss 
such  theories I have left out  a number of arguments that could oppose the 
distributive effects of incentives and position this form of healthcare as outside 
the sphere of legitimate state action. Given a starting position of accepting, in 
principle, state provision of healthcare, it  is more productive to consider how 
those principles that would permit some healthcare interventions would 
respond to the case of incentives.
 Another  reason why  incentives may  be made to fit with  a  variety  of 
principles is that they  are not yet  fully  understood,  both in terms of their 
mechanisms of action and their  distributive effects. This discussion has been 
mostly  speculative, and so it  remains to be seen if incentives do, in fact, combat 
inequalities in health, well-being, capabilities, and so on, or if they  reward 
individualistic,  self-regarding action. Insofar  as incentives can take many 
different forms, and may  operate both as aids to psychological efforts to change 
behaviour and as trades to tempt behaviour change, it  seems there is scope for 
different varieties of incentives to have different  distributive effects,  and so too 
have differing degrees of consistency with principles of distributive justice.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter, I have sought to explore a range of political considerations 
relating to health incentives.  Much of this has served more to indicate the 
degree of complexity  involved in seeking to measure or  predict  the impact of 
healthcare interventions, rather  than to confidently  argue for an understanding 
of how incentives fit into this picture.
 The initial motivation for  this kind of analysis was the concern with 
‘efficiency,’ both as a recognised concern of state action in general, and as a 
criticism  frequently  arising in the media analysis. I presented efficiency  as 
involving different  elements, all  of which contribute to an analysis of any 
healthcare intervention. These were the development of a concept of efficiency 
(including what ‘effectiveness’ will mean, what outcomes will be desirable); a 
calculative method (whereby  inputs and outputs can be assessed and cross-
compared); and a judgement which situates these concerns in the wider political 
98
context and acknowledges the kinds of action that are permissible for a state to 
undertake.
 Tverdek (2004) argues that efficiency  can be thought of in  a stripped 
back, prudential sense, where it is concerned only  with the question of how  a 
particular end might be maximised. It seems to me that much of the discussion 
about the ‘efficiency’ or otherwise of health incentives (as well as healthcare 
more generally) is not concerned with  such calculative questions, but  rather 
with  the ‘what’ and ‘why’ questions which prescribe the appropriate ends of 
action and tell  us what efficient  action will look like.  My  intention in this 
chapter has been to look at those concerns,  rather than to address the 
calculative question.
 I discussed the notion of well-being,  and the way  that such a concept  is 
often taken as fundamental to calculating the effectiveness, and thus efficiency, 
of healthcare interventions. In particular, QALYs are often  used as a method for 
quantifying and comparing the well-being produced by  different interventions. I 
sought to indicate a few of the ways in which well-being and QALYs are 
imperfect tools for measuring the value of healthcare.
 Much of the trouble with trying to evaluate the worth of healthcare 
interventions stems from the difficulty  inherent in conceptualising just  how 
health should be valued, rather  than with the calculative problem. Although 
arguments expressed as ‘efficiency’ concerns may  trigger associations with 
mathematical questions and solutions, it  seems that the conceptual level 
presents us with at least as much work to do.
 I argued that where criticisms directed towards incentives make 
reference to ‘inefficiency,’ this will rarely  refer to uncontentious claims about 
efficacy  and cost. Rather, more likely, such criticisms could be prompted by 
heuristics and will often be informed by  moralised judgements about the value 
of such interventions. I do not intend to suggest such judgements are worthless: 
quite the opposite,  I have argued that the negotiation of values when 
considering efficiency  is vital.  However, the ‘gut instincts’ expressed by 
individuals in  the media and elsewhere, when relatively  uninformed about the 
realities of incentives, and when apparently  masquerading as pronouncements 
about calculative efficiency, will not be particularly helpful.
 It  seems that many  prescriptive arguments about the appropriate ends of 
healthcare and state intervention are presented as prudential questions of how 
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to achieve maximum efficiency. Criticisms that incentives are a ‘waste of money’ 
or ‘won’t  work’ or that  they  won’t convey  lasting benefits appear  to be empirical 
claims about the effectiveness and efficiency  of this intervention. Yet, where 
these claims are made by  lay  members of the public in the media, and are not 
supported by  empirical research into the effectiveness of incentive schemes,  and 
where there is no clear framework for  assessing ‘efficiency’ judgements, these 
arguments begin to look less like ‘strict’ efficiency  claims and more like 
moralised arguments about the appropriate ends of healthcare and state 
intervention.
 Efficiency  is of importance when assessing healthcare interventions,  and 
it  is likely  that  the involvement of money  in the case of incentives lends this 
issue greater salience when we are asked to consider  the worth of such an 
intervention.  Yet, often, concerns may  be best expressed through discussion of 
things other than economic efficiency,  and the resolution of these debates would 
result in greater progress than ongoing head scratching about efficiency  is likely 
to achieve.
 Hence, much of this chapter  has been concerned with questions relating 
to what ought to be promoted through  healthcare; what  ought not to be 
interfered with; what the limitations on state intervention in people’s lives to 
promote health  should be; and what distributive effects the state should aim  for. 
Well-being is of great significance when considering how far the state ought to 
go in promoting health,  and some would be inclined to argue that it  is the only 
thing that matters. However, concern for  other goods - justice and liberty  in 
particular - might constrain efforts to promote well-being.
In the context of the extent  of legitimate state intervention,  I have discussed 
how healthcare interventions,  and incentives in particular, might be considered 
threatening  to liberty.  The next chapter  will be of further relevance to this issue 
as it  takes up the question of whether incentives might exert  a  coercive influence 
on people’s decision-making capacity. Thus, the next chapter considers whether 
incentives can limit the psychological liberty of agents.
 In this chapter, I focused on the issue of political liberty, and whether  a 
government that  promotes certain (healthy) lifestyles, especially  through  the 
use of incentives and rewards,  might be considered as not acting according to 
the principles of a fair  democracy. The debate here links to the ongoing 
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discussion within political philosophy  surrounding perfectionism  and state 
neutrality.
 I suggested that a position of moderate perfectionism looks to be the 
most plausible, both in that it fits with commonsense attitudes towards allowing 
the state some degree of interference, but  whilst protecting citizens from  an 
overly  enthusiastically  interventionist state. Such a  position  permits the 
promotion of relatively  uncontroversial components of the good life,  such  as 
health, but is cautious in its use of pressure in doing so. I argued that health 
incentives, along with many  other forms of health behaviour change 
interventions, will be permissible on such an account, so long as individual 
liberty  is respected.  An understanding of the value of liberty  is important here, 
as it is not a  straightforward case of ‘the more, the better.’ Restriction of choice 
may,  in  some cases, not represent a  loss in valuable liberty  for the individual, 
and at  times (where it helps agents achieve their  long-term  goals) it  may 
promote some aspect of liberty.
 Aid-type incentives, then,  are likely  to be supported by  a  conception of 
political legitimacy  that permits moderate perfectionism. Not all feasible 
designs of incentive schemes will be so benign: incentives could be offered that 
strongly  promote highly  controversial goods in forceful ways, and these may  be 
unacceptable. For  the most part, however, it looks like health incentives will 
remain within these parameters.
There will also be other  reasons for  thinking that the state ought not to use 
incentives to encourage healthy  behaviour - reasons which  do not relate to 
liberty  in the way  that  the neutrality  principle does. Most accounts of political 
theory  identify  the state as responsible for ensuring a just patterning  in  the 
distribution of resources amongst its citizens (a notable exception being 
libertarianism, which focuses on the procedural justice of the free market, which 
will inherently  produce a just distribution). On most accounts,  then, healthcare 
and health are important  goods, the fair allocation of which the state ought to be 
concerned with.
 I outlined a few influential approaches to distributive justice from  
different theories within the liberal tradition. These were Rawlsian liberalism 
(in particular, the Difference Principle), luck egalitarianism, the capability 
approach, and communitarianism. Absent a good understanding of how, 
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exactly, health incentives are likely  to impact upon distributive patterns,  I 
sought only  to show that they  do not look immediately  unacceptable on this 
range of accounts.  Once again,  the variety  of potential incentive schemes means 
that there will always be a  broad range of effects that could result,  and so,  in 
some cases, health incentives could have objectionable allocative tendencies.
 Features of incentive schemes which will make them  more appealing to a 
variety  of distributive principles will include prioritising resources and benefits 
to those worse off so as to reduce inequalities between different socio-economic 
groups; supporting  people to act in line with their (considered, rational) 
preferences without overwhelming the agents’ wills to act  freely, such  that all 
strata of society  have the necessary  opportunities to direct their  lives as they 
wish; encouraging prosocial behaviour and solidarity.
 Not all incentive schemes will be efficient, fit within the constraints of a 
moderately  perfectionist state, and have desirable distributive effects. However, 
it  is plausible that some amongst the multifarious types of incentive scheme 
possible, will fit such criteria, and both promote those values which we think it 
right  for the state to promote without overstepping important boundaries of 
acceptable state intervention. In the following chapters I will consider  some 
further  objections to the use of health  incentives which might yet  deliver some 
restrictions on the kinds of schemes that will be permissible, or  even provide 
reasons for thinking that incentives on the whole will be undesirable.
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THE INFLUENCE OF INCENTIVES: COERCION AND ITS COMPANIONS
INTRODUCTION
A number of the arguments arising  in media  discussions of health  incentives 
concerned the potential for health incentives to pressure the recipient into 
changing her behaviour.9  The worry  is that  this form of pressure harms the 
recipient, perhaps by  coercing her into behaving in ways she doesn’t want to 
behave. Any  interventions intended to influence decision-making can raise 
issues of this sort  because it  is often assumed that free,  autonomous, 
independent decision-making is preferable to decision-making that is in some 
way  determined, influenced, manipulated,  or controlled by  another. Actions 
that are perceived as controlling are often  met with hostility, and there is a 
particular tradition within medical ethics procedures which involve influencing 
agent behaviour.
 Related to issues of influencing behaviour is that of paternalism. By  
definition, this identifies an action that is intended as benevolent by  the 
perpetrator, but which goes against  the subject’s wishes,  or  is performed in 
ignorance of those wishes (Feinberg [1986]; Dworkin [1988]).  Paternalistic 
action may  be justified when there is good reason to believe that an agent is not 
capable of behaving rationally  or is at risk of causing herself significant harm: 
for  instance, individuals who are suffering from severe psychosis, are 
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9  For  instance, Bribe, Responsibility, Nanny State, Health Harm, Doctor-Patient Relationship, 
Political, Stigma, Wrong Message
particularly  young, or are unaware of all the relevant facts. In such cases the 
paternalist may  have a privileged capacity  to identify  what is best  for  the agent. 
Where no factors that undermine the agent’s capacity  to choose for herself are 
present, then paternalistic action denies her the opportunity to do so.
 Coercion, force, compulsion, or  extreme pressure is generally  thought 
undesirable because it  denies agents the opportunity  to act freely. Paternalism  is 
generally  objected to on the grounds that it  undermines agent autonomy 
(related to freedom, but not equivalent). My  concern in this chapter  is to 
consider if incentives will ever, never, or  sometimes result in  objectionable 
liberty  and / or autonomy  undermining outcomes. In particular, I am  interested 
here in the effects of incentives on the agent,  rather than the intentions of the 
incentive provider. Paternalistic and non-paternalistic interventions may  be 
enacted through a number of means of influence,  and it is these (rather  than the 
presence or absence of paternalism) that I wish to discuss.
 It  is plausible (indeed probable) that health  incentives can be described 
as paternalistic: generally, they  aim to promote the best interests (‘healthy 
choices’) of the agent, and need not take into account what the agent’s 
preferences about her behaviour are. However, whilst  interesting, I do not think 
the question of paternalism should be the primary  concern. As discussed 
elsewhere (see Wilson [2011]) many  health interventions (particularly  in  the 
domain of public health) will be paternalistic,  and this should not be assumed to 
be problematic.  Rather, the concern ought to focus on the opportunity  for 
agents to act freely  and maintain a  degree of autonomy  (where feasible). Thus, 
the means of paternalism, rather than the paternalism  itself,  may  be considered 
the primary issue.
In the previous chapter  I discussed liberty, and in particular, whether 
governments must remain neutral with regards to conceptions of the good life 
so as not to impose alien values on citizens.  This chapter  will be concerned with 
liberty  as well, but here I am  more interested in the psychological freedom  of 
the agent, and whether she is put under unacceptable pressure to act in 
particular ways (perhaps against her will). Sufficient psychological and political 
liberty  are necessary  conditions for autonomous agents, as well as being 
important in their own right.
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 This chapter  is split  into three parts: Part One considers the concept of 
coercion and outlines some of the key  ideas developed in philosophical theories 
of coercion. Part Two seeks to apply  this discussion to the case of incentives, 
assessing the extent to which incentives might be thought to have a  coercive 
influence over recipients. Of the methods of behavioural change discussed in 
this chapter  - persuasion, coercion, manipulation,  nudging - the most 
threatening  to liberty  appears to be coercion, as it  is often taken to utterly 
subjugate the agent’s will to that of the coercer. Hence, I lend more discussion 
to this concept.  Part  Three considers these other  means of influencing 
behaviour, and how they  play  a role in the way  incentives encourage healthy 
behaviour.
 My  aim in this chapter  is to be able to make some comments about how 
health incentives impact upon liberty  and autonomy. I seek to do this by 
building up relatively  abstract accounts of different ways of influencing 
behaviour, with a  particular focus on how these influences are experienced by 
the agent (how they  affect  her psychological state).  I then compare these forms 
of behaviour  to what looks to be happening when incentives are used to 
encourage healthy  behaviour, in order  to establish whether  incentives can be 
thought  to employ  these means of influence. The final task is to consider the 
relevance of this for liberty  and autonomy, and the overall ethical acceptability 
of health incentives.
 First, by  way  of framing the discussion, I will make some introductory  
remarks about autonomy, and the importance of having a realistic conception of 
the human agent in identifying undesirable deviations from  the ideal.  This will 
serve to inform the later discussion about the extent to which  incentives should 
be considered to negatively  (or positively) affect liberty  and autonomy. I 
describe some of the misconceptions of autonomy, often  involving excessively 
demanding conditions to be met for  autonomy  to be achieved. I also run 
through  some areas of discussion which  have relevance for autonomy  and 
(health-related) behaviour, including situationism, nudging, and research into 
the social determinants of health.
‘INDEPENDENT’ BEHAVIOUR AND AUTONOMY
It  is generally  assumed that ‘free,’ ‘autonomous’ action is the most worthwhile, 
and action lacking in these qualities will be undesirable. Yet there is a tendency 
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to talk about such attributes as if all human agents are capable of attaining 
‘perfect’ freedom  or autonomy, and that  this should be the ultimate 
(downstream) aim of all  self- or other-regarding action (or  at least,  one of its 
primary aims).
 Even where ambition does not stretch quite so far, idealised models of 
autonomous agents may  be far removed from reality. This can  result  in the bar 
being set too high, and unrealistic assumptions being made about the extent to 
which agents can  (and should) make robust, self-conscious, character-driven, 
internally-motivated, independent, rational, reasons-sensitive,  future-aware 
decisions, and cleanly execute these decisions in all of their actions.
 This is clearly  pie in the sky: none of us lives in isolation, and all of our 
actions are influenced at some level by  other agents and the environment. 
Further, we are constantly  subject to failings of cognitive function. I need not 
surrender  my  perception of myself as an autonomous agent simply  because, 
once again, I poured coffee on my  cereal and filled my  mug with milk, or made 
another  ‘accidental’ purchase from  Amazon.  There is a leniency  in everyday  life 
for behaviour to be less than fully  consistent with rational, considered 
preferences,  and yet  for the agent to still be considered autonomous. We must 
adopt a reasonable level of ‘autonomy’ that is both achievable and desirable.
 When it comes to incentives, we must consider how far the external 
influence disrupts the agent’s capacity  to make decisions freely, and her status 
as an autonomous agent. It  is not at all clear  that simply  being subject to more 
external influence will be undesirable. As social creatures, being aware of and 
responsive to our  environment is key  to successful survival, and the alternative, 
of being isolated and unresponsive to others in one’s behaviour, will not be a 
worthwhile enterprise.
 The philosophical literature on the concept of autonomy  has developed to 
reflect the debates about just  what is valuable about  different forms of political, 
moral and psychological forms of autonomy. Hence, autonomy  discussed in 
different domains may  stipulate different conditions. A widely  influential 
discussion of moral autonomy, however, is provided by  Kant  (1785/1993). The 
Kantian tradition places autonomy  central to practical reason, and uses it to 
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derive the Categorical Imperative and the basis of morality. 10 This fundamental 
significance of autonomy  is maintained in the dominant  political philosophy  of 
our time, Liberalism.11
 I cannot do justice to the rich and involved literature on autonomy  that 
already  exists, even within the disciplinary  confines of bioethics.12 Historically, 
autonomy  has played a substantial role in moral and political thought, and 
continues to hold importance for contemporary  philosophical theory, especially 
within bioethical debates (Beauchamp and Childress [2001]; Gillon [2003]). 
Despite more recent scepticism as to the centrality  liberty  and autonomy  ought 
to play  in moral thinking in bioethics (Dawson [2010]; Wilson and Dawson 
[2010]) the concept still clearly  holds intuitive appeal as a valuable feature of 
human agency.
 For  the purposes of this discussion, I take it  that some conception of 
autonomy  can uncontroversially  be assumed a desirable ‘good,’ though the 
specifics of this claim  I leave largely  underdetermined. As this chapter develops, 
the kind of features that I take to contribute to valuable autonomy, and factors 
that detract from it, should become clear.
Of relevance to the discussion of autonomy  in  the context of influencing health 
behaviour is the role the environment plays in determining preferences and 
decision-making. A better understanding of human psychology  may  alter how 
we conceive of (the importance of) autonomy. Some, including ‘situationist’ 
social psychologists, argue that  it  is the situations a person finds herself in, 
rather than her robust character traits, that predict how she will behave (Doris 
[2002]; Harman [2000]). Thus, situationists claim, “across a range of 
107
10  Kant offers the Categorical Imperative as  the supreme principle of practical  reason, a 
commonly  used formulation being “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the 
same time will  that it should become a  universal law” (Kant [1785/1993: 30]). Once again, much 
sophisticated analysis of  Kantian  autonomy, including the Categorical Imperative, has been 
undertaken, but I do not intend to engage with  this discussion  here (see O’Neill  [1975]; O’Neill 
[1989]; Guyer [2000]; Korsgaard [1996])
11  In  particular, it is central to much of Rawls’s work, including  1971’s A Theory of Justice  and 
the proposal for establishing a society built upon just institutions.
12  A  handful of relatively  recent influential discussions directly addressing  or  relating to 
autonomy  include Mill  (1859/2006); Raz (1986); Berlin  (1969); Dworkin (1988); Dworkin 
(2000); Feinberg (1986); O’Neill (2002).
situations, the person’s behavior tends to converge on the behavioral norm for 
those situations.” (Kamtekar [2004]) Various experiments have been conducted 
by  those within moral psychology  and experimental ethics,  seeming to show 
interesting examples of inconsistent, contradictory  and often surprising moral 
reasoning in experimental subjects (Appiah  [2008]; Strack and Deutsch [2004]; 
Haidt et al. [1993]).
 Such a  theory  proposes to challenge the significance of the Aristotelian 
conception of the “firm  and unchangeable”  virtuous character, expressed 
through  right actions (Aristotle [1984: 1105b1]).  A debate has developed 
between the situationists on the one hand who argue that  the importance of 
environmental influences on behaviour mean we should discard notions of 
virtue and character as attaching to particular  individuals,  and the virtue 
theorists on the other, who argue that the empirical evidence poses no such 
challenge to virtue theory  (for  proponents of situationism, see Doris [1998, 
2002]; and Harman [1999, 2000]; for  responses see Kupperman [2001]; and 
Kamtekar [2004].
 Another example where it  seems that behaviour is surprisingly  
responsive to unnoticed external influences is described by  the ‘libertarian 
paternalists’ Thaler and Sunstein (2008) whose popular  and oft  debated book 
Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness describes 
how subtle changes to the way  a  decision situation is set up (the ‘choice 
architecture’) can have a  significant  impact on the way  people behave. They 
provide what has become the classic example of nudging: arranging food items 
in  a particular way  in a cafeteria in order to influence what people eat. 
Supposedly, by  positioning healthy  items in more salient positions, one can 
make it  more likely  that diners will  select those items over less healthy 
alternatives (Thaler and Sunstein 2008: 1).
 Again, whereas in the situationism/virtue ethics debate the claim  is that 
it  is environmental influences rather than moral character that best predict 
behaviour, here the libertarian  paternalists claim that it is choice architecture 
rather than personal preferences which predict dietary decisions.
 A final domain of research worth  mentioning relates to lifestyle choices 
and socio-economic status. In the next chapter,  I discuss further  some of the 
empirical literature which looks at the relationship between level of deprivation 
and health outcomes. Briefly, there is a correlation between social and 
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environmental factors and health which may  be at least partly  explained by  non-
personal factors,  calling into question the idea that lifestyle choices are the 
result of agent-specific, independent decisions (Marmot et al. [2010]).
Empirical evidence of the sort mentioned above is open to debate as to the 
reliability  and interpretation of results, and, importantly, how they  should 
shape our theories about human agency. However,  the assumption that  people 
ordinarily  act according to stable preferences seems weakened by  such evidence, 
and psychological research relating directly  to the mechanisms of health 
behaviour suggests that much behaviour is not consciously willed.13
 As mentioned, it  will be important to have a realistic understanding of 
what kind of ‘autonomy’ human agents are ordinarily  capable of attaining. 
When considering the danger posed by  health interventions, therefore, we 
should focus on the general capacity  for  self-determination: to direct  one’s life 
in  the manner  in  which one chooses.  In order for agents to have this control 
over their  own lives, they  must be capable of informed deliberation between a 
reasonable choice set, and they  must have the power to implement those choices 
and influence how their life goes.
 This is a fairly  minimal notion of autonomy, but  I adopt this in  part to 
indicate a  version of autonomy  that could be considered valuable to agents on 
the majority  of accounts.14  This rather modest autonomy  will, however, be 
frustrated where an agent’s actions do not  reflect her  own plans and projects, 
but  rather  those of another, or of some overwhelming compulsion within 
herself. Coercion, manipulation, and ‘nudges’ by  others (however benevolent 
their intentions) which circumvent  the agent’s deliberative capacities as a 
means to behaviour  change may  be deleterious to agent autonomy. The aim of 
this chapter  will be to explore if and when health  incentives might employ  such 
means of behaviour  change, and whether in doing so agent autonomy  is 
undermined in a troubling way.
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13  I discuss this further  in  the section  on ‘Reflective and Impulsive Control  Over Behaviour’ 
towards the end of this chapter.
14 Inevitably, some will be dissatisfied and would insist a more robust notion of autonomy is an 
essential criterion to any permissible health intervention.
PART ONE: A THEORY OF COERCION
THE CONCEPT OF ‘COERCION’: TWO APPROACHES
There is something paradoxical about the concept of ‘coercion.’ Whilst it  seems 
to offend against a  number of uncontroversial ‘goods’ (choice, freedom, 
voluntary  action,  autonomy, and so forth) it  is also widely  accepted as being 
essential to the government of society.  Most illustrative is the need for a  law 
enforcement system with the power to coerce (would-be) criminals with (threats 
of) fines, incarceration, and other  punishments. Some philosophers, such as 
Robert Paul Wolff (1970/1998) bite the bullet here,  insisting that state coercion, 
where this is at  the expense of individual autonomy, is never  justified. Most, 
however, uphold that  to coerce an individual will generally  be wrongful, but  is in 
some instances justified.
 There are two key  requirements, then, for an account of coercion. First, it  
must  specify  under what circumstances we should identify  an influence as being 
coercive. Second, it  must instruct us as to when a  coercive influence is morally 
permissible,  and when it is not.  Such an account will provide a descriptive and 
normative framework for talking about coercion in a  useful way  – a  way  that 
allows us to evaluate potentially coercive actions according to this framework.
 A useful distinction can be drawn between two approaches to developing 
an account of coercion which I will  call the situation-centric and agent-centric 
approaches.  The former is more concerned with  looking for coercion in facts (or 
assumptions) about the situation in general, whilst  the latter  looks for coercion 
in  facts (or assumptions) about the agent. One might phrase this (roughly) in 
terms of causes and effects: the situation-centric approach focuses on the 
causes of coercion, and what items need to be present in a situation in order for 
it  to qualify  as coercive. Contrastingly, the agent-centric  approach focuses more 
on the effects  of a proposal, and what consequences would indicate the 
occurrence of coercion. 15
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15 Imagine how one might identify  what is a cake and what is not. The situation-centric approach 
will  look at the ingredients list, and how it was cooked. If  it contains eggs and flour  and butter 
and is baked in an oven, it is probably a  cake; if it contains none of these ingredients then it 
could not be a cake. The agent-centric approach, in contrast, will look at the finished product 
and try to decide if the final item meets some ‘cake’ standard.
Of course, most sensible accounts seek to capture both these aspects of 
coercion, acknowledging that  both agential and non-agential factors contribute 
to whether  or  not a proposal is coercive.  However, the two approaches 
distinction I have described here is rarely  explicitly  acknowledged. Rough and 
ready  though the situation-centric / agent-centric distinction may  be,  it is worth 
making and bearing in mind during  the discussion of different accounts of 
coercion. Many  accounts will emphasise one or other  of the situational and 
agential factors in assessing coercion, and there also tends to be more within-
group consistency along this distinction.
THREATS, OFFERS, AND BASELINES
Much of the literature on coercion dwells on the distinction between threats and 
offers, and whether  offers, as well as threats, may  be coercive. Threats and offers 
can broadly be distinguished thus:
The threat / offer distinction provides a platform for thinking about proposals 
in  terms of how  they  affect  the recipient  relative to some baseline. The baseline 
provides the reference point for the ‘better off’ and ‘worse off’ used to 
distinguish threats from  offers. This approach tends to be more situation-
The situation-centric approach focuses on the actions of the proposer 
and the situation the proposee subsequently  finds herself in. This 
approach tends to be tied to discussions of the distinction  between threats 
and offers, and the significance of baselines by  which to assess proposals. 
Such items provide standards to judge the coerciveness of a proposal 
against. 
The agent-centric  approach focuses on the psychology  of the proposee, 
and the impact  the making of the proposal has on her. Of less interest to 
this account is the position of the proposal relative to some baseline (and 
thus, whether  it  is a  threat or an offer). All influences on the proposee’s 
psychology are evaluated in the same way. 
A proposal is a threat if the recipient will be made worse 
off if they reject the proposal.
A proposal is an offer if the recipient will be made no 
worse off by rejecting the proposal.
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centric, because it looks to features of the pre- and post-proposal situation to 
identify whether the proposal should be considered a threat or an offer.
 Most theories that place an emphasis on threats, offers, and baselines 
assume that these distinctions are significant  to identifying coercion. That is, 
whether  a  proposal is coercive or not  will depend in part on how  it affects the 
recipient relative to some baseline. Agent-centric approaches place more 
emphasis on the psychology  of the recipient and tend to be less interested in the 
threat / offer distinction, instead emphasising the effect a proposal has on the 
recipient rather than the form of the proposal itself. On such accounts, all 
influences on an agent’s psychology  (threats and offers alike) are treated in the 
same way. If there is a qualitative difference between how threats and offers are 
experienced by  recipients (with one being capable of coercion and the other  not) 
then the threat / offer distinction would hold more significance on the agent-
centric account.
Baselines are used to judge whether  an individual has been made ‘better’ or 
‘worse’ off by  a proposal,  and thus whether that proposal is a threat  or  an offer. 
Often, baselines appear obvious and need not be explicitly  identified in  order to 
distinguish threats from  offers. In the following  two cases, Case I seems 
obviously to be a threat, and Case II obviously an offer.
Case I: Dick holds a loaded pistol up to Ambrose’s head, demanding that 
Ambrose hand over his purse, or suffer being shot in the head.
Case II: Boris asks David if he would like to buy  his rhinestone-encrusted 
bicycle for £500.
In Case I,  Dick’s proposal (to take Ambrose’s money  in exchange for  not 
shooting him) is a  threat because, once the proposal has been made, Ambrose is 
worse off than before the proposal was made.  In Case II,  before the proposal is 
made, David has all of his money  but  no rhinestone-encrusted bicycle. After 
Boris has made his proposal, David may  choose to either  part  with £500 in 
exchange for  a sparkly  bicycle, or keep his money  and continue to drive to work. 
David is no worse off for receiving Boris’s proposal, as he can safely  reject it 
without suffering any loss from his baseline (pre-proposal) condition.
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 Roughly, in these cases we compare the situation before the proposal was 
made (the pre-proposal situation) to the situation after the proposal was made 
(the post-proposal situation). The pre-proposal situation acts as a  baseline by 
which to judge if the proposal was coercive.
 Sometimes, however, peoples’ baselines place them  in already  vulnerable 
positions. Nozick (1997: 26-27) provides an example of a drowning man who is 
offered rescue in exchange for $10,000. Clearly  the man is better off for  having 
received the offer of rescue,  yet the actions of the greedy  rescuer still seem 
coercive. One response of the baseline-theorist is to change the stipulation of 
the baseline: instead of being the ‘normally  expected’ course of events, the 
baseline is now  identified as the ‘morally  expected’ course of events.  The 
baseline is now set as what the proposer ought to do (in this case, the proposer 
clearly  ought to save the drowning man for no money) (Nozick [1997: 27]). This 
creates a moralised (baseline) account of coercion.
 Wertheimer (1987) adopts a broadly  Nozickian account of coercion, but 
whilst Nozick does not insist  that only threats (and never offers) can coerce, 
Wertheimer’s view differs:
I have argued,  in  effect,  that  the coerciveness of proposals is all  in  the 
baseline. And relative to that baseline, only threats are coercive.
Wertheimer (1987: 222)
There are others who agree with Wertheimer and argue that only  threats, and 
never  offers, can be coercive. Gorr (1986) and Berman (2002) both  argue that 
proposals should be seen as ‘biconditionals’ – that is,  they  have two parts to 
them, the offer and the ‘anti-offer’.  For instance, I might propose to give you 
£20 if you give me your watch. The first  conditional here is that which is 
explicitly  made: I give you £20, you give me your watch. The alternative 
conditional is implicit: I do not give you  £20, you do not give me your watch. 
This can be read as “unless you give me your watch, I will not give you £20.” 
According to Gorr and Berman, when proposals are coercive,  it  is always by 
virtue of one of their constitutive conditionals being a threat.
 Zimmerman (1981) is one of the most prominent advocates of the view 
that offers, as well as threats, can coerce. According to Zimmerman, “By  and 
large, threats involve coercion and offers do not: mainly  because people do not 
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like to be threatened whereas they  do like to receive offers.” (1981: 125) In 
explaining his position, Zimmerman refers to another example of Nozick’s, the 
Slave Case,  where a regularly  beaten slave is told he will not be beaten on a 
particular occasion if he performs some specified (unpleasant) task:
[A]n  offer  is coercive only  if [the recipient] would prefer to move from 
the normally  expected pre-proposal  situation  to the proposal 
situation, but he  would strongly prefer even more to move from  the 
actual proposal situation to some alternative pre-proposal situation. 
The slave,  for  example,  would strongly  prefer  not  being  a  slave to 
having  a  choice between being  beaten  and being  spared a  beating  for 
performing a disagreeable task.
Zimmerman (1981: 132, emphasis in original)
The slave would much prefer to be in an alternative situation (where he is 
neither a slave nor beaten). In this situation, the ‘slave’ would be made worse off 
by  the ‘slave owner’s’ proposal (“perform action A or I will beat you”), thus it 
would be coercive. It is through keeping the slave in his enslaved situation, and 
denying him access to a preferred situation, that  the slave owner’s ‘coercive 
offer’ derives its coerciveness.
 Zimmerman stipulates conditions to restrict the kinds of alternative pre-
proposal situations that might be referenced. First, the alternative situation 
must be feasible for  the ‘coercee,’ and second, the ‘coercer’ must  have actively 
prevented her from achieving it  (Zimmerman [1981: 144-145]). In the Slave 
Case, it is feasible that the slave not be a  slave, and also the case that the slave 
owner actively  prevents the slave from  accessing this preferred situation, thus 
the slave owner’s proposal is coercive.  In the Drowning Man Case, however, 
although it is feasible for the man not to be drowning  the greedy  rescuer is not 
actively  preventing him  from accessing this situation. On Zimmerman’s 
account, then, the greedy rescuer does not coerce. 16
In summary, the requirements for coercion to occur according to the different 
baseline theories are:
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16 Instead, Zimmerman identifies this as a case of exploitation.
NON-BASELINE APPROACHES
Another  group of philosophers take a different approach to identifying coercion. 
Frankfurt (1988/2007) and Feinberg (1986) both  look to the affect a proposal 
has on the recipient’s will and their ability  to choose between courses of action 
to distinguish coercive from  non-coercive proposals.  Neither of these accounts 
require a baseline to be identified.
 Frankfurt takes coercion as a very  robust notion,  whereby  one who is 
coerced is absolutely  compelled to act in the way  she does - her will is utterly 
overwhelmed by the proposal:
A  coercive threat arouses in  its victim  a  desire – i.e.,  to avoid the penalty  – 
so powerful that  it  will  move him  to perform  the required action  regardless 
of whether  he wants to perform  it or considers that  it would be reasonable 
for  him  to do so. Now  an  offer  may  also arouse in  the person who receives it 
a  desire – i.e., to acquire the benefit – which  is similarly  irresistible. This 
suggests that a person may be coerced by an offer as well as by a threat.
Frankfurt (1988/2007: 41)
• One is better off in the preproposal situation than the postproposal 
situation (it would be better not to receive the proposal). The proposal 
is a coercive threat (according to both moralised and non-moralised 
accounts), or;
• One is better off in the postproposal situation than the preproposal 
situation (it is better to receive the proposal). However, there is an 
alternative (morally  acceptable) preproposal situation that is better 
than one’s actual (morally  unacceptable) preproposal situation, and 
also better than the postproposal situation. The proposal is a  coercive 
threat (according to the moralised account), or;
• One is better off in the postproposal situation than the preproposal 
situation (it is better to receive the proposal). However, there is an 
alternative preproposal situation  that is both feasible and made 
unavailable by  the proposer. This alternative preproposal situation is 
better  than one’s actual preproposal situation, and also better  than the 
postproposal situation. The proposal is a  coercive offer (according to 
the non-moralised account).
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Frankfurt relates coercion to moral responsibility: one is free from moral 
responsibility  when one is coerced. Hence, Frankfurt stipulates such demanding 
conditions for agents to be considered as having acted under coercion.
 Feinberg (1986) similarly  identifies coercion as placing an extraordinary  
degree of pressure on  the subject’s will, such that  her  choice is not truly  ‘free’ or 
‘voluntary.’ Feinberg  draws a line between compulsion and coercion, however. 
In the former case, all actions apart from that which  the compeller wishes to be 
performed are closed off, so that it  is not  possible for  the compelled agent to act 
in  any  way  other than how she does. In the case of coercion,  all actions other 
than that action  the coercer  wishes to be performed become associated with an 
extremely  high cost. The coerced agent could still choose to act other  than the 
coercer wishes her to act, but it  would be to her  vast detriment (she may  be shot 
in  the leg  if she chooses not to hand over her money,  or  suffer  some other 
terrible fate) (Feinberg [1986: 190-193]). Depending on the degree of coercive 
pressure placed on the recipient by  a proposal, the voluntariness of her 
subsequent actions may be utterly compromised, or may be less affected.
 As with Frankfurt, Feinberg accepts that offers may  coerce as well as 
threats (Feinberg 1986: 229). Part of Feinberg’s criteria for identifying coercion 
proper (where coercion is judged to have occurred) distinct from  coercive 
pressure (where ‘coercive’ proposals have been made but the recipient  is not 
coerced) is that the recipient accede to the coercive proposal. This gives 
Feinberg a way  of distinguishing coercive from non-coercive threats: the former 
are successful in getting the recipient to act as the coercer  wishes, whilst the 
latter  are not. People will only  succumb to a  threat (and thus act in a manner 
that makes them  worse off) when the consequences of the alternative action are 
even more undesirable.
 This raises an issue when trying to distinguish coercive from non-
coercive offers. People will often act in accordance with offers,  as they  make the 
recipient better off,  yet we should not  wish  to say  that on these occasions the 
recipient is coerced. To resolve this issue, Feinberg identifies two criteria that 
are significant to identifying  coercion: the polarity and proximity conditions 
(Feinberg  [1986: 235]). In the polarity condition, Feinberg stipulates that only 
when one part of a proposal (half of the biconditional) promises to make the 
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recipient worse off can that proposal be coercive.17  The proximity condition 
refers to the degree of coerciveness brought by  a proposal, and thus how likely  it 
is that the recipient will be coerced.18
 These approaches to coercion are agent-centric, as the focus is not on the 
proposal itself, but  on how it  influences the recipient.  Where the proposal 
sufficiently  impacts upon the will or  decision-making ability  of the recipient so 
as to render her actions unfree, involuntary, compelled, or ‘not her own’ in some 
way, the agent is considered to have been coerced. The non-baseline accounts 
need not strictly  distinguish between a threat and an offer  because they  are 
concerned with the way  a  proposal affects the recipient’s psychology  and her 
decision-making ability, rather than with the nature of the proposal itself.
SUMMARY REMARKS
I have sought  to outline some different forms an account of coercion could take. 
In doing so, I have indicated how differences in these theories relate to different 
evaluations of potentially  coercive proposals. The main distinction I have drawn 
has been between situation-centric and agent-centric accounts, which typically 
focus on baselines in  the first case,  and psychological pressure and 
voluntariness in the second.
 As I have described it, the agent-centric,  non-moralised account will 
probably  be more permissive when it  comes to identifying coercion (although all 
accounts will vary  depending on what other necessary  conditions they  include). 
Unless it is made a precondition of coercion that the coercer acts wrongfully, it 
is possible that trivial threats and proposals not intended to put  significant 
pressure on the recipient will qualify  as coercive because they  have an unusually 
large impact on the recipient. For instance,  the threat “I will stuck my  tongue 
out at you unless you give me some of your popcorn”  could be intended as a 
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17 It  cannot be the case that choosing between  two options that both  make me much better  off, or 
choosing between my current (comfortable) status quo and a better  situation  can be at all 
coercive.
18  Two minimally  bad outcomes will make for a ‘hard’ decision  because there is  little to choose 
between them. Contrastingly, choosing between a  bad outcome and a completely  disastrous one 
may  be a  more harrowing  decision  to make, but is  actually  quite ‘easy’ in this  sense. The latter 
decision will prove more coercive.
joke. However, if the recipient of such  a proposal happened to have a  mortal 
fear of tongues then such a proposal could coerce her.
 If we care about the moral status of the actions of the proposer  and, in 
particular, the recipient, we should adopt  an agent-centric account,  where the 
key  to identifying coercion is the impact a proposal has on the recipient’s will. 
Abstracted from the effect on the recipient, a  coercive (or non-coercive) 
proposal carries no moral weight.  Focus on the legitimacy  of the coercer’s 
actions might be judged better by  measures of her  intentions (whether to coerce 
or not), and this might be accessible by  considering the reasonableness of the 
expectation that  the recipient will be coerced by  a  proposal (rather than whether 
the recipient  actually was coerced).  I am, however, more concerned with the 
recipient than the proposer,  and the extent to which the recipient’s liberty  and 
autonomy  is threatened by  a particular  proposal (in this case an incentive). 
Hence, an agent-centric account seems to identify the right features here.
 That said, baseline (and situation-centric) criteria  probably  provide a 
handy  way  of judging when an agent is likely  to be coerced, but seem  to miss 
something of the importance of coercive influence (that the agent is not able to 
act freely  and voluntarily). It is a  matter  of psychological fact rather than 
philosophical speculation, but it seems much more likely  that the threat of being 
made worse off will pressure an agent and limit her liberty  than the offer  of 
being made much better off.  Where baselines present a helpful way  of assessing 
the influences on an agent, they  may  be a good way  of structuring the 
consideration of what kind of pressure her will is placed under.
 In order to avoid (the charge of) coercing someone, the proposer  must 
make herself aware of the recipient’s psychological state, as far as is feasible. 
This would require one to avoid, where possible, making proposals likely  to 
overwhelm an agent’s will and prevent her  from  acting voluntarily. There may 
also be vulnerabilities to particular  threats and offers that affect people quite 
generally,  not just those with  limited capacity  to resist coercive proposals. The 
proposer  must therefore make it her business to be aware of just  how much 
pressure a proposal is likely to place on the recipient’s will.
 In Part Two, I will consider  how this account of coercion relates to the 
provision of health incentives. It will be important to bear  in mind that 
incentives may  be targeted at particular groups of people, and such groups may 
be likely  to share particular psychological features that make them more 
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susceptible to incentives and thus more vulnerable to coercion from  such 
interventions. I say  this to pre-empt the likely  (and completely  appropriate) 
complaint that it is rather too large a burden on the proposer  to make herself 
aware of all of the psychological foibles of the recipient. Indeed,  one could 
hardly  consider  someone to have acted wrongfully  by  making a well-intentioned 
offer which happens to coerce.  As mentioned, we may  adopt  a  standard of 
reasonableness here which will firstly  indicate what kinds of proposals could 
potentially  coerce, and further,  to what extent the proposer  must  inform  herself 
of the specific vulnerabilities of her recipients.
PART TWO: COERCION AND HEALTH INCENTIVES
INTRODUCTION
I now  want to assess health incentives in relation to this discussion of coercion. 
I will follow roughly  the structure of Part One. First,  I consider the significance 
of the ‘two approaches’ to theories of coercion proposed in the previous Part. I 
then discuss how incentives fit  into the earlier discussion of baseline accounts of 
coercion, providing some examples of how different incentive scheme designs 
might look on these baseline accounts. Next I go on to look at non-baseline 
accounts, those tending to relate coercion to degree of choice and voluntariness 
of action: to what extent the recipient feels compelled to act in a certain way  by 
a proposal.
 I conclude with a brief discussion of how an agent-centric account of 
coercion relates to those factors significant to making normative judgements 
about the use of incentives. I gesture at  how notions of choice, voluntariness, 
responsibility  and autonomy  will make a  coercive act undesirable, and how, too, 
coercion might be justified where it  benefits similar phenomena, or improves 
welfare or  suchlike. My  main point here is to emphasise that the relationship 
between the coerciveness of an act and the moral permissibility  of that act is 
non-linear. The extent to which coercion is experienced, the manner  of 
coercion, the benefits produced through coercion, and numerous other  factors 
will contribute to the overall assessment  of the rightness or wrongness of a 
potentially coercive act.
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TWO APPROACHES
In Part One, I suggested that  a  useful distinction could be drawn between 
theories of coercion that place an emphasis on the situation and those that place 
an emphasis on the agent. These different approaches to identifying coercion 
could have different relevancies for  the use of incentives in altering health 
behaviour. To recap:
On the situation-centric account,  the pertinent question when considering the 
coerciveness of incentives is whether or  not there are features of incentive 
schemes that could make the proposals involved within them  coercive. 
Contrastingly, if we take an agent-centric approach, we must consider what 
features of human psychology  might mean that incentives could have a coercive 
impact on the recipient.
 My  preference is for  a more agent-centric account, as these foreground 
the importance of the agent’s experience, and whether  or not she feels coerced 
(and is able to act voluntarily).  However, both  situational and agential factors 
will be helpful for  predicting and judging  coercion.  Another division within 
theories of coercion  was between baseline and non-baseline accounts. Again, I 
think both have something to offer to the analysis of health incentives, and 
provide different ways of framing the issue: does this proposal make the 
recipient worse off (baseline); does this proposal place excessive pressure on the 
recipient’s will (non-baseline).  Both seem pertinent to assessing the 
permissibility of behavioural interventions such as health incentives.
The situation-centric approach  focuses on the actions of the proposer and 
the situation the proposee subsequently  finds herself in. This approach tends to 
be tied to discussions of the distinction between threats and offers, and the 
significance of baselines by  which to assess proposals. Such  items provide 
standards to judge the coerciveness of a proposal against.
The agent-centric approach focuses on the psychology  of the proposee, and 
the impact the making of the proposal has on her. Of less interest to this 
account is the position of the proposal relative to some baseline (and thus, 
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THREATS, OFFERS, BASELINES, AND LOSS AVERSION
My  aim in this section is to relate the earlier discussion of the threat / offer 
distinction and baselines to the coercive potential of incentives. Baseline 
accounts of coercion identify  some relevant starting point, against which the 
issuing of a proposal or  the effect of that proposal is judged. Some accounts 
stipulate that only  proposals that  count as threats relative to the baseline can be 
coercive whilst others allow that offers may  coerce as well. Different  accounts 
also suggest  different strategies for  selecting the relevant baseline. In the earlier 
discussion, I suggested the following conditions under which a proposal can be 
considered coercive, according to the baseline accounts:
Although generally  oriented towards situational factors, these baseline 
approaches can be more or  less agent-centric as well. They  focus on the effect 
the proposal has on the recipient, but judge this against some discernible 
baseline (which may  be composed of elements of agent psychology  and 
situational factors). Ordinarily, however, baseline approaches tend to emphasise 
situational factors in judging the valence of a  proposal. In applying this aspect of 
• One is better off in the preproposal situation than the postproposal 
situation (it would be better not to receive the proposal). The proposal 
is a coercive threat (according to both moralised and non-moralised 
accounts), or;
• One is better off in the postproposal situation than the preproposal 
situation (it is better to receive the proposal). However, there is an 
alternative (morally  acceptable) preproposal situation that is better 
than one’s actual (morally  unacceptable) preproposal situation, and 
also better than the postproposal situation. The proposal is a  coercive 
threat (according to the moralised account), or;
• One is better off in the postproposal situation than the preproposal 
situation (it is better to receive the proposal). However, there is an 
alternative preproposal situation  that is both feasible and made 
unavailable by  the proposer. This alternative preproposal situation is 
better  than one’s actual preproposal situation, and also better  than the 
postproposal situation. The proposal is a  coercive offer (according to 
the non-moralised account).
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coercive theory  to incentives, I will  focus on the key  consideration of whether 
the proposal makes the recipient worse off. Here, the emphasis is on the 
identification of the appropriate baseline.
Take the most  straightforward use of incentives, where the proposal is 
considered both  welcome and an offer. In this case, the recipient is no worse off 
for receiving the proposal of an incentive. This incentive could be something in 
the form of “as a one off,  if you  do not smoke any  cigarettes today, I will give you 
three pounds.”  In this case, receiving the proposal makes you no worse off as 
you can turn it down without suffering any  harm. This situation accords with 
none of the requirements listed above for a  proposal to qualify  as coercive: it is 
not  a threat relative to the normal baseline; it is not a threat relative to the 
moral baseline; and let us assume there is no feasible,  preferred pre-proposal 
situation that I have actively  prevented you  from  accessing. In  no way, 
according to the baseline accounts, should this proposal be considered coercive.
 If this were the only  way  in which incentives could be used then, on the 
baseline account, there would be little need for further discussion.  However, we 
can further  complicate the picture. An important consideration for determining 
whether  incentive schemes would be an appropriate means of changing 
behaviour and improving health is how  efficacious they  are. Some incentive 
schemes could involve straightforward mechanisms, such as the case where you 
do not smoke for a period of time and receive a cash payment in return. There 
might, however, be more effective ways of implementing the same incentive. 
Information relating  to the psychology  of decision-making and behaviour  can 
help those designing incentive schemes to make them as effective as possible. In 
the next section, I will discuss how efforts to design effective incentive schemes 
may influence their coerciveness.
INCENTIVE SCHEME DESIGN: THE CUSTODIAN AND HABITUATION CASES
Economists and psychologists have long been aware of the phenomenon of loss 
aversion,  developed as a component of ‘Prospect Theory’ by  Kahneman and 
Tversky  (1979). Prospect Theory  seeks to explain  why  individuals do not always 
behave so as to maximise ‘expected utility’ (i.e. people do not  choose the option 
with  the greatest  likely  payoff). Initially, Prospect Theory  was used to explain 
the decisions people made under conditions of ‘risk,’ but components of 
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Prospect Theory  (such as ‘loss aversion’) are observed in riskless choice 
situations as well (see Tversky and Kahneman [1986: S258]; [1991]).
 Loss aversion explains why  people sometimes do not act in a manner 
most likely  to maximise their gains, in preference for acting to avoid losses. This 
is because individuals are more sensitive to losses from  the status quo than they 
are to gains (Tversky  and Kahneman [1991: 1047]). Roughly,  people weight 
some monetary  loss about twice as heavily  as the same monetary  gain (Tversky 
and Kahneman [1991: 1053-1054]).19
 Loss aversion can manifest  itself in a number  of empirically  observed 
phenomena, such as the ‘endowment effect’ (Tversky  and Kahneman [1991: 
1041]; Thaler  [1980]; and Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler [1991]). The 
endowment  effect is identified as causing the asymmetry  between the valuation 
of items made by  buyers and those made by  sellers.  In such cases, “the loss of 
utility  associated with giving up a valued good is greater than the utility  gain 
associated with receiving it.” (Tversky and Kahneman [1991: 1041])
 Another  important aspect of the theory  relating to loss aversion is 
reference dependence,  whereby  “the carriers of value are gains and losses 
defined relative to a  reference point.”  (Tversky  and Kahneman [1991: 1039]) 
This references dependence is important in the case of incentive schemes and 
coercion, because it plays a fundamental role in determining the baseline.20
 In designing incentive schemes,  as with any  healthcare intervention, 
efficiency  will be advantageous. Exploiting phenomena such as loss aversion 
may  provide a way  of achieving greater cost-effectiveness. One way  of utilising 
loss aversion in order  to make incentive schemes more effective would be to 
make recipients experience non-gains as losses, and gains as non-losses. This 
can be achieved through framing. Depending on how a situation is framed – 
how it is described – logically  equivalent occurrences can be interpreted 
differently, and affect a person’s behaviour differently.
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19  I.e. to lose five pounds is about twice as bad as gaining five pounds is  good. So, I might be 
expected to go to the same effort to avoid losing five pounds as I would in  order to gain  ten 
pounds.
20  However, the reference point is  not equivalent to the baseline. The reference point is that 
which  losses and gains are judged relative to, whereas the baseline incorporates additional  facts 
about the situation  (for instance, Ambrose has all  of his  money  and no threat to his life; David 
has £500 and no sparkly bicycle).
 I propose that framing  will, in  part,  depend upon a person’s expectations: 
actual events will be evaluated in the light of what the agent expects to happen. 
In terms of incentives, for example,  someone who does not  expect  to receive five 
pounds will experience the receipt  of five pounds as a gain, and will experience 
the absence of the five pounds as the maintenance of the status quo. In contrast, 
someone expecting to receive five pounds will experience receiving the money 
as maintenance of the status quo, and not receiving the money as a loss.
There are at least  two ways in which  the lack of an incentive payment could be 
experienced as a loss from the status quo. One is due expressly  to the design of 
the incentive scheme, and the other due to changes in the recipient’s psychology 
as the incentive scheme progresses.
Take the simple case:
In order to exploit loss aversion, however, I could be given the £100 upfront, 
and then have money  deducted each time I fail to stick to my  pledge. So, for 
each week that I drink alcohol, £10 of the money  I was given is taken back. By 
having the money  in  my  possession initially, I incorporate it  into what I believe 
to be ‘my’ property  (even though it will not become fully  mine until I have 
successfully  achieved my  target of ten weeks alcohol free). Call this the 
custodian scheme.  In this scheme, loss aversion and the endowment effect mean 
that I will likely  suffer  a greater disutility  due to deductions from  the £100 than 
the utility  I would gain from  receiving it.  Through the operation  of loss aversion 
the same sum  of money  should have greater  leverage over my  preferences in the 
custodian case than in the simple case.
 The second way  the lack of a gain may  be experienced as a loss relies 
upon the recipient’s psychology  altering as the incentive scheme progresses. 
Take the case where I have committed to not drinking alcohol for ten weeks. 
Simple Case: I pledge to give up alcohol for ten weeks,  in  return 
for £100. I could be paid the £100 in one lump sum at the end 
of ten weeks, providing I have not drunk any  alcohol, or I could 
be paid £10 each week I do not drink any  alcohol, or  £1.43 each 
day I don’t drink alcohol.
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Now, imagine that I have been extremely  successful, and have not touched a 
drop for the first seven  weeks. In addition, I have become accustomed to my 
weekly  payments of £10, and I have been using the money  to go to the cinema 
each week. In the eighth week, I fully  expect to receive my  £10 payment and 
have even picked out which film I will  go to see with the money. But then 
disaster  strikes: in a moment of weakness I indulge in a forbidden gin and tonic. 
This means I do not receive my  payment of £10 for  that  week, and can no longer 
go to see the latest James Bond movie at the cinema.
 Over  the course of the preceding seven weeks I have become habituated 
to the weekly  £10, and the absence of payment in the eighth week is very  much 
experienced as a loss.  In this, the habituation case, the lack of an incentive 
payment is experienced as a loss because I have grown accustomed to receiving 
the money  and have incorporated it into my  expectations and plans for  the 
future.21
 There will be other ways in which incentive schemes can be designed to 
exploit the fact  that people are more sensitive to losses than gains. Loss aversion 
could, of course, be triggered by  making the subject experience actual losses, for 
example,  by  requiring them to pay  penalties. Some schemes could combine 
paying out a reward if participants succeed with issuing a penalty  if they  fail, 
whilst. Some penalty-based, or combined penalty-and-reward schemes, could 
be designed to exaggerate the influence of loss aversion, so that relatively  small 
losses have a more significant impact. My  focus here will remain on schemes 
providing rewards rather than penalties.
BACK TO BASELINES
In the simple case the incentive scheme does not appear coercive according to 
either the normally  expected, morally  expected, of preferred preproposal 
baseline accounts. Key  is that the offer  of the simple case incentive does not 
appear  to make the recipient worse off. We might generally  think that incentives 
cannot coerce because they  are offers: they  can be turned down without the 
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21 I do not claim here that any of the example schemes I propose would necessarily  work in  the 
ways I suggest – this  will  be an empirical  question  about how individuals experience the effects 
of payments under  particular  circumstances. I am only trying to provide examples in order  to 
illustrate what I believe is a  plausible proposition, namely, that people can experience the failure 
to gain as a loss, and that this could operate in the domain of health incentives.
recipient being made worse off or experiencing any  harm. However, in the 
habituation and custodian cases it seems that incentives (or rather, the denial 
of incentives) are capable of making the recipient worse off.
 On the agent-centric account the gain or  loss experienced by  an 
individual will be important  to determining coercion. On the situation-centric 
account the absolute gain or loss will be more relevant. So, where the recipient 
of an incentive is made no worse off (financially) compared to their  position 
before the incentive was offered, if we take a situation-centric view, there will be 
little to suggest that incentives could be coercive. Contrastingly, if we take an 
agent-centric view, the fact the recipient  experiences  a  loss, even if they  do not 
suffer any absolute loss, could be sufficient to indicate that coercion is possible.
 In the habituation and custodian cases, I described scenarios where the 
recipient feels worse off for not  receiving an incentive. The issue that must be 
addressed is whether  this experienced ‘worse off’ can be explained in  terms of a 
legitimate baseline against which coercion can be judged. In order for this to be 
so,  there has to be a shift in the recipient’s baseline during the course of the 
incentive scheme. When incentives are first offered, they  act as in the simple 
case, and cannot  be coercive according to a baseline account. It may  be possible, 
however, that during  the course of the incentive scheme the agent’s expectations 
alter, and a change in agent-determined preferences and expectations could 
cause a shift in the baseline.22
In the custodian scheme, the recipient is given custody  of the total amount that 
she would receive if she met all of her pre-specified targets. The example I used 
was one where I commit  to not drinking alcohol for ten weeks,  and receive £10 
for each week I succeed in  not drinking alcohol. On the custodian scheme, I 
would be given £100 in the first instance, and lose nothing for  every  week I do 
not  drink alcohol, but lose £10 for  every  week that I do drink alcohol. Once the 
money  has been given to me,  I might plausibly  incorporate it  into ‘my’ 
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22 It is worth noting  here that the baseline accounts discussed in the previous chapter  do make 
reference to recipient preferences when  identifying  baselines  and coercion. On  Nozick’s account, 
recipient preferences  can  determine whether a  normal or a moral baseline should be adopted. 
On Zimmerman’s account, recipient preferences are used to determine if there is a  relevant 
preferred pre-proposal situation, and what this is. On  agent-centric accounts, recipient 
preferences and expectations are likely to be central to identifying coercion.
possessions; it becomes a part of my  ‘status quo,’ and thus alters my  reference 
point.
 Likewise, in the habituation case, I become accustomed to my  weekly  
payments of £10 and make plans about how  I will spend the money  and so 
forth: the weekly  payments are incorporated into what I expect to happen each 
week. Thus, my  reference point alters to include the weekly  £10 payments, and 
the lack of a payment is experienced as a deduction from this reference point.
 In these custodian and habituation cases,  the framing of the situation 
alters during the course of the incentive scheme (that  is,  any  time after  the offer 
of the first  incentive is made, until the payment / non-payment of the final 
incentive). So, payments that were initially  framed as gains become neither 
gains nor losses, and non-payments become framed as losses.
 It  thus seems possible that an incentive could be non-coercive when 
offered at the beginning of an incentive scheme, but coercive when offered later 
in  the scheme. This requires that  incentive schemes be considered as a series of 
distinct proposals, rather than as one initial, continuing proposal. This is 
probably  only  plausible in the case of schemes that pay  out  incentives at 
intervals, rather than schemes that  pay  out a single lump sum  at the end. For 
instance, in the case of abstaining from alcohol,  at the end of each week I am 
either paid or not  paid £10. The proposal of “you will receive £10 if you  do not 
drink any  alcohol this week” is then (implicitly  or  explicitly) renewed for the 
next week.
The reference point is fundamental to determining the baseline by  which to 
judge coercion, as it identifies the point relative to which ‘better off’ and ‘worse 
off’ judgements are made. However, the baseline should not be considered as 
simply  equivalent to the reference point, and this means that there is a 
potentially  important distinction between the custodian and habituation 
schemes.
 In the custodian scheme, the initial baseline can  be taken as that where I 
drink alcohol and neither  receive nor lose any  money. This should be taken as 
the pre-proposal situation. Relative to this,  as established, the proposal of an 
incentive does not make the recipient worse off and will  not be coercive. If I 
accept  the proposal I am immediately  given £100.  In fact, I am  given ‘custody’ 
of the money  – I cannot  spend it until I meet the criteria of the scheme and it 
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becomes ‘fully’ mine. It may  be initially  paid into an account I will later  be given 
access to, or I may  be given ‘Monopoly  money’ that  can later  be exchanged, or 
through  some similar  means. The key  is that I am ‘given’ the money  such that  I 
incorporate it into what I consider to be my possessions.
 After I have received the money  the proposal alters. The proposal now 
presented to me switches from “each week you do not  drink you will receive 
£10” to “each week you drink you will lose £10.” The proposal now moves to a 
loss frame (lose £10 for every  week you drink).  The change in frame triggers a 
change in  my  reference point: after  I have accepted the initial proposal my 
reference point alters to include the £100 I have custody of.
 In the habituation case the initial baseline is the same (I drink alcohol,  I 
receive no money). The proposal of the incentive before the scheme has begun, 
relative to this (pre-proposal) baseline is not  coercive. When I accept the 
proposal my  reference point  initially  remains the same. However, after  a  few 
weeks of successfully  not drinking, I grow accustomed to the incentive 
payments: my reference point shifts to incorporate the weekly £10 payments.
 The shifts here are similar, but not the same: in the custodian case the 
reference point  changes without any  associated changes in  behaviour; in the 
habituation case the reference point only  changes after  a number  of weeks of 
behaviour change. Whilst the reference point can be taken as the utility  status 
quo (the marker against which gains and losses of utility  are judged), the 
baseline must be taken as a broader,  more holistic measure.  In this case, the 
reference point is the financial situation from which  I experience gains or  losses, 
but  we must incorporate this reference point  and my behaviour (in this case, 
whether or not I drink) into the baseline.
 In the custodian case, because the shift  in reference point is not 
associated with  a shift in behaviour, the new  baseline is such that subsequent 
proposals can count as threats. In the habituation case, the reference point 
alters only  with the associated behaviour  change and thus the renewal of the 
proposal in the seventh week is not a threat.23
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23  I think the habituation case is  in line with  common  sense judgements. Take the case of an 
employer and an employee: if the employee receives payment for performing a  particular  agreed 
upon  job then they cannot expect to stop performing that job and still receive money  from their 
employer.
 To summarise, in the custodian case proposals could potentially  operate 
as coercive threats, as the recipient  may  be better off in  the pre-proposal 
situation than in the postproposal situation after  she has received the first 
payment. I have argued that the same is not  true for the habituation case, 
however, as neither the initial,  nor  any  subsequent incentive proposals should 
qualify as coercive threats.
NON-BASELINE APPROACHES
The previous section sought  to explore whether  incentives targeted towards 
changing health behaviours could be coercive according to a  baseline account of 
coercion. I have suggested that some schemes specifically  designed so as to 
make the recipient feel as if they  are being made ‘worse off’ when they  do not 
receive a payment may coerce.
 This does not show  that health incentives actually  are in practice 
coercive, merely  that it is possible for  them  to meet the initial criteria. In fact, 
losing £10 may  simply  not be a big enough threat to warrant coercion. The 
trouble with the baseline account is, even when we have successfully  identified 
an appropriate baseline, and determined whether  a proposal makes the 
recipient better  or worse off relative to this baseline,  we still cannot say  whether 
the proposal is coercive or not. Assuming that coercion is taken to be something 
over and above simply  acquiescing  to a threat,  there will be many  proposals that 
make the recipient worse off (‘threats’) but do not coerce.
 Baseline accounts seem able only  to take us part of the way: identifying 
instances that are definitely  not coercive. I have shown that not all cases of 
incentivising health behaviour change can be ruled out  in such a way. In order 
to identify  those cases where the recipient actually  experiences coercion, a non-
baseline account may  be useful. Such accounts, as adopted by  Frankfurt 
(1988/2007) and Feinberg (1986), look at how the proposal affects the 
recipient’s will and her decision-making ability.
 Both Frankfurt and Feinberg emphasise the importance of the unique 
susceptibility  of the recipient to a particular proposal,  and make the psychology 
and preferences of the recipient central to judgements about coercion. Feinberg 
in particular argues that:
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For  moral purposes we should always use the subjective “willingness” 
standard, and judge voluntariness by  reference to the actual motivation  of 
the person  whose choices are at issue.  That is the approach  that  is most 
respectful of autonomy  and individuality,  judging  each  individual as he is, 
not as the actuarial tables say he probably is.
Feinberg (1986: 258)
Thus, the actual experience of the individual is fundamental to judging coercion, 
although Feinberg acknowledges that in  practice this is extremely  difficult to 
judge, and often we may  have to use our objective knowledge of the situation as 
a proxy  for this information.  Frankfurt’s stronger  claim is that  coercion will 
result in the complete absence of voluntary  action (not simply  a reduction): 
Coercive proposals must be “irresistible” (Frankfurt 1988/2007: 41):
Coercing  someone into performing a  certain  action cannot be, if it  is to 
imply  his freedom  from  moral responsibility, merely  a  matter  of getting  him 
to perform  the action  by  means of a  threat.  A  person  who is coerced is 
compelled to do what he does. He has no choice but to do it.
Frankfurt (1988/2007: 36)
On these non-baseline accounts it is possible for offers as well as threats to 
coerce. It still seems that schemes like the custodian case are likely  to put more 
pressure on the subject than, for example,  the simple case. Yet even the 
custodian scheme seems very  unlikely  to provide sufficient pressure to meet 
Frankfurt’s criteria for coercion.
 For  Feinberg, the coerced act must be chosen, and thus involve a 
minimum degree of voluntariness.  It  must also meet the polarity and proximity 
requirements. For polarity the incentive may  only  coerce where its proposal 
makes the recipient ‘worse off’ in  some way  (for  instance, the quasi-threatening 
custodian scheme) or where the recipient is in such a  dreadful situation that she 
cannot countenance any  thought of remaining in that situation (and the 
proposal represents her only  chance of escape). In addition, the proximity 
condition  requires sufficient pressure to be placed on the individual. It still 
seems unlikely  that incentive schemes will  meet both of these conditions. 
However,  as the size of incentives gets larger, and the recipient more vulnerable 
and more susceptible to external pressure, it becomes feasible that  incentives 
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could coerce. The relevant cases here are those where very  vulnerable people are 
being offered (perhaps very large) incentives to change their behaviour.
 I use the term ‘vulnerable’ with a deliberate vagueness. It could, for 
instance, identify  very  poor people, for whom  even a small cash incentive could 
represent a significant sum; people addicted to drugs who may  be desperate for 
money, and who may  also have a reduced capacity  for rational decision-making; 
or people suffering from mental illness, who may  struggle to make consistent, 
considered choices. How external circumstances affect  the vulnerability  of an 
agent will depend on her individual character, although psychological research 
is likely  to be able to help identify  many  situational indicators of susceptibility 
to coercive proposals.
OTHER EFFECTS OF INCENTIVES
It  is worth briefly  mentioning how other aspects of health  incentives might 
introduce psychological pressure that  could contribute to coercion. There are at 
least two other features of incentive schemes that could vary  such that 
incentives sometimes wield a large (potentially  coercive) degree of influence 
over the will and decisional capacity of the recipient.
 First, the wider  social significance of the incentive: why  the incentive is 
being offered.  By  this I am  considering the implications of, say, offering cash 
incentives to pregnant women who smoke. The message behind such proposals 
could be interpreted along the lines of “you must accept  this incentive and quit 
smoking for  the good of your  unborn child.” Such statements employ  ‘emotional 
blackmail’ by  intensifying feelings of moral duty  and guilt. Effects such as these 
could make the recipient  ‘worse off’ if they  prefer not to be reminded about the 
harm  they  do to others through their smoking. The stimulation of such  feelings 
could make the recipient’s current situation untenable (assuming  the feelings 
were potent enough), or they might simply add to the power of the incentive.
 Second, the identity  of the provider of incentives may  be relevant.  If the 
offer of incentives comes from a person of authority  one might be reticent  to 
reject it for fear of causing offence, disappointment, or  similar negative attitudes 
directed towards oneself. Alternatively, the identity  of the offerer might produce 
a ‘signalling’ effect. For example, if an individual’s GP offers her  an incentive, 
she might assume he has her  best interests at  heart  and that she ought to accept 
the incentive because it is his recommendation. Such an influence may  simply 
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enhance the allure of the offer  (so long as the recipient  is still choosing between 
an acceptable situation and a better situation), though  the signalling effect  could 
also produce greater apprehension in the recipient about the consequences of 
refusing the incentive.
SUMMARY REMARKS
In Part Two, I have sought to apply  the general theories of coercion discussed in 
Part One to consider if health incentives are likely  to have a coercive influence. 
Rather than applying a  single theory  of coercion, I have included various 
elements from different theories, including  more situation-centric and agent-
centric accounts, those using baselines to judge coercion, and those focusing on 
the psychological experience of the agent. This is because it is not clear that any 
one of these theories of coercion is ‘right’: they  all identify  different aspects of 
proposals that seem  coercive. I think it is worthwhile trying to capture any 
coercive elements of health incentives, rather  than making a rather simplistic 
evaluation of their coercive potential on a single account.
 That said,  I have emphasised the importance of the agent’s psychological 
experience and the quality  of her  will,  rather  than those situational factors 
which could indicate coercion. It seems that if we care about coercion insofar  as 
it  affects liberty  and autonomy  then we must be most concerned with whether 
the agent is able to act voluntarily,  and this will depend upon the interplay  of 
external pressures and psychological factors. To this end, information about  the 
situation and the proposal will be helpful in predicting and judging coercion, 
though will not be definitive.
 On the accounts I have sketched,  however, often certain necessary  
situational conditions are imposed for  coercion to occur: there is an extent to 
which an incentive is either able to coerce,  or not. For  example, one may 
stipulate that the proposal must represent a  loss from  the recipient’s baseline; 
that it  offers the only  alternative to an extremely  unpleasant outcome for the 
recipient; that it  makes the recipient  worse off in  some way; or  that the recipient 
is so vulnerable that she is unable to make a rational decision to refuse the 
proposal. Once these conditions have been met, the extent to which  the 
recipient actually  experiences the effects of coercion will differ in degree. Thus, 
incentives that could coerce (in that they  meet the necessary  conditions for 
coercion) may, in practice, place very little coercive pressure on the recipient.
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 In fact, I have suggested that generally  health incentives will not coerce. 
There are, however, certain structures of incentive schemes which, when 
targeted at susceptible individuals, could meet the criteria for coercion  on some 
accounts. Thus, if coercion is to be avoided, where some or all the necessary 
conditions for  coercion are met (for instance, the proposal is a threat relative to 
the baseline, or it meets Feinberg’s polarity condition) great care will be 
required to minimise the pressure placed on the subject’s will. For instance, an 
individual who is deemed vulnerable (perhaps she is in debt, addicted to drugs, 
mentally  unstable, has a number of dependents,  and so on) may  be coerced 
where the incentive offered is posed as a quasi-threat, or is very large.
 There is only  so much that a philosophical account can do here. Further 
work to inform when coercion is actually  likely  to occur  will depend on how 
situational factors affect different agents’ psychologies, and the extraction of 
such  information requires empirical study. Thus, I am  unable to conclusively 
answer the question of whether and when health incentives coerce,  but merely 
say that, on the accounts I have described, it seems possible, though unlikely.
 Moving on from  the case of coercion, I will now discuss how incentives 
might alter  behaviour in other  ways that  could be problematic. Persuasion, 
manipulation, and nudging are more likely  to be justifiable than coercion as 
they  are generally  assumed to have less of an invasive effect  on the agent’s will, 
and thus, are less destructive of liberty  and autonomy. However, manipulation 
and nudging can be quite contentious, and may  be thought to be unacceptable 
ways of altering health behaviour. In Part Three,  I will introduce briefly  the key 
features of these different ways of changing behaviour, and will then move on to 
discuss the moral implications of how health  incentives alter behaviour  in  the 
light of this discussion.
PART THREE: PERSUASION, MANIPULATION, AND NUDGING.
INTRODUCTION
Clearly, it is not always wrongful for one or more agents to act  to intentionally 
change the behaviour  of another agent or  group of agents.  In the previous 
chapter I discussed the possibility  that  the project of promoting healthy 
lifestyles through behaviour  change strategies may  be an illegitimate one for 
governments to undertake. The concern in  that instance related to the liberty  of 
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individuals to determine their  own values and lifestyles, and the respect  shown 
to citizens by  different degrees of state neutrality  towards conceptions of the 
good.
 I argued that under  a moderate perfectionist set  up, encouraging healthy  
behaviour through  interventions like health incentives should be considered 
justifiable.  However, the issue deserves further consideration in light of the 
effect health incentives might have on individual psychology  and free will. Most 
of the time, the state ought not to employ  political policies which hinder 
psychological liberty, even where the intention is to bring about politically 
legitimate changes. Both the conceptual aims of the state and the methods used 
to bring about these aims will affect liberty and autonomy.
 Here, I introduce persuasion,  manipulation, and nudging as means for 
behaviour change. I will be briefer  than in the discussion of coercion: the 
conceptual literature on these other forms of influence is smaller, in part 
because they  are typically  of less concern to political and moral philosophers 
interested in legitimate action. The discussion of coercion should also be useful 
for considering the relative disruption of these forms of behaviour change.
 There are also other  tools for influencing behaviour, such  as facilitation, 
seduction, education, deception, and exploitation. It  is not possible to discuss all 
of these,  though some of them  may  play  a  role in the methods I do consider (for 
instance, education may  be an important component of persuasion; deception 
might be used in manipulation). Many  of these concepts do not  have settled 
philosophical definitions, but carry  with  them particular philosophical baggage 
and colloquial usage.
 My  concern here is how incentives influence behaviour,  and whether this 
affects liberty  and autonomy  in impermissible ways. Looking at these different 
methods of influence,  and how they  appear to be involved in the use of health 
incentives will  be a helpful approach, but not in itself conclusive.  It  still remains 
to be considered how health  incentives, by  employing such methods of 
influence, affect agent liberty  and autonomy, and whether this is objectionable. 
The final part of this section will seek to consider these questions.
PERSUASION
Persuasion is generally  presumed to be one of the least problematic methods of 
intentionally  influencing another  agent’s behaviour. This applies far more to 
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rational persuasion than non-rational persuasion: whilst  all persuasion 
involves appeals to reasons to influence an agent’s behaviour, rational 
persuasion provides reasons that encourage the agent to deliberate rationally, 
whereas non-rational persuasion  encourages faulty  assumptions and failures in 
critical reflection (Rossi and Yudell [2012]; Beauchamp and Childress [2001]; 
Wertheimer [1987]; Faden and Faden [1978]).
 In its ideal form, rational persuasion does not disrupt deliberative 
decision-making and operates entirely  within this process of reasoning. Thus, 
rational persuasion enables the kind of ‘free’ deliberation which Scanlon (1986) 
argues is necessary  for their being subject to moral appraisal.  This requires 
“critically  reflective, rational self-governance... less appropriately  thought of as a 
kind of freedom than as a  kind of intrapersonal responsiveness. What is 
required is that  we be importantly  dependent on our process of critical 
reflection,  that that  process itself be sensitive to reasons, and that later  stages of 
the process be importantly  dependent on conclusions reached at earlier 
stages.” (Scanlon [1986: 176]) 
 Non-rational persuasion appears to provide agents with  a  reason, and 
similarly  engage with  her deliberative capacities, but  it may  fail to give her a 
good,  rational, or valid reason. Consider: I may  be persuaded to buy  a brand of 
face cream  because it  is advertised as having diamonds in it, and the impression 
is given using scientific language that these diamonds are key  to making my  skin 
look brighter.  However, this form of persuasion may  be encouraging me to 
make false assumptions about the effects of diamonds in face cream  and the 
reasons I have to buy the product.
 Non-rational persuasion begins to cross over into the realm  of 
manipulation (see the next section), and is more contentious. Some theorists, 
however, propose that we should be wary  of all persuasive influence (Faden and 
Faden [1978]). In part, this is because it is extremely  rare (perhaps impossible) 
for persuaders to employ  only methods of rational persuasion: they  claim  that 
other means of influence such as non-rational persuasion and manipulation will 
almost always operate in tandem.
 This problem could go deeper in that persuasion might necessarily  be 
manipulative insofar  as it  involves one agent trying to get  another agent  to 
change her attitude or  behaviour (Mendelsohn [1968]). If such  intentions create 
unavoidable manipulation then this issue will afflict any  method of behaviour 
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change intervention, all of which are aimed at altering how  people behave. 
These different methods of influencing behaviour  will only  differ  in the way 
those intentions are translated into interventions. Education and facilitation 
may  lie at  the far end of the spectrum here, but if they  are employed with the 
explicit  intention of altering behaviour then, on  some accounts, they  must 
employ at least a modicum of manipulation.
MANIPULATION
Manipulation, then, tends to be identified when features of an  agent other than 
her  rational reasoning capacities are exploited in order to alter  her attitudes or 
behaviour, although a number of different variations on this have been 
proposed (Rossi and Yudell [2012]; Blumenthal-Barby  and Burroughs [2012]; 
Rudinow [1978]). As mentioned, manipulation may  be used in conjunction with 
other influences such as persuasion and coercion, so the boundaries become 
easily blurred.
 Warwick and Kelman (1973) distinguish between situational and psychic 
manipulation. The former operates by  setting the social structure up in such a 
way  so as to alter the decisions people are likely  to make, whereas the latter 
works at  the level of the individual psychology  of the manipulated agent. 
Particular  situations may  be such  that  they  have an inherent tendency  to make 
subjects more susceptible to external influence, including manipulation,  and (as 
discussed earlier) the psychological make up of an agent may  also predispose 
her  to being influenced by  others. Manipulation may  thus be rather hard to 
avoid, particularly  in contexts where the emotional relevance of behaviours are 
highly  salient,  where people struggle to effectively  reason about decisions and 
behaviour, or where there is a significant power  imbalance between agents 
(O’Neill [1984]).
 Sometimes manipulation can involve a considerable degree of 
sophistication on the manipulator’s part, who may  take the trouble to find out 
precisely  what ‘buttons to push’ in  order to exert maximal influence over  her 
subject  (Cave [2007]). This may  be highly  personalised, or it  may  derive from 
specialist knowledge about the workings of human psychology in general.
 Often, manipulation is secretive and may  deceive the subject  such that 
she is unaware of being manipulated.  Secrecy  and deception is often thought a 
key  indicator (and an objectionable feature) of manipulation. However, there 
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are instances where we may  be at least partly  aware of the manipulative efforts 
of others, and their likely  effect  on us (for instance, the use of cute labrador 
puppies to advertise loo roll),  yet  still be influenced by  such tactics. Thus, 
manipulation may  vary  in the degree to which it deceives the subject or is 
explicitly enacted.
 Due it its failure to engage the deliberative reasoning capacities of agents 
(often quite the reverse), and its frequent use of deception and exploitation of 
individual weaknesses in  order  to wield influence, manipulation is often thought 
to be undesirable. Yet, it should be borne in mind that manipulative tactics for 
altering behaviour may  (often) be justifiable,  either  because the manipulation 
itself does not  appear particularly  disrespectful, controlling, or  freedom 
limiting, or  because the benefits derived as a consequence of the manipulation 
are sufficiently  valuable. The permissibility  or otherwise of manipulation must 
thus be judged on a case by case basis.
NUDGING
‘Nudges’ are another addition to the repertoire of behaviour change 
interventions available to health promotors.  It is perhaps better  to describe 
nudges as a category  of interventions that employ  other,  more basic means of 
influence (in the same way  that television  adverts might employ  persuasion). 
Yet it  is worthwhile including a discussion of nudges here because they  have 
become extremely  prominent  in debates about behaviour  change and healthcare 
policy.  The kinds of behaviour change that nudges might target overlap with 
those targeted by  health incentives: everyday,  lifestyle behaviours as well as 
‘one-shot’ decisions where, quite often,  individuals’ choices seem  to be 
inconsistent with many of their long-term preferences.
 Thaler  and Sunstein (2008) were the first to appropriate the term ‘nudge’ 
and use it  to describe a  range of interventions which alter behaviour through 
small changes to the decision-making environment (the ‘choice architecture’ of 
a situation). Thaler  and Sunstein argue that the interventions they  describe fall 
within a  philosophy  of ‘libertarian paternalism’: nudges do not reduce the 
choices available to an agent (hence libertarian), but they  encourage the agent 
to make decisions that are in  her own best  interests (hence paternalistic) 
(Thaler and Sunstein [2008]; [2003a+b]).
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 Numerous criticisms have been directed at the conceptual framework 
proposed by  Thaler and Sunstein. Often it  seems that the interventions they 
group together as ‘nudges’ are highly  variable and they  do not  provide a clear 
definition of ‘nudges’ which links these diverse interventions. Further, the 
philosophical underpinnings of ‘libertarian paternalism’ are rather weak, in part 
due to misapplication of the concepts of both ‘libertarianism’ and ‘paternalism.’ 
It  has also been argued that the empirical evidence used to back up claims about 
the efficacy  of nudges is poor  (Hausman and Welch [2010]; Marteau et al. 
[2011]; Bovens [2008]; Mitchell [2005]).
 Despite these and other  criticisms, nudges have proved very  popular, in 
particular with policy  makers. The two authors have landed jobs working for the 
US (Sunstein) and UK (Thaler) governments,  and nudge-like approaches to 
policy-making in healthcare and other domains have been influential over  the 
last few years (Vlaev et al. [2010]).
 The kind of interventions Thaler and Sunstein describe as nudges include 
presenting the food available in a cafeteria in such a way  that people are 
encouraged to choose healthy  food over  unhealthy  food; setting the default such 
that employees are automatically  enrolled to make contributions to pension 
schemes (an opt-out rather  than an opt-in system); or providing information 
about how one’s energy  usage compares to that of one’s neighbours. What 
distinguishes ‘nudges’ from ‘shoves’ may  be tricky  to determine (Marteau et al. 
[2009b]), though it  could relate to the costs associated with resisting the nudge 
(buying the chocolate cake, opting out of pension contributions, not taking any 
steps to reduce energy  consumption); the degree of voluntariness the choosing 
agent is able to demonstrate; the benefits gained by  the agent; the intentions of 
the nudger; and other things.
 Those describing the potential applications of nudges tend to draw 
heavily  upon the psychological and behavioural economic literature relating to 
the ‘bounded rationality’ of humans and to ‘heuristics and biases’ which affect 
much of our reasoning and behaviour, relating,  for example, to risk, decision-
making, preference formation, and recalling  from  memory  (see for  example 
Slovic [2000]; Tversky  and Kahneman [1974, 1981, 1986, 1991]; Kahneman 
[2012]; Kahneman and Tversky [2000] Gigerenzer and Selten [2002]).
 One example is the phenomenon of loss aversion, described in the 
section on coercion. Framing something as a loss rather than a  gain can mean it 
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will make a  bigger impression on the agent. Loss aversion relates to many  other 
phenomena, such as the endowment effect (also mentioned earlier) and status-
quo bias (which describes, as one would expect, our  natural preference for  what 
we already know and have) (Thaler and Sunstein [2008: 34]).
 There are many  other examples of heuristics and biases, and the 
literature on this subject is fascinating, but too extensive to properly  discuss 
here.  The main point is that the use of this privileged understanding of human 
psychological functioning is put  to work by  nudgers like Thaler and Sunstein in 
designing behavioural interventions. This may  qualify  as manipulation, at least 
some of the time, and so we might think that nudges are often manipulative. 
Furthermore,  as much  of the literature to do with  heuristics and biases and 
nudges asserts,  most of the time we are unaware of the sorts of factors 
influencing our behaviour. Thus,  such nudges will often be invisible to the agent 
subject to them, and so also employ deception.
 I will discuss shortly  the extent to which influencing behaviour through 
these methods might  have problematic effects on liberty  and autonomy, and 
relate this to the use of health incentives. However,  it  is worth pointing out at 
this point that nudges are often  thought to correct errors in reasoning; 
discrepancies between preferences at  different times; lack of will power; and 
other factors that lead to what  is sometimes described as ‘boundedly  rational’ 
behaviour. Thaler and Sunstein argue that nudges help people to act  in ways 
that are in their  best interests and that,  on reflection, they  would choose to act 
anyway  (Thaler and Sunstein [2008]). This may  be correct in some instances, 
though it will not be true all of the time, and there may  be no way  of ensuring 
that nudges always and only  operate in this way. Nonetheless,  interventions 
which tend to correct for  undesirable idiosyncrasies of psychology  may  be 
evaluated differently  in terms of their impact on the autonomy  of the individual 
they influence.
THE INFLUENCE OF INCENTIVES
Parts One and Two explored the concept  of coercion and developed an account 
of if and when health  incentives might coerce the recipient. I now wish  to look at 
how incentives employ  other methods of influence: persuasion, manipulation, 
and nudging described above, to encourage healthy behaviours.
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 As became apparent in the discussion of coercion,  incentive schemes can 
take many  different forms, and so different  schemes may  well involve different 
degrees of persuasion, manipulation and nudging. Further, the use of these 
tools to change behaviour may be permissible in some cases, yet not in others.
First, incentives may  operate by  providing an agent with a reason to alter her 
behaviour. Consider  someone who is on the cusp of getting  tested for an STI, 
but  who feels that  it  is not quite worth the effort. The offer of a £5 iTunes 
voucher  might tip the balance of costs and benefits in favour of getting the test: 
the situation where she gets an STI test and receives a £5 voucher is preferable 
to the situation where she doesn’t get tested and doesn’t receive the voucher. If 
the incentive factors into the agent’s deliberation in this manner it seems to 
influence via rational persuasion.
 Incentives for ‘one-shot’ behaviours,  such  as STI testing, cancer 
screening, vaccinations, and so on, could work in this way: attaching additional 
benefit to one decision option to tip the balance in its favour. Such an effect 
sounds like the kind of incentives I have previously  described as ‘trade-type’ as 
they  provide an extra reason in  favour of performing the incentivised behaviour, 
making that behaviour now the preferred action. Similarly, incentives for 
lifestyle changes could provide a reason in a similar way,  persuading the agent 
to adopt a healthier lifestyle because the addition of the incentive to that 
behavioural option elevates it to being the most appealing.
 Aid-type incentives could act as persuasive in a slightly  different way: the 
agent in this case is presumed to already  prefer  the healthy  behaviour, so she 
does not need to be given further  reasons to think it  is the right action for her. 
However,  her  current reasons are somehow  incapable of motivating the 
behaviour she generally  thinks is best.  Incentives can provide a different kind of 
reason,  the significance of which may  lie in its propitious timing. Whilst the 
reasons an agent has to be healthy  might govern a general attitude that adopting 
a healthy  lifestyle will be wise, the incentive (when effective) provides a 
motivating reason: a reason to act in a  particular way  on this occasion. Whether 
it  does so via rational persuasion or  not will depend on the kind of reason the 
incentive provides and how it influences the agent’s will.
 Often, persuasive methods are thought of as those which draw the agent’s 
attention to pre-existing reasons she has for  acting  in a particular way,  for 
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instance, by  pointing out to her  the risks associated with not  getting  tested for 
an STI. Sometimes agents neglect the relevance such reasons hold for 
themselves: a kind of ego-centric, ‘optimism bias’ can cause people to assume 
that, although  there are definite risks associated with a behaviour,  they 
themselves  won’t suffer  the consequences (Slovic [2000: 366]).  It is plausible 
that incentives have this effect, if their introduction acts to remind the agent of 
pre-existing reasons she has,  rather  than by  creating a new reason for  her to act. 
Whether incentives create a new  reason or remind the agent of pre-existing 
reasons (or  perhaps both) will depend on the unique circumstances of a 
particular incentive.
 Health incentives may  thus influence via rational persuasion. It  is equally  
plausible that they  could influence via  non-rational persuasion. In  such  cases, 
the incentives might appear to be a  reason for the agent to act in a particular 
way, when in fact it  isn’t (in  the sense that it  doesn’t provide a rational reason to 
act,  or  a ‘good’ reason to motivate her behaviour). Agents who are liable to 
overweight the value of incentives might be non-rationally  persuaded, or  those 
who are mistaken in what they  understand the benefits of a  particular  action 
will be.
 Some might argue that attaching money  to a  particular  behavioural 
choice is not  persuasive (does not engage with an agent’s rational deliberative 
capacity), but rather,  is manipulative. This could be the case if agents typically 
found cash incentives disrupted their deliberative capacities. In such cases, 
rather than being able to evaluate the costs and benefits associated with 
different courses of action, agents’ reasoning processes might be confused by 
the introduction of a cash incentive. Money  is thought to have peculiar  effects 
on the way  people make decisions, sometimes by  mediating emotional affect. 
This, in turn, can have diverse effects ranging from encouraging self-sufficient 
behaviour  to exaggerating  autonomic responses (more impulsive, risky 
behaviour) (Vohs et al. [2006]; Bechara [2005]; Mantzari et  al. [in submission, 
personal communication]).
 Some of the ways money  influences decision-making are not well 
understood and it would be rash to make general claims about the influence of 
incentives.  A study  by  Mantzari et al. (in submission, personal communication) 
indicates mixed effects of monetary  incentives on risk information processing, 
assimilation and understanding. The offer  of money  to take a pill as part  of a 
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medical trial does not appear to undermine risk information  processing or 
knowledge of side effects, but does affect  the time participants spend viewing 
information about the risk of side effects.
 Where health incentives do disrupt decision making due to the diverse 
effects money  may  have, and where these effects are harnessed in order  to bring 
about  desirable changes in behaviour, incentives may  be considered 
manipulative. Some analogous areas where worries relating to the potentially 
manipulative influence of money  on health-related decisions include payment 
for organ and tissue donation and participation in research trials (Becker  and 
Elias [2007]; Olbrisch et al. [2001]; Dickert and Grady  [1999]; Grant and 
Sugarman [2004]).
 Once again, the experience of the individual is crucial here: the same 
incentive could act as a rational, reasons-compatible tool to persuade one 
individual to adopt a healthy  behaviour,  whilst  disrupting the deliberative 
capacities of another  and manipulating her. As discussed in the above section on 
coercion, identifying just how incentives actually  work and the way  they  are 
likely  to influence people will require psychological,  rather than philosophical, 
insight.  Even then, it  seems that we will never be able to predict  with certainty 
how a given individual will respond to a particular incentive.
 Incentive schemes might  also be specifically  designed to exploit  
psychological features of agents in  order  to achieve maximum  effect. Providing 
incentives at regular intervals structures efforts to change lifestyle behaviours 
by  establishing short term goals and giving immediate, rewarding feedback. 
Some variations on this design may  be tried, for  instance,  a  scheme 
incentivising HPV vaccination uptake (where the individual must receive three 
separate injections of the vaccine on different occasions) offered different sized 
rewards of £20 for the first injection, £5 for  the second, and £20 for  the third 
and final injection (Mantzari et al. [in submission, personal communication]). 
Varying rewards in this way  might be more successful at encouraging  agents to 
receive all three injections than paying £15 for each injection or other 
configurations.
 There is other information about human psychology  that might be used 
to enhance the efficacy  of incentives.  Loss aversion and the endowment effect 
have been mentioned already  (in the context of the custodian and habituation 
schemes I described in Part Two). These involve framing outcomes in terms of 
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losses rather than gains in  order to enhance their  ‘force,’ and encouraging 
agents to incorporate incentives not yet earned into what they  consider  to be 
‘their’ possessions (or reference point).
 Other examples could involve the selection of the sort of incentive used: 
cash might be more motivating than vouchers because of its fungibility  and 
immediacy, though sometimes vouchers for luxury  goods items are preferred 
(these can  license the recipient  to treat herself in ways she might not  otherwise 
do) (Reilly  et al. [2000]; Kivetz and Simonson [2002]).  Behavioural economic 
research shows that people tend to overvalue lotteries with small probabilities of 
large rewards (Tversky  and Kahneman [1974]; Gonzalez and Wu [1999]), so this 
might suggest  offering lottery  tickets as incentives will have greater  motivational 
power than cash of equivalent expected gain.
 Such design  features might help influence agent  behaviour, and they  
seem  to do so by  exploiting privileged knowledge that behavioural science 
experts have access to about certain foibles of human behaviour. Further,  this 
knowledge often relates to non-deliberative features of decision-making 
behaviour, or at  least,  non-rational deliberation. Certain aspects of incentive 
schemes, then, appear to utilise the kind of sophisticated manipulation 
described earlier.
 We might  still distinguish between different aspects of the manipulative 
effects of incentive schemes. Providing rewards at regular  intervals works on 
non-deliberative features in order  to achieve an  effect,  but seems of a different 
sort  to the manipulation involved in knowingly  offering lottery  tickets with a 
small chance of payout (that may  nonetheless motivate misguided / optimistic 
agents). The latter  might appear  more cynical, exploiting as it does our tendency 
to erroneously  evaluate lotteries.  Further, some methods of manipulation may 
be more or less deceptive, or secretive about the basis for their efficacy.
 An example of an incentive scheme that uses some of these manipulative 
techniques is ‘Weight Wins,’ which offers rewards for weight loss. On the front 
page of its website (on the 19/01/2013), Weight Wins features two individuals, 
one planning  to lose 50lbs (23kg) in 12  months (who will earn £1185 if 
successful), and one who has successfully  lost  56lbs (25kg) in 12  months (and 
earned £418 for doing so) (Weight Wins [2013]). Such examples may  be 
misleading to potential participants with regards to the kind of success both  in 
terms of weight loss and monetary  rewards accumulated that they  might expect 
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to achieve. On the ‘Pounds for Pounds’ scheme, an NHS pilot operating through 
the Weight  Wins organisation, the mean weight loss for participants was 6.4kg. 
Clinically  significant weight  loss (defined as losing 5% or more of baseline 
weight) was achieved by  180 of the 402 participants (Relton et al.  [2011]). 
Clearly  (and unsurprisingly) the people behind Weight Wins select the most 
successful and ambitious participants to include in their promotional material.
Nudges are a form  of intervention in themselves, and may  employ  a range of 
methods to influence behaviour. Nudges can provide informational feedback, 
emphasise the appeal of certain choice options, encourage the salience of 
particular social norms, exploit the ‘stickiness’ of defaults, and so on. The key 
interest of nudging lies in its link to the behavioural science literature and 
heuristics and biases. Rather than focusing on how  a  specific individual might 
be motivated to act in a particular way, nudgers look at trends of behaviour  and 
general tendencies for ‘choice architecture’ to influence the decisions people 
make.
 The main difference between incentives and nudges lies in their 
explicitness: nudges are typically  secretive and hidden from  the view  of the 
person being nudged. It  may  be that, were the agent’s attention drawn to the 
existence of the nudge, it would lose its effect. Incentives, in contrast,  absolutely 
require the agent to attend to them: an invisible incentive will not motivate 
action.
 Yet, in some sense, we can treat incentives as a  kind of nudge. I have 
emphasised in this chapter  the importance of the agent’s experience and the 
effect on her  will of some external intervention. Effective nudges, just like 
incentives,  tweak the choice set available to someone in order to encourage a 
particular decision at the crucial time of action. Incentives make one behaviour 
(such as choosing to eat  lettuce rather  than cake) more appealing because of the 
prospect  of a reward; nudges make that  behaviour  more appealing because of 
the position of lettuce in the canteen, or  by  informing the diner that ‘most 
people choose lettuce,’ or by  providing lettuce rather than cake as a default 
addition to a meal. In the ‘heat’ of the moment,  many  considerations will have 
different pulls on the agent’s will, and incentives and nudges are just two more 
inputs into her decision,  and she may  be more or less aware of the influence 
such inputs are having on her behaviour.
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 Incentives which  are not overly  large will surely  not cross the ‘libertarian’ 
line of libertarian paternalistic nudges, insofar as they  will not dramatically 
increase the costs of any  of the choices available to the agent. The paternalist 
requirements of nudges may  not  be met by  incentives, which could certainly  fail 
to promote the best interests of the recipient. Yet, the same is the case for 
nudges: despite Thaler  and Sunstein’s insistence that nudges are paternalistic, it 
is not clear that there is any way of ensuring this.
 Both trade-type and aid-type incentives could nudge: trade-type 
incentives by  making one choice more appealing than it  previously  was; aid-type 
by  compensating for the lack of tangible,  immediate and rewarding feedback 
from healthy  behaviour and providing motivation at the time and of the form 
needed to support agents in altering their lifestyle behaviours.
 The way  nudges work looks to be manipulative in that they  do not tend to 
change behaviour  by  engaging the rational,  deliberative capacities of the agent. 
However,  an interesting feature of at least some nudges is that they  seek to 
dampen non-rational influences on behaviour (or what are perceived to be non-
rational influences), and thus allow agents to make decisions based more upon 
deliberation and stable preferences. Yet this activity  takes place in the shadows: 
nudges, typically, are secretive and hidden from  the conscious awareness of the 
one nudged. Further, nudges may  not reduce the effect of bias, but simply  add 
to it (albeit in ways that may make the agent better off) (Ashcroft [2011]).
 Aid-type incentives may  correct for  ‘irrationalities’ in agent decision-
making behaviour as well, supporting behaviour change in those who desire it. 
In this sense,  incentives may  also lay  claim  to not manipulating agents to exploit 
irrationalities in reasoning, but rather, counteracting those same irrationalities. 
In contrast to nudges, however,  incentives are explicitly  provided: the whole 
point being that agents must know about  the prospect of the reward in order  for 
it  to have motivational power. Thus, one feature often thought to be involved in 
manipulation - secrecy  - is absent at least in the fundamental action of 
incentives (as mentioned above, certain aspects of the design  of incentive 
schemes may involve deception or secrecy).
HEALTH INCENTIVES, LIBERTY, AND AUTONOMY
This chapter has sought to look at the means of influence health incentives use 
to effect behaviour  change. If nothing else, it has argued that incentives, at least 
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in  theory, can alter  behaviour through a whole variety  of different ways. In part, 
this is because the scope for designing  different sorts of incentive schemes is so 
wide, and as such, different  schemes can vary  a  great deal from one another. 
Additionally, different  methods of influence over behaviour  are poorly  defined 
and frequently  overlap even in the abstract. In  real life cases, behaviour change 
interventions will invariably  employ  different combinations of coercion, 
persuasion, manipulation, and nudges, as well as other means of influence, in 
their operation. Incentives are no exception. Finally,  individuals differ, and the 
way  incentives affect different individuals will depend at least  in part on 
psychological features of the agent.
 I wish now to consider how such influences might  impact upon liberty  
and autonomy. This will only  permit, at most, indirect conclusions about 
incentives because (as discussed) generally  incentives will employ  multiple 
means of influence and the impact of different influences on agent liberty  and 
autonomy  will be moderated by  contextual facts about the agent, the incentive, 
and other situational factors. However, this discussion should help to illuminate 
the potential for incentives to have harmful effects on liberty and autonomy.
 Earlier, I discussed how  autonomy  has historically  played an important 
role in bioethics.  Too often, however, autonomy  is presented as the most 
fundamental value of human existence, to be promoted above all others 
(Dawson [2010]). Yet there are many  things we value (well-being and justice to 
name two), and it is not clear that we can sensibly  incorporate so many  values 
into a single concept, nor that we consider them  to always be subordinate to 
autonomy.
 Autonomy  should not, therefore, be privileged above all other  values at 
risk of destruction from  disease or  its treatment.  Nor  should it be the only  value 
we seek to promote through healthcare (either in a proximal or  distal sense). 
The other chapters in this thesis consider some of the other values of relevance 
to the ethical evaluation of a healthcare interventions. Despite devoting  this 
chapter to the consideration of how incentives might impinge upon liberty  and 
autonomy, I do not wish to suggest these two values are more or  less important 
than other values both  present and absent  from  this thesis.  However, it  does 
seem  that  these values are the basis for  concern where arguments point to the 
influence incentives have on people’s capacity to choose how to behave.
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 I emphasised earlier  that when considering the negative impact of 
incentives on liberty  and autonomy, it  is important to have a concept of 
valuable autonomy  in mind. That is, we should probably  not be concerned 
about any  kind of influence on an agent’s behaviour, no matter  how small or 
benign. Rather, we should worry  when those influences significantly  limit the 
agent’s liberty  to choose how to live her  life, and disrupt her in a general pursuit 
of a  self-determined life (and pursuit of the good as she conceives of it). Thus, it 
is a relatively  modest form  of autonomy  I am concerned with, and one which 
seeks to be responsive to the limitations of actual human agents to direct  their 
lives.
 In this section, I will discuss how those coercive,  persuasive, 
manipulative, and nudging influences might bear on autonomous action, and 
what this might mean for the moral status of incentives.  I will then also provide 
some discussion informed by  research from  health psychology, relating to the 
mechanisms by  which we control our behaviour.  My  intention here is to 
consider how  incentives interact  with our mechanisms of behavioural control 
and in particular how trade- and aid-type incentives can be thought to have 
different influences here.
I argued that although it is conceptually  possible,  incentives will rarely, if ever, 
prove coercive. Key  to this conclusion was the assertion that incentives are 
unlikely  to place sufficient psychological pressure on the agent to restrict her 
ability  to make voluntary  decisions in such  a way  as to be considered coercive. 
Were incentives to coerce, they would also prima facie restrict liberty.
 Liberty  restriction is not always unjustifiable: it is at least likely  to be 
permitted where it  prevents one individual from further restricting the liberty  of 
(or harming) another (Mill  [1859/2006]).  However, generally, liberty  restriction 
is difficult  to justify, particularly  where it  is enforced without some form of 
consent from the individual concerned. Regulations to prohibit smoking under a 
certain age and requiring seat-belts to be worn in cars are supported by  explicit 
paternalistic reasons,  and are generally  well-accepted.  Yet  the introduction of 
liberty-restricting legislation is often met with hostility  and state governments 
are often  (sometimes inappropriately) reticent to use such regulation (House of 
Lords [2011]).
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 The potential for  incentives to restrict liberty  looks weak.  As discussed, 
incentives are unlikely  to place sufficient pressure on the recipient’s will 
through  coercion, or indeed persuasion, manipulation, nudging, or  other 
means, to threaten the voluntariness of the agent’s choices and behaviour.  The 
extent to which incentives actually  do pressure recipients’ wills is a  matter for 
empirical assessment, yet common-sense tells us that relatively  small rewards 
(£10 or £20 a week) would be unlikely  to place a significant (liberty-restricting) 
pressure on the majority of individuals.
 Liberty  might be threatened were the agent’s deliberative processing to 
be disrupted significantly,  to the point where she is sufficiently  confused or 
distracted that  she is no longer  able to make a  ‘free’ decision. However,  we 
ought to take liberty  to be a reasonably  robust notion, present in the majority  of 
agents making decisions under ordinary  circumstances.24 This liberty  ought not 
to be vulnerable to disruption from offers such as a  relatively  small cash sum. If 
this were the case,  there would be many  greater  threats to liberty  than that 
posed by  incentives. Through pressure or  disruption,  then, it looks unlikely  that 
incentives will be liberty-restricting.
 Where agents lack the capacity  to understand the options open to them 
and / or are unable to make a well-informed decision about how to act then they 
may  be said to lack positive liberty. This form of liberty  is closely  connected to 
autonomy, the general capacity  for  self-determination. Autonomy  will be 
disrupted where an agent’s choice set is significantly  altered such that  choices 
that are, in principle,  available to her appear  unavailable, or  she is unable to 
choose them for some reason.
 Generally, influences that are liberty  restricting will also be autonomy  
restricting.25  Coercion, then, and any  other influence undermining liberty 
through  pressure or disruption to the agent’s will,  will also undermine 
autonomy. But autonomy  will  also be vulnerable to influences which ‘hide’ 
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24  Clearly, such an  ad hoc specification of liberty  is not entirely  satisfactory, and were my 
intention  to fully justify  the value of pursuing  liberty  then  a  more comprehensive discussion 
would be necessary, and a better  explanation of how to specify the lower  limits for ‘liberty’ 
would be needed. However, I do not intend to provide such  a justification here. I assume that 
practices which accord with  our  everyday notions of  ‘liberty’ will  be acceptable, and take this to 
be the standard against which incentives (and the means by  which they influence the agent) 
should be judged.
25 There can be exceptions, which I will discuss later.
choice options, or manipulate the agent’s behaviour in more subtle ways so as to 
control her decision-making. Where the offer of cash has an especially  large 
(though not coercive) influence on the agent, her autonomy  may  be 
compromised by  making alternative (non-incentivised) decision options 
significantly less ‘available’ to her.
 Autonomy, further,  requires that agents are able to direct their  own lives; 
that they  ‘authentically  author’ their  behaviour. Kantian autonomy  places 
particular emphasis on rationality  as a fundamental component of autonomy: 
the agent who acts inconsistently  and irrationally  cannot be autonomous in this 
sense. To be an  autonomous agent will also require one to be treated with a 
degree of respect by  others. The Kantian tradition characterises this as being 
treated always as an end in oneself, and never  merely  as a means by  which 
others may achieve their own ends (Kant [1785/1993]; Korsgaard [1996]).
 Autonomy  in the sense of being respected as a  self-determining, rational 
agent, is a richer notion than positive liberty. Clearly, it will be valuable to have 
power over one’s own life course and not merely  to be used as an instrument by 
others. However,  it  is not always obvious how agent autonomy  can be protected 
and promoted, for a number  of reasons. For instance, autonomy  can have a 
rather complex interaction with  freedom (in the sense of both positive and 
negative liberty); the time scale autonomy  may  be considered over  can vary  (less 
autonomy  now may  be necessary  to guarantee future autonomy); it will always 
depend on agent psychology  and so is highly  sensitive to individual 
idiosyncrasies; it can interact with  other values in variable ways (some of which 
may contribute to agent autonomy, or may require its sacrifice).
To begin, there are two important candidates for arguing that providing health 
incentives is not compatible with a  concern for agent autonomy  (aside from  the 
ways in which incentives could hinder liberty  through coercion or  extreme 
pressure,  although as argued, this seems very  unlikely  to arise). Both of these 
involve incentives operating in ways that  would be described as manipulative on 
my account.
 First, incentives may  cause people to act for inappropriate reasons. This 
can occur  at  the quasi-conscious level: the agent who is so distracted by  the offer 
of cash that she fails to evaluate her  other options properly. It may  also be 
unconscious (or preconscious): the agent who is unwittingly  more moved to be 
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motivated by  the offer  of a lottery  ticket because she overvalues the small 
probability  of winning the prize. We would not wish to say  that such an agent is 
unfree to choose properly  between different options, however, her  capacity  to do 
so is either compromised by  the offer  of money, or  influenced by  inappropriate 
features of the scheme that she may be unaware of.
 This kind of manipulation (as well as non-rational persuasive influences) 
could undermine autonomy  by  limiting the extent to which  the agent  acts as a 
rational,  reasonable (and reasons responsive) individual.  Whilst she might view 
herself as acting according to reasons which  she recognises as ‘good’ (and which 
she considers move her  appropriately), in fact she is acting according to poor 
reasons, or things which are not reasons at all.
 Second, the provider of the incentive may  manipulate the agent’s 
behaviour in order to further  the provider’s own ends.  Some public health 
interventions provide benefits at the societal level, and sometimes the 
individual herself will be unlikely  to benefit, and may  even experience harm. For 
example,  a given individual may  do better not to receive a vaccination,  and to 
rely  on herd immunity  instead. Yet public health interventions which aim  to 
create herd immunity  must target  (almost) everyone in  the community. 
Incentives may  thus be offered where the intention is only  partially, or  perhaps 
not  at all,  to benefit the recipient, but rather  to get her to alter her behaviour in 
order to benefit  others (or society  at large). It  is also important to note that even 
where the intention is (entirely  or  mostly) to benefit the incentive recipient, the 
provider of the incentive may  judge wrongly  what is in the recipient’s best 
interests. Thus, encouraging someone who derives extreme pleasure from  eating 
fatty foods to diet may not be a good way of promoting her interests.
 Agents who are manipulated in this way  are not given the opportunity  to 
act as self-directing individuals, with their  own values and life plans. As such, 
they  are not treated with  the respect  owed to autonomous moral agents. 
Further, where their interests are not promoted by  the manipulator, then agents 
subject  to such manipulation may  have their  future interests harmed, suffering 
not only a loss of autonomy but potentially well-being as well.
 Manipulative influences which encourage action that  is based upon 
inappropriate reasons, or which is designed to make instrumental use of the 
agent, may  hinder  the agent’s capacity  to act in ways consistent with being an 
autonomous, self-determining agent. Further, such actions fail to treat agents 
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with  the respect due to autonomous persons. However, influence which  does 
not  manipulate in such ways, but instead engages the agent’s deliberative 
capacities to make decisions about  how she wishes to behave and to make (so 
far as can reasonably  be expected) autonomous choices, will not have such a 
disruptive effect on autonomy.
REFLECTIVE AND IMPULSIVE CONTROL OVER BEHAVIOUR
As mentioned, when discussing the effect healthcare interventions such as 
incentives may  have on liberty  and in particular autonomy, it  is important  to 
begin with a realistic conception of human agency. When discussing decision-
making, and particularly  the interference with the decision-making behaviour  of 
other agents, there is a tendency  to exaggerate the value of ‘independence.’ In 
part, the assumption that independent (uninfluenced) decision making is 
preferable seems to rest on a false assumption that much human behaviour is 
determined in this way. This is supported by  the ‘fundamental error  of 
attribution’; the tendency  to overestimate how much one’s character  is 
responsible for one’s behaviour (and the underestimation of the importance of 
situational factors in determining behaviour) (Nisbett and Ross [1980]; Ross 
[1977]).
 It  is, I think, worth saying a little about current social psychological 
theory  on behavioural control, which  has particular relevance to health 
behaviour and the evaluation of behaviour  change interventions. This is the ‘two 
systems’ model, which describes how behaviour  control operates through  both 
reflective and impulsive systems. The following discussion draws heavily  upon 
Strack and Deutsch’s (2004) influential article which builds on previous dual-
process accounts and focuses particularly  on the interaction of the reflective and 
impulsive systems, and how these systems may  operate synergistically  or 
antagonistically.
 Furthermore,  Strack and Deutsch consider the effect of the two systems 
on behavioural outcomes, rather than on  judgements and information 
processing (often thought of as the antecedents to behaviour, but in  fact not 
always present). Strack and Deutsch’s account therefore seeks to make sense of 
phenomena such as akrasia (weakness of the will) and instances where agents 
do not act  to maximise utility, or in  ways that appear  to thwart their 
preferences.  This is of particular  relevance to health behaviour where agents 
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often act to achieve short term benefits and in  ways inconsistent with their  long 
term goals and values.
 Reflective system  (also know as ‘system  1’) behaviour  is based upon 
reasons, values, and an understanding of the future and what desirable or 
undesirable consequences will be brought about  by  present action. Thus, the 
reflective system directs behaviour as a result  of conscious reasoning processes. 
In contrast, the impulsive system  works through associative links and often 
controls habitual (routine) and unconscious (or pre-conscious) behaviours. The 
impulsive system therefore requires far  less cognitive effort than the reflective 
system, can operate more quickly, and is less vulnerable to disruption from 
suboptimal conditions.
 It  is thought that around 45% of behaviour is habitual, and mostly  
controlled by  the context-cued impulsive system  (Neal et al. [2006]; Marteau 
[2010]). This will include many  everyday  behaviours which make up one’s 
‘lifestyle’ as a whole, such as dietary  choices and exercise. It takes a large 
cognitive effort to intervene in  habitual behaviours under impulsive control and 
to alter this behaviour to bring  it into line with reflective processes: this is often 
what is required for agents to resist the chocolate bar and choose fruit instead, 
or to make similar healthy substitutes for unhealthy behaviours.
 Only  the reflective system is capable of explicitly  generating a time 
perspective (and thus adapting present behaviour in order to achieve future 
goals). Often, then, unhealthy  behaviours are maintained by  the operation of the 
impulsive system, responding to immediate cues and desires. Where the 
impulsive and reflective systems act antagonistically, agents may  struggle to 
modify  their  behaviour in  line with their  reflective wishes, and impulsive 
behaviours may be enacted in spite of efforts to inhibit them.
 The consideration here, then, is how incentives interact with these 
systems of control, and what relevance this holds for agent autonomy. The 
distinction I wish to draw is between trade- and aid-type incentives, and the 
different impact they  have on the orientation of the agent’s behaviour. In the 
trade-type case, the agent (before the offer of an incentive) is happy  engaging in 
her  unhealthy  behaviour (be that  smoking, eating a  poor diet, failing to get 
vaccinated, and so on). It  is generally  the case that behaviours which produce 
immediate pleasure and which tend to be cued by  our  environments are those 
which will typically  have negative effects on health  in the long run. Thus, agents 
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subject  to trade-type incentives can be assumed to have their reflective and 
impulsive systems oriented in the same direction (towards unhealthy 
behaviour[s]).
 In contrast,  aid-type incentives are those offered to agents who already  
hold some desire to change their behaviour. In these agents, the impulsive 
system leads them to display  unhealthy  behaviours, whilst  the reflective system 
struggles (and generally  fails) to bring about healthier  behaviours. The 
impulsive and reflective systems of the agent receiving aid-type incentives are 
therefore oriented in different directions.
 When the incentive is introduced, let us assume that this could either fail 
to alter the orientation of either system; it could succeed in altering the 
orientation of one system but not the other; or it could succeed in altering the 
orientation of both  systems.  It is not clear that we can state which system 
incentives operate through: potentially,  an immediate reward could figure in the 
operation of the impulsive system, although it  seems more likely  that it would 
be involved in the reasoning of the reflective system.
 In the aid-type case, then, the incentive orients towards healthy  
behaviour and away  from unhealthy  behaviour. This is consistent with the 
agent’s reflective system, but contrary  to her impulsive system. This agent 
already  has antagonistic systems, and an  incentive may  be effective in changing 
behaviour in one of two ways. First, the incentive may  simply  boost  the power  of 
the reflective system to determine eventual behaviour (by  adding additional 
reasons or motivation for behaviour, or  structuring  motivation in some helpful 
way, or  similar). In  this case, the agent adopts the new (healthy) behaviour, 
which is consistent with her  reflective preferences,  though not with her 
impulsive desires.
 Second, the incentive may  bring these systems into line, resolving the 
conflict by  re-orienting the impulsive system towards healthy  behaviour. We 
may  accept that the incentive is more or less successful so, although it may  bring 
the two systems into alignment some of the time, it may  fail to do so all of the 
time. Moreover,  this second effect may  take time to become established, and 
may  result  from the first: the agent is initially  able to act  in line with her 
reflective system by  over-powering her impulsive system  but, as the healthy 
behaviour is repeated more and more, it  becomes habitual and comes under the 
control of the impulsive system.
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 In the aid-type case, the effective incentive will  either cause the agent to 
act in line with her  reflective system (though a conflict between reflective and 
impulsive systems will remain), or it will resolve the conflict  between both her 
systems, bringing her behaviour  into line with both reflective and impulsive 
systems.
 The trade-type case differs, because here the agent’s systems are initially  
oriented in the same direction and she experiences no conflict. The successful 
(behaviour-changing) incentive will either have the effect of altering the 
orientation of one or  other system, or  it may  alter  the orientation of both 
together. If the incentive has this latter  effect, the agent will alter her behaviour, 
will not experience conflict between her two systems, and will act in line with 
her  reflective system. If the (successful) incentive re-orients only  the reflective 
but  not the impulsive system, the agent will alter  her  behaviour  and this will be 
consistent with her reflective preferences, though not with her  impulsive 
desires. Alternatively, the agent’s impulsive system may  be re-oriented, but not 
her  reflective system, leading to her  acting consistently  with  the former but not 
the latter.
 Sometimes, then, the incentive may  change behaviour but create a 
conflict that was previously  absent between the agent’s systems of behavioural 
control. There is another  concern with the trade-type case, and that  is where the 
incentive re-orients one of the systems but fails to change behaviour. Here the 
incentive creates a conflict, as before, but does not produce any  health benefits 
that changing behaviour would produce.
 Seeking to alter behaviour  with trade-type incentives would seem to 
create potential problems for  autonomy. Creating a  conflict  that  was previously 
absent between the agent’s reflective and impulsive systems may  be 
problematic. Such antagonism  can create feelings of temptation and frustration 
in  the agent, and undermine her experience of being able to fluently  control her 
behaviour (Strack and Deutsch [2004: 230]). Further, the incentive may  cause 
the agent’s behaviour  to diverge from her reflective preferences. This will occur 
either where the impulsive system is re-oriented and the behaviour is changed, 
but  the reflective system remains oriented towards the original behaviour, or 
when the reflective system  is re-oriented towards the new behaviour but the 
agent does not  alter  her behaviour (the impulsive system  still controls the final 
behaviour).
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 Although the incentive could result in either the reflective or the 
impulsive system being frustrated,  it  seems worse from  the point of view of 
autonomy  that the reflective system ends up opposed to the action performed. 
This is because it is the reflective system  which  directs reason-based action, 
consistent with the agent’s values,  goals, and self-perception. Where the agent’s 
behaviour is not in line with  such things, she becomes alienated from her 
behaviour.
 Trade-type incentives, then, risk creating conflict within an agent in 
relation to her two systems for behaviour  control, and between an agent’s 
reflective system  and her behaviour.  Whilst  the trade-type incentive may  bestow 
benefits in terms of well-being and improved health, it may  sacrifice a  degree of 
agent autonomy  in bringing this about. Aid-type incentives, on the other hand, 
would seem to promote autonomy: in this case, the incentive either brings 
behaviour into line with the agent’s reflective system, or it brings both the 
agent’s systems into agreement.
This has been a necessarily  simplified discussion of how behaviour might be 
altered using incentives. The real picture will be far more complicated, 
particularly  as preferences may  change depending on time and situational 
factors, and behaviour may  be inconsistent  to begin with. It is a further 
complication, still,  to consider how the methods of influence described earlier - 
coercion, persuasion, manipulation, nudging - feed into the way  trade- and aid-
type incentives influence behaviour  through the impulsive and reflective 
systems. This,  I suspect, would be a step too far into speculation in a discussion 
which is already  vulnerable to such a criticism. I shall leave it here, then,  but I 
hope to have provided at  least a  plausible account of how incentives might 
influence agent behaviour, and the impact this might  have on liberty  and 
autonomy.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Influences which pressure agents to act in particular  ways; exploit peculiarities 
of (non-rational, non-deliberative) decision-making; disregard the agent’s own 
interests and rather promote the interests of others or  society, may  undermine 
liberty  and autonomy.  Where incentives are likely  to do this, they  may  be less 
defensible than where they  avoid these effects.  My  aim  in this chapter has been 
155
to describe what kind of features of proposals will result in different forms of 
influence, to assess the extent to which  health  incentives possess such features, 
and finally  to consider the impact of health incentives on agent liberty  and 
autonomy.
 It  is worth reiterating that trade-offs may  be required.  Examples of 
permissible coercion have been described, but there will also be cases where 
concerns for welfare, justice, and other  values (including the autonomy  of other 
agents) justify  interventions that limit  liberty  and autonomy. It thus matters 
how much harm an intervention does to agent autonomy, and what  is gained 
from the intervention, and what harms might  arise from non-intervention. 
However,  without  knowing what the benefit-side effects of an intervention will 
be,  those interventions with  the least potential to undermine liberty  and 
autonomy will look more likely to be justifiable.
 Incentives likely  to result in coercion will probably  be difficult to justify.  
As discussed, in reality, this seems unlikely  to occur given the size of incentives 
generally  offered and design of incentive schemes.  However, where incentives 
are large, structured to play  on loss aversion and other  psychological biases, 
offered to vulnerable individuals by  powerful others, and so on, then they  will 
have optimum potential to coerce, or  otherwise have an illegitimately  powerful 
influence over the recipient.
 Incentives that encourage agents to act from  something other  than 
rational,  deliberative decision-making processes,  may  also be difficult to justify, 
due to an undermining effect on autonomy. This is a more demanding 
requirement than simply  avoiding coercion, and may  rule out more instances of 
incentive use. For instance, it  may  be impermissible to target agents likely  to 
struggle to deliberate once offered incentives. If psychological or social risk 
factors were known such that  agents like this could be identified (for  instance, if 
this were descriptive of a particular group, such  as drug addicts or  people 
suffering from  particular mental illnesses) then it might  be inappropriate to use 
health incentives as an intervention for behaviour change in those groups.
 Another  area of concern will arise where incentives fail to promote the 
interests of the agent.  This may  occur because the agent is not the intended 
(main) beneficiary  of the intervention, or  where she is intended to benefit  but 
the intervention fails to promote her interests effectively. The latter  will be 
harder  to avoid than the former, although all schemes must be considered 
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carefully  to ensure that their likely  outcomes have been evaluated as accurately 
as possible. The more widely  targeted the incentive, the more difficult  it  will be 
to assess whether the population influenced by  it will  be likely  to benefit (or  be 
harmed) by the intervention.
 Incentives that exploit cognitive or  volitional deficiencies may  also be 
problematic. This means that schemes which use lotteries may  be less justifiable 
than those which use certain  rewards.  This is a  difficult line to draw, as all well-
designed behavioural interventions (incentive schemes included) ought to 
consider how best to achieve cost-efficiency. Nudges seem more prone to this 
potential for undermining autonomy  than incentives,  as they  frequently  employ 
secretive,  non-cognitive means of behaviour alteration, such as setting defaults 
or exploiting social norms so as to influence behaviour.  Sometimes such 
interventions will, in reality, seem fairly  benign and their impact  on agent 
autonomy  is,  I believe, limited. It has been suggested by  Bovens (2008) that  the 
test for  legitimacy  here should lie in whether agents can, if they  so desire, 
identify the means by which they are being influenced.
 It  may  also be argued that, insofar  as nudges work to counteract the 
effects of biases ever-present in human psychology, they  may  help to promote 
rational agent action, and thus, autonomy. Similarly,  incentives can support 
agents to act in accordance with their  own long term, considered, rationally 
deliberated life plans. In the section on the reflective and impulsive control of 
behaviour, I suggested that aid-type incentives seem to act (where they  are 
successful) to bring an agent’s behaviour  into line with her  considered 
preferences,  and perhaps to resolve conflict between her two systems of 
behavioural control. Such synergy  would appear  to be promoting,  rather than 
undermining, of agent autonomy, facilitating more consistency  between the 
agent’s preferences, goals, intentions and her behaviour.
 The two systems theory  also suggests the potential for trade-type 
incentives,  targeted at individuals with  no prior intention of altering their 
behaviour, to create conflict. Antagonism  between an agent’s two systems, or 
alienation of her behaviour from  her reflective system  is likely  to be autonomy 
undermining. A  desire to preserve autonomy, then, may  lead us to avoid 
offering trade-type health incentives to individuals.
 Rather than indicating that incentives are,  on the whole, permissible or 
impermissible,  this discussion has shown that it is very  much dependent on 
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features of the incentive scheme, the agent, and the surrounding situational 
factors. In short, the effects of health incentives on agent liberty  and autonomy 
will be highly  context dependent. However, I have indicated certain features of 
schemes that  will make them more likely  to have pernicious effects on liberty 
and autonomy. Although each individual will experience incentives differently, 
it  seems likely  that, where a number  of these features cluster together (which 
could occur when targeting  incentives at particular groups or at certain 
diseases) incentives may  have more potential to undermine agent liberty  and, in 
particular, autonomy.
 The justification of the use of health incentives in a  given situation 
cannot be determined by  consideration of liberty  and autonomy  alone. Rather, 
the other effects of such interventions on things we value - their ability  to 
promote goods or  create harms - will need to be taken into consideration for an 
overall judgement to be made.
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FIVE
THE DIFFICULTY WITH DESERT: FAIRNESS, RESPONSIBILITY, AND 
FREEDOM
INTRODUCTION
So far, I have considered a number of themes of criticism  relating to health 
incentives.  Chapter Three looked at  some political features of healthcare 
interventions: what kinds of values the state ought to promote (through 
healthcare); where the limitations of state intervention should be set; how the 
state ought to aim to distribute resources amongst its citizens.  In Chapter Four, 
I looked at a  more personal aspect of healthcare interventions: the effect on the 
individual’s psychology, and the extent to which different means of influence 
have the capacity to constrain one’s freedom and autonomous action.
 There are,  of course, always overlaps between the political and the 
personal. Discussions of the political permissibility  of an intervention are in part 
concerned with  how that intervention will affect the individual. Similarly, 
questions about individual interactions can be ‘scaled up’ to concerns about 
patterns of treatment by  the state and population wide effects. The topic 
considered in this chapter  particularly  encapsulates the dual relevance of 
bioethical concerns to political and moral philosophy. Here I will discuss the 
issue of desert and how we should conceive of people as responsible agents and 
treat them  fairly. Desert and responsibility  are both notions typically  operating 
at the personal level, where agents interact with one another. Yet it  is also 
common to extend this notion of desert to the political level, and to demand that 
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states treat citizens fairly  and as they  deserve to be treated. Though highly 
intuitive,  there are difficulties with this extension of desert into the political 
sphere which will become apparent.
The concern about desert  is often spelled out in the press in terms of incentives 
‘rewarding unhealthy  behaviour’. This criticism could also indicate a  concern 
that rather  than discouraging unhealthy  behaviour, incentives actually 
encourage it.  Such a perverse effect  of incentives would mean they  entirely  fail 
in  their intended task, becoming worse than useless.  Once again, this is a 
criticism  that is dependent upon there being evidence which shows such an 
effect of incentives,  and is not something I make any  attempt  to support or 
challenge here.
 The aspect of ‘rewards unhealthy  behaviour’ that I do intend to consider  
here is that which relates to fairness. Specifically, that incentives do not treat 
people according to their just deserts. This can either mean that those receiving 
incentives are getting more than they  deserve, or that those not receiving 
incentives are getting less (or perhaps that both these are true). 
 In this chapter I will flesh out the claim that  some individuals are 
undeserving of incentives,  and thus that incentives are unfair. I will look at the 
notion of desert,  as well as the related concepts of responsibility  and blame. I 
consider how  the distinction between incentives as a  psychological aid, and 
incentives as an economic trade may  be of relevance to the assessment of the 
fairness of incentives. I outline a number of arguments that criticise incentives 
on the basis that they  provide rewards for people who are undeserving of them 
(or less deserving than others). In  seeking to respond to some of these 
criticisms, I consider the link between moral responsibility  and health 
behaviour. For  this,  I draw upon Philip Pettit’s work which conceptualises 
freedom  as ‘fitness to be held responsible,’ and consider how circumstances of 
deprivation, and the psychological mechanisms controlling health  behaviour  fit 
into this account of freedom. I argue that  there is reason to think that, at least 
some of the time, agents will not  be entirely  free, nor  fully  morally  responsible, 
nor deserving of blame for their unhealthy behaviour.
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WHY CONSIDER DESERT?
The criticism that  incentives fail to treat  people in  a just and fair  manner arises 
in  the media under the guise of a number of arguments: Misuse,  Rewards 
Unhealthy, Responsibility, Nanny  State, Giveaway, and Universal can all be 
construed as involving claims that health incentives fail to meet some standards 
of justice (Parke et al [2011]).
 The aspect of justice that is striking in the ‘rewards unhealthy  behaviour’ 
claim is that of desert.  The criticism, as I consider it here,  is that some (or all) of 
those who are offered incentives to adopt healthier lifestyles are not deserving  of 
this form of healthcare intervention. 
 Yet most  recent work on justice in political philosophy  has focused on the 
distribution of resources in society. If desert were included as a  principle of 
distributive justice, it would look something like: ‘a  just distribution will be that 
which treats everybody  exactly  as they  deserve to be treated.’ This would mean 
that the patterning of resources across society  (or, perhaps, the patterning of 
access to resources) would reflect the deservingness of individuals.
 Although intuitive and commonplace in our ordinary  thinking about 
fairness,  desert  is relatively  unpopular  as a principle of justice. Samuel Scheffler 
describes how “none of the most prominent contemporary  versions of 
philosophical liberalism  assigns a significant role to desert  at  the level of 
fundamental principle.” (1992: 301) Scheffler points to a whole range of 
theorists whom he identifies as neglecting, or explicitly  excluding any  principle 
of desert  from  their conception of distributive justice. These include the 
contractualists John Rawls and T. M. Scanlon; utilitarians such  as J. C. C. 
Smart; ‘Lockean libertarian’ Robert Nozick; and communitarian Michael 
Sandel.
 This consistent exclusion of desert from  such a variety  of theories (albeit, 
theories still falling  within the broad ‘liberal’ tradition) occurs because of the 
difficulty  inherent  in identifying agents as morally  responsible, and thus 
deserving, of any  features which  leads to their having a greater  or lesser  share of 
the distribution of resources in society. For instance,  imagine that intelligence is 
crucial to determining lifetime earnings,  and is itself determined by  biological 
and environmental factors over which  the agent has little or no control. It is 
difficult  to see how an agent can deserve her  higher  / lower earnings given that 
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she had no control over (was not responsible for) the intelligence she was born 
with.
 These sorts of claims conflict with ordinary  notions of moral 
responsibility, desert, and justice, where it is neither unusual nor problematic to 
talk about an  agent ‘deserving’ benefits and burdens such as income.  In part, 
this may  be because the picture is always more complicated than the example 
above allows: we may  be taking account of the fact  that, even with  natural 
attributes that make high earnings possible, the agent  must still exert herself in 
order to achieve those earnings and that such  exertion entails desert.  Thus, one 
problem with thought  experiments such as this is the difficulty  inherent in 
imagining what our intuitions would be were it the case that high income had 
no relation to factors within the agent’s control.
 At the deepest  level, we reach the problem  of free will and the question of 
compatibilism. I do not  intend to deal with this issue here, but our ordinary 
notions suggest  that there is room for  free will in human action, which would 
entail that some form of compatibilism  is true,  or determinism false. If we 
assume that  free will,  and thus moral responsibility, is possible, the difficulty 
then becomes where we should make the cut.  It still seems that  there will be 
many  morally  relevant features of an agent and her actions which  she cannot 
plausibly  be said to control.  There is a gap between our ordinary  notions of 
fairness which suggest a principle of desert is appropriate, and our 
philosophical theories of justice which tend to exclude such a principle.
Despite the philosophical scepticism, I will consider the fairness of incentives in 
terms of desert here.  In the main, this is because it is so central to our  ordinary 
notions of fairness. Numerous criticisms of incentives, particularly  in the lay 
media, stem  from  desert-based concerns, and it is necessary  to make a 
reasonably full exploration of the basis for these criticisms.
 Further, desert might not be so thoroughly  absent from contemporary  
theories of justice: Nozick criticises Rawls’s assumption that “the foundations 
underlying  desert [must be] themselves deserved, all the way down” (Nozick 
[1974: 225]).  Even Rawls allows that desert may  play  an important role in 
retributive justice, thus acknowledging the appeal of the idea that people should 
‘get  what is deserved’ in some cases (1971/1999: 314-315).  Theories described as 
‘luck egalitarian’ (see, for  example Cohen [1989]; Dworkin [1981a, 1981b, 
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2000]), seek to compensate for unequal distributions resulting from ‘brute bad 
luck’, but not those resulting from ‘option luck’. Luck egalitarianism may  derive 
some of its appeal from its apparent consistency  with notions of personal 
responsibility and desert.
 Personal responsibility  in healthcare is also discussed in the bioethics 
literature (Buyx [2008]; Schmidt [2009]; Thornton [2009]). This may  not 
always be framed in terms of ‘desert,’ but occasionally  the notion that  some 
individuals are more deserving than others seems to motivate these arguments. 
Rhetoric surrounding desert  and responsibility  is also frequent in media articles 
debating the prudence of health incentives, often demonising the potential 
recipients.26
 In considering this notion of desert I will also consider the related 
concepts of moral responsibility  and blame. As I have argued throughout, 
incentives may  be conceived of as a psychological aid to behaviour change, as 
well as a form of economic trade.  The claim: ‘individual A does not deserve the 
healthcare intervention X’, may  be quite different from the claim: ‘individual A 
does not deserve the payment X’. The basis for asserting that some individual is 
not  deserving of healthcare supplied by  the state will  look quite different from 
the basis precluding the state from trading with that individual.
PRELIMINARY REMARKS: REQUIREMENTS FOR HEALTHY LIVING.
Some of the arguments that people do not  deserve incentives assume that those 
receiving them act wrongfully.  I do not consider this assumption in full here, 
but  it  is worth indicating briefly  the sort of argument that might underlie it.  I 
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26  See, for example, Harcombe (2009); Chapple et al. (2004) for discussion of the stigma 
attached to diseases associated with obesity and smoking. Titles arising during the search  for 
articles to include in  Parke et al.’s (2011) media  analysis included ‘Pay nurses.. not these 
mollycoddled tubbies’ The Mirror, 2009; ‘Lose  weight and get £425 from the 
NHS; ...meanwhile  patients are denied life-saving drugs’  Daily Mail, 2009; ‘Dying patients are 
denied drugs  but the  obese  can get £425 from the  NHS  to diet’  Daily Mail, 2009; ‘Take  up two 
bus seats and they’ll pay your fare’  The Times, 2008; ‘Finger on the pulse; should patients be 
paid for doing little  more  than taking their medication, asks Max Pemberton’  The Daily 
Telegraph, 2009; ‘Do addicts  deserve  freebies?’  Yorkshire Evening  Post 2008; ‘Why reward the 
least deserving?’  Aberdeen  Evening  Express, 2007; ‘NICE wants incentives for addicts days 
after refusing cancer drug’  Aberdeen  Evening Express, 2007. All  these titles were retrieved 
from  either online sources or the Lexus Nexus database and were provided via personal 
communication with Hannah Parke.
suspect justification may  rest upon the idea that one has duties, either  to oneself 
or to others,  to take care of one’s own health (for  instance, to avoid becoming a 
burden on the healthcare system). This would mean that  failure to adopt a 
reasonably  healthy  lifestyle would be grounds for  criticism. There is a 
considerable literature on duties that follows a broadly  Kantian line of 
reasoning (Kant [1785/1993]; Herman [1981]; O’Neill [2002]).
 Alternatively, we might think that something like a  principle of solidarity  
requires citizens to contribute to, and avoid taking too much from, the common 
resources,  including healthcare. Solidarity  compels agents to recognise that we 
are ‘all  in it together’, and must take care of the interests of others as well as of 
ourselves. I discuss the notion of solidarity further in the next chapter.
 Finally,  some minimal degree of healthy  living might  be required in order  
to avoid harming others. An agent who lives unhealthily  and suffers poor health 
as a result may  directly  or indirectly  harm the interests of others. For  example, 
she may  subject others to the harms associated with passive smoking, additional 
burdens on the healthcare system  which  everyone must bear, or having to cover 
the work of an absent colleague.  This ‘harm’ based requirement for healthy 
living  is slightly  different from the positive duties one has to be healthy, or those 
arising from solidaristic obligations.
 Any  factors demanding that agents adopt healthy  lifestyles will be 
limited, and must be traded off against considerations of the well-being of the 
individual and other values. Some formulation of the basic libertarian principle 
of respect  for the rights of the individual to act as she wishes, and not face 
unacceptable limits on her freedom to choose how to live her life, will also be 
important  in explaining why  any  ‘healthy  lifestyle’ requirement on citizens, if it 
exists, must be in a restricted form.
 For  the purposes of this discussion,  I assume that  it is possible to support 
some version of the claim that agents have at least a minimal duty  to live 
reasonably  healthy  lives. This still leaves open the question of ‘how healthy  is 
enough?’ That is, just how  healthy  must an agent’s lifestyle be in order for  her to 
be considered as having fulfilled her  obligations. This will depend on factors 
such  as those described above: how strong the imperative to be healthy  is, and 
what other considerations place limits on it.
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1. TRADE-TYPE INCENTIVES
The distinction between trade-type and aid-type incentives seems particularly 
relevant to the discussion of fairness and desert. In part, this is because we have 
different norms governing the use of money  in buying / selling transactions 
around consumer goods and labour, and the use of monetary  resources in 
healthcare interventions. Hence, I want to devote this first section to 
considering trade- and aid-type incentives in turn, and exploring the different 
kinds of objections that they  attract.  After introducing the objections to trade- 
and aid-type incentives in turn, I will consider  all the objections together in 
more detail.
 Where incentives are viewed as a trade - a straightforward ‘payment’ - 
there are a number of ways they  might be viewed as objectionable. We can first 
distinguish between those arguments which  claim that the trade, in principle,  is 
fair, and those which claim that such  a  trade is never  fair. Within the first group, 
we can pick out at  at least two distinct arguments.  First, it might be accepted 
that incentives can be deserved as a form of compensation, reward for effort, 
contribution to society, or similar. However, one might still  argue that 
incentives,  in fact, are unfair because they  tend to provide people with more 
than they  deserve. Second, one might similarly  accept incentives in principle, 
but  argue that it is not fair  that they  are only  provided to a  small sub-group of 
people.
 Both these arguments make a claim about the relevant  desert base when 
considering the fairness of incentives.  It is generally  accepted that, in order for 
an agent to deserve something, she must posses a desert base for  that thing. For 
instance, Usain may  deserve to win the olympic gold medal because he is the 
fastest sprinter  in the world. What will count as relevant desert  bases in 
different situations is a central, much debated aspect of desert theory.27
 The claim that  incentives are greater  than recipients deserve is a claim  
that those receiving  incentives do not posses the relevant  desert  base in  the 
required amount  to deserve the size of incentives they  receive. The claim that all 
people who show the healthy  behaviour should receive rewards is a claim  that 
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27 Lamont (1994: 49) argues that we cannot extract the correct desert bases  merely  by analysing 
the concept of desert itself. Rather, he makes the point that  we must use external  goals and 
values from  the practice we are considering in identifying the relevant desert bases  for  that 
practice.
all those people also posses the relevant desert  base and ought not to be 
excluded.
Of course,  one might argue that those receiving incentives do not posses the 
relevant desert base at all: they  are not deserving of any  rewards, because 
adopting healthy  behaviours is not  a desert base for receiving incentives. This 
may  be the strategy  that many  desert-related criticisms of incentives assume. It 
raises an interesting issue about the relevance of desert  when considering trade-
type incentives but can, I think, be set aside.  For  consider: it is clearly  not the 
case that simply  lacking a desert base for some benefit  means that it is unfair 
that one receives that benefit.  Take, for  example, my  finding £10 on the street: 
there is no desert base that makes it  obvious that  I deserve that £10. However, 
neither is it wrongful or unfair that I keep the money.28
 Olsaretti (2003: 197) distinguishes between positive and negative desert 
claims. The former, stronger  claims, assert that an agent actively  deserves 
something. So, I may  deserve a reward because I have the relevant  desert base 
for that reward. The latter  are weaker claims, and assert that an agent lacks the 
relevant desert  base for  something,  and so does not (actively) deserve it: if I 
have done nothing to merit the reward, I do not  deserve it. Similarly,  I have 
done nothing  to deserve the £10 I find on the street, so the negative desert claim 
that I do not deserve it will hold.
 Where we are considering  trades, negative desert does not seem  
sufficient to make the trade unacceptable.  The mere lack of a desert base for an 
incentive is not sufficient to make it wrongful or unfair  that an agent receives 
that incentive. Some may  deny  that the effort made by  agents to adopt healthier 
lifestyles, or the sacrifices they  must make in doing so, are relevant desert  bases. 
However,  this amounts only  to a  negative desert claim: recipients of incentives 
do not possess the relevant desert base to deserve rewards.
 Those who wish  to argue that the incentive trade is always, in principle, 
unfair, must make a positive desert claim, or show why  the negative desert 
claim is sufficient. This positive claim is that those receiving incentives have a 
desert  base for not receiving them: incentives should be denied to these people 
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28  I appreciate the two cases here are not analogous, and there may be further  reasons  for 
thinking the incentives to be unfair. I will consider some of these later in the chapter.
because they  have acted in a particular way  (for instance, they  have committed 
wrongful acts) that render them actively deserving the denial of incentives. The 
positive claim  thus further implies that  people should not get incentives, and 
that it would be unfair for them to receive incentives.
 These implications do not follow from  the negative claim, unless 
additional conditions are brought  to bear. It  seems likely  that such conditions 
would be relational claims, such as that  the state must not provide (negatively) 
undeserved rewards because it ought  to conserve resources,  or similar. 
However,  in the case of incentives, the efficacy  of this intervention (which  may 
save the state money  in the long term) would look likely  to override the negative 
desert  claim. This notion of relational desert,  and negative desert claims will be 
more active in the the aid-type case than here, where free-market norms are 
fairly permissible with respect to the size of a payment.
I now want to focus on the potential for  positive desert claims to object to the 
provision of trade-type incentives.  I will discuss two strategies for this kind of 
claim. The first is that  incentives reward cynical bad behaviour, and the second, 
that they reward non-cynical bad behaviour.
 I have already  outlined how we might conceive of unhealthy  behaviour as 
wrongful action  on the agent’s part. For the purposes of this discussion, I 
assume there is at least a  minimal requirement  for  agents to avoid unhealthy 
lifestyles, and that failure to do so qualifies as wrongful action.29  The non-
cynical bad behaviour argument proposes that  the agent’s wrongful action (in 
failing  to adopt a healthy  lifestyle) is sufficient grounds for  denying her  the 
opportunity  of the incentive trade. In terms of desert,  the claim is that 
unhealthy behaviour renders the agent actively undeserving of incentives.
 The cynical bad behaviour case adds in an extra layer  of wrongful 
behaviour. Here, the agent intentionally  adopts an unhealthy  lifestyle so as to 
become a candidate for  incentives, and thus profit from receiving incentives to 
revert to the healthy  behaviour. This is a form  of ‘gaming’, where the agent 
cynically  manipulates the practice of incentive-giving so as to financially  benefit 
from it.
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29 This assumption is highly contentious and I do not mean to endorse it as true.
To summarise,  the different  desert-based arguments against trade-type 
incentives that I have outlined are:
2. AID-TYPE INCENTIVES
Before discussing these lines of criticism  in  more detail, I will first introduce 
those criticisms deriving from  the conception of incentives as psychological 
aids.  This alters the status of incentives from  trade to healthcare intervention. 
The role of notions like desert  and fairness (and justice more generally) tends to 
be different within the domains of trading and of healthcare provision.
 Often, entitlement, rather than desert,  is used to ground reasons for  
providing an agent  with healthcare. Entitlement requires that,  for justice to be 
served,  individuals’ rights be respected. Entitlements are formalised through the 
structure of institutions which provide for  agents’ entitlements, and obviously 
depend upon what rights agents are thought to have, and what corresponding 
duties and obligations are owed to them.
 Desert  often tracks entitlement, but  the two are distinct and may  
sometimes conflict.  For instance,  had Usain tripped in the last metres of the 
100m  sprint, and Yohan passed him and won the gold medal, we might say  that, 
although Yohan is entitled to his medal because he won the race, it  is really 
Usain who deserves to be the champion because he is the faster sprinter.
 In healthcare it is normally  necessary  and sufficient that  individuals are 
entitled to certain sorts of treatment: we need not consider further whether 
individuals deserve treatment in order to think that they  should be treated. The 
critic of aid-type incentives, however, argues that this form of intervention is not 
deserved, and that because of this, incentives should not be included in the basic 
healthcare provision citizens are normally entitled to.
 Within a  socialised welfare system, such  as the NHS, the extent of 
healthcare provided will normally  be determined by  things like cost and likely 
Trade in principle acceptable
Amount is too great
Exclusion of other individuals is unfair
Trade in principle is unacceptable
Cynical bad behaviour
Non-cynical bad behaviour
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improvements in well-being. Facts about the agent  are normally  relevant only 
insofar as the agent must be capable of benefitting from the treatment, and that 
she be a citizen (or  holder of health  insurance) which  allows her  access to 
healthcare in general.
 Desert  requires the additional assessment of responsibility  in order  to be 
incorporated into decisions about what healthcare people should receive. If 
people are to be considered blameworthy  for  their illness they  must also be 
responsible for the causes of that illness. The practical work done by  desert here 
is to suggest  that agents who are responsible for  their  illness should not receive 
treatment  for it,  but  rather  deserve to suffer the consequences of their 
behaviour.
 It  is not clear why  critics of incentives often prefer to adopt the language 
of desert,  rather than of entitlement, here.  The parallel claim  would be to say 
that those agents who are responsible for their illness are no longer  entitled to 
treatment  for it (or  something along those lines). It is perhaps because desert 
also carries with it the assumption of moral blame. To claim  that agents are not 
entitled to incentives could be a claim that those agents do not qualify  as 
citizens; that incentives are not effective; that incentives are too expensive to be 
provided; and so on. These can be claims about the intervention, the social 
institution, or  about the agent herself.  Desert, however, makes a claim 
specifically  about the status of the agent: there is some salient moral feature of 
the agent which means she does not deserve this intervention. Thus, the 
absence of desert is a form  of condemnation upon some aspect of the agent’s 
character or actions.
Once again, it seems the critic must make a positive desert  statement in order to 
claim that agents should not receive incentives. Given that there is a 
presumptive entitlement to treatment (assuming the other necessary  features 
for entitlement are in place: incentives are cost-effective, recipients are citizens, 
and so on), an active desert claim that agents do not deserve incentives because 
of some desert base they posses must be made.
 As with trade-type incentives,  such  a  positive desert claim  will rest  on the 
assertion that  agents act  wrongfully  in failing to adopt healthy  lifestyles. If it can 
be shown, along the lines I gestured at earlier, that agents who adopt unhealthy 
lifestyles fail in their  duties to themselves or society,  or harm  others, or do not 
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adhere to a principle of solidarity, then these may  count as relevant bases for 
denying such agents health incentives.
 This strategy  may  be modified somewhat by  conceiving of desert as a 
comparative feature. This takes central account of the fact that  healthcare 
provision involves divvying up resources between different  interventions, 
illnesses,  groups, and individuals.  Resources not spent on one intervention  can 
be spent  on another instead. The comparative desert claim  is that  those who are 
responsible for their  illness are less deserving of treatment than those who are 
not  responsible for  their illness. Further, healthcare provision should be 
prioritised in favour of those who are more deserving.
 The sharpest  example of using  a comparative desert-based criterion for  
allocating healthcare resources is in the case of organ transplants, as illustrated 
by  Thornton (2009). There are often insufficient organs to treat everybody  who 
is in need of them. Where all other relevant features of two candidate recipients 
for a  transplant are the same, Thornton argues that moral responsibility  should 
be used to break the tie. Different justifications can be given for using moral 
responsibility  in this way, but one possible motivator is the connection between 
moral responsibility  and desert.30 In this case, it  need not be preferable that one 
who is responsible for  her illness suffers for it, but it  must be preferable that she 
suffer  from  her illness, rather than that  some other agent (who is not 
responsible for his illness) suffers.
Although incentives do not  constitute a clear ‘tie-break’ situation, they  do 
involve diverting resources in one direction, and benefitting a  particular set of 
people, rather than directing those resources differently  to benefit a different 
set. Desert (as deriving  from  responsibility) could be used as a  criterion to factor 
into decisions about where those resources are directed.
 This argument assumes that  those targeted by  incentives tend to be 
responsible for  the diseases they  suffer. Incentives are generally  offered to 
individuals whose lifestyles contribute to their  poor health prospects, either 
because they  eat poor  diets,  take little exercise, do not vaccinate against disease 
or attend disease screening programs, and so on. It is also assumed that there 
are plenty  of people requiring healthcare who are not responsible (or 
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30 It should be noted that Thornton does not use desert as the motivator in this case.
significantly  less responsible) for  the diseases they  suffer. Those who receive 
incentives may  thus be considered less deserving of treatment than those who 
receive other forms of intervention.
 The implications of this argument may  go further than the critic intends: 
we must  remember not only  to treat incentives as a healthcare intervention, but 
also to treat other healthcare interventions as we treat incentives. The 
implication  here is that if it  is unfair to provide incentives to those with 
unhealthy  lifestyles (in order to reduce chronic disease) because they  are 
deemed undeserving, it may  also be unfair to provide some other forms of 
(costly) intervention, such as support groups, drug therapies, and so on, to those 
same individuals. The consequences of introducing a principle of desert into 
healthcare provision decisions will affect more interventions than just 
incentives,  and more conditions in need of treatment than merely  those 
resulting from  the kind of lifestyle behaviours mentioned. For instance,  skiing 
and getting pregnant are activities that  one generally  engages in voluntarily  and 
which increase one’s risk of needing medical assistance.
To summarise, I have described how  the desert-based argument regarding aid-
type incentives can be presented in a non-comparative and a comparative form:
ANALYSIS
I will now  consider in more depth the various arguments outlined above that 
suggest the use of incentives is unfair. I have highlighted different arguments in 
relation to trade-type incentives and aid-type incentives. I believe not only  are 
the arguments presented in support of the desert-based account  different in 
these two cases,  but the threshold for  the arguments to succeed (for them  to 
make us think that incentives are inappropriate) is different.
Non-comparative case
Individuals should, in general, bear the consequences of actions they  are 
morally responsible for
Comparative case
Individuals who are responsible for their illness are less deserving of 
treatment than those who are not responsible for their illness
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 In relation to this second, threshold claim, T. M. Scanlon’s (1986; 1998; 
2012) work is instructive.31  Scanlon insists that, when thinking  about moral 
responsibility  and blame, it is important to keep one eye on the consequences of 
such  evaluations. For example, if the evaluation of an agent as blameworthy 
means that we are justified in punishing that  individual, the requirements for 
establishing blame must be set quite high. We may  alternatively  wish to identify 
blame in situations where no justification of punishment follows, and in this 
case the requirements for blameworthiness may be more easily met.
 It  need not follow  that finding incentives to be incompatible with notions 
of desert, and thus unjust, means that, all  things considered, they  shouldn’t be 
used. However,  desert-based criticisms might constitute serious reasons for 
thinking incentives should not be used (and the most forthright proponents of 
these criticisms will want to claim that incentives should not be used).
 To deny  trade-type incentives is different to denying  aid-type incentives. 
The former  is to stop one individual (or  rather the state or similar institutional 
provider of incentives) from freely  trading with another individual. In this case, 
we prevent these two agents from  benefitting from  the advantages of the trade. 
The latter  involves denying individuals access to healthcare that could help 
them, and that they would otherwise be entitled to.
 I propose that  the bar  be set higher for denying access to aid-type 
incentives than to trade-type incentives. That is, there must be excellent reasons 
for supposing that  it is unfair  to provide aid-type incentives to people in order 
for this to constitute a  good reason to prohibit the use of incentives. We may  not 
need to set the bar so high for  trade-type incentives, as the consequences of 
denying access to these incentives are not so serious (though  I do not wish to 
imply that such a denial of access should be considered trivial).
In the discussion that follows, I first  consider  three of the arguments made 
against trade-type incentives: that  the amount represented by  incentives is too 
great; that incentives ought to be offered to everybody; and that those receiving 
incentives display  cynical bad behaviour.  I do not  offer  a full defence of 
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31 It should be noted that Scanlon falls  into the group of  theorists who deny  that desert should be 
included in a theory of distributive justice.
incentives in the light of these arguments,  but suggest that each has only  limited 
strength.
 Next, I consider the arguments that base their  claim  on the idea that 
agents receiving  incentives act wrongfully  in some way. These come under the 
non-cynical bad behaviour argument; the argument that  individuals ought, in 
general, to bear  the consequences of behaviour they  are responsible for; and 
that individuals who are responsible for  their illness are less deserving of 
treatment  than those who are not responsible for  their  illness. In considering 
these arguments, I consider the key  notion of responsibility, and discuss the 
extent to which agents can be considered morally  responsible for their 
unhealthy  lifestyles. In doing so, I present  some evidence from  research  into the 
social determinants of health, and the mechanisms of health behaviour.
ECONOMIC DESERT
Trade-type incentives are payments to individuals in return for  something the 
incentiviser wants. Such payments may  be thought ‘deserved’ along the same 
lines as one might deserve a wage for performing one’s job, or deserve 
compensation for participating in medical research. Feinberg (1970) insists 
earned income can only  be deserved where it is compensation  for  hazardous or 
costly  work. Sadurski (1985) in contrast  proposes that effort should be the main 
basis for  deserved income. Other  desert  bases could include contribution to 
society, exposure to risk, need, current wealth, opportunity costs, and so forth.
 It  will often be very  tricky  to determine the exact payment - not  too great 
nor  too little - that any  individual deserves.  Attempting this involves assessing 
the ‘absolute’ desert of an agent.  Different metrics could be used to tell us how 
much each desert base should contribute to the economic deserts of an 
individual. It  seems likely  that some plausible metrics we could use would tell us 
that many of the payments made to real-world citizens are not fully deserved.
Take some real-life example schemes (see also Appendix A):
• ‘Give it  up for Baby‘ offers £12.50 in supermarket vouchers per  week to 
women who smoke no cigarettes that week;
• FIAT (Financial Incentives for Adherence Trial) offers £15 cash  per anti-
psychotic depot medication the agent receives;
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• A trial incentivising HPV (Human Papilloma Virus) vaccination offers £20 for 
the first injection, £5 for the second, and £20 for the third and final injection.
I do not know how much effort,  sacrifice,  risk exposure, or productive 
contribution was required for any  agent to meet the demands of one of these 
schemes. It is not clear  that knowing this for  any  individual, or  knowing the 
average for all participants, would help us to judge absolute desert, since there 
is no clear guidance as to how much value we should place on effort,  sacrifice, 
risks, and so on.
 Alternatively, we may  consider  the comparative, rather than absolute, 
aspects of desert. In this case, we can only  determine what  one individual 
deserves by  taking into account  what other  individuals will receive. In  order  to 
determine comparative desert, we may  compare the payments made in 
incentive schemes to payments made in comparable situations, and make some 
approximate judgement of their appropriateness on that basis.32
 However,  it is not clear  what  should act as a precedent for  this 
judgement. Should we use the effort : pay  ratio involved in working as a teacher 
and apply  it  to the case of incentives for  healthy  behaviour? Or should we match 
incentive payments to the compensation per unit  of sacrifice involved in medical 
trials? The comparative approach does not seem to move us on much further.
 All that I propose to say  here, I fear  rather  unhelpfully, is that it  is 
extremely  hard to judge one way  or  the other whether  the size of incentives 
matches the deserts of recipients. We might make intuitive responses about  £10 
weekly  payments, or £650 cumulative payments, but  such assertions would not 
seem  to be robustly  justified.  It  might be possible to provide some sort of 
judgement on the matter, through sophisticated sociological analysis, combined 
with  a thoroughgoing philosophical apparatus instructing us as to what the 
appropriate desert bases are and how they  should be translated into payment. 
Such ambitions are far beyond this thesis.
 I put to one side, then, the claim that incentives are larger than recipients 
deserve. I have not  ruled out this argument,  but it has also not shown itself to be 
particularly  compelling. It seems that,  whilst  incentives remain relatively 
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32  For  more on the distinctions between absolute, proportional, and comparative desert, see 
Scheffler (2003: 83-84)
modest, the gap between what people receive and what they  deserve is unlikely 
to be too great.
UNFAIR EXCLUSION
The related claim is that everybody who shows the incentivised (healthy) 
behaviour should receive payments, not just  those who newly  adopt the healthy 
behaviour. This assumes that the appropriate desert base is the healthy 
behaviour itself, thus, anybody  showing the healthy  behaviour  is deserving of 
incentives.
 An obvious reason for  providing incentives only  to those who currently  
exhibit  unhealthy  behaviours is cost: it will be much cheaper to provide 
incentives only  to those whose behaviour it will be advantageous to alter. 
Targeting incentives in  this way  pays for  the change in behaviour: smoking to 
not  smoking; unhealthy  diet to healthy  diet; failing to get vaccinated to getting 
vaccinated; non-adherence to adherence to treatment.  Recipients of incentives 
only  receive them for  the duration of the scheme, in order  to bring about the 
transition from unhealthy to healthy behaviour.33
 Identifying  the appropriate desert base can be difficult. Different 
approaches to economic desert have been mentioned: economic payments may 
be deserved as compensation; reward for  effort; for  productive contribution to 
society, and so on.  All those who exhibit  healthy  lifestyles contribute to society 
by  doing so, by  reducing the likelihood of illness and the negative effects this 
will have on society.  This contribution  alone may  constitute a sufficient desert 
base for  incentives. Further, it may  be a struggle for these individuals to 
maintain their healthy  lifestyles, and they  may  have had to work very  hard and 
make significant sacrifices to achieve them. Considering these features as well, 
we may  have more reasons for  thinking that lots of individuals who have already 
adopted healthy  lifestyles are no less deserving of payment than those who do so 
in exchange for incentives.
 There are some plausible desert bases which will tend to recommend 
incentivising (according to desert) those who currently  show  unhealthy 
behaviours in preference to those who already  show healthy  behaviours. For 
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33 Incentive schemes are not intended to continue after behaviour change has been  established. 
However, empirical  evidence is  lacking and it is not clear how long incentives  may need to 
continue in order to ensure that behaviour change is sustained.
instance, features like need, social deprivation, and health prospects could play 
a role in determining someone’s desert. These features will arise more 
frequently  in individuals who currently  have unhealthy  lifestyles,  and who are 
also more likely to be subject to greater deprivation (discussed later).
 Nonetheless, strict  adherence to desert may  require that at  least some 
who already  show healthy  behaviours are deserving of incentives as well. It  is 
unlikely  that it  will be practical to adopt incentives if they  must  be given to 
people who already  have a healthy  lifestyle. Thus, excluding such individuals 
from eligibility  to incentives would be a necessary  structural feature of practices 
of providing incentives.
There is a  danger  here of over-stating the imperative to adhere strictly  to what is 
required by  desert. Most  of the time, monetary  transactions occur free from 
scrutiny  as to their particular desert bases. If I buy  a bicycle from Chris rather 
than from Bradley,  that is not made wrongful if we come to understand that 
Bradley  has put  in many  hours of hard work to repair  his bicycle, and really 
needs the money, whereas Chris is quite wealthy  and is simply  selling a bicycle 
he was given as a gift but  no longer wants. There may  be facts about Bradley  and 
Chris that make us think that Bradley  deserves the sale more. However,  we 
accept  that, where a  market operates with relative freedom, transactions will 
often be based on criteria other than strict desert.
 Giving incentives to people who already  live healthily  is paying for  
nothing (or perhaps, back-paying them  for  something they  have already  done). 
Rather than being obligated to do this by  the requirements of desert, this seems 
like a case of excessive generosity, and is not demanded by  principles of 
fairness.
 Once again,  there is some basis to the criticism that providing trade-type 
health incentives only  to those whose behaviour  we wish  to alter fails the 
demands of desert.  However, I think the power of this criticism  is limited. In the 
domain of transactions, desert may  have some relevance, but it  seems that other 
factors (ownership rights,  fulfillment of contractual obligations, absence of 
exploitation,  and so on) will constitute the main criteria for determining the 
fairness of a  trade. In the case of trade-type incentives, then, concerns about 
desert  will be less worrisome. As with the argument relating to the appropriate 
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size of incentives, whilst incentives remain relatively  modest, desert  concerns 
are unlikely to constitute a significant objection.
‘BAD BEHAVIOUR’
The second set of arguments that I described relating  to trade-type incentives 
were those which posit a positive desert claim that  individuals receiving 
incentives actively  do not deserve them. I proposed that the ‘do not deserve’ 
here comes from the claim  that those offered incentives have acted wrongfully 
in failing to adopt healthy behaviours.
 The criticisms of aid-type incentives rest on similar claims: that  those 
who receive incentives act  wrongfully  and thus do not deserve the treatment, or 
at least, are less deserving of treatment than agents who live healthily  (and who 
therefore do not act wrongfully on this front).
 In what follows, I will consider the link between agent  behaviour and 
desert. I argue that, even if we accept the claim  that agents ought to adopt 
healthy  lifestyles, their  failure to do so does not mean that they  are morally 
blameworthy, nor  that they  are undeserving of incentives. I propose that 
sociological evidence concerning the social determinants of health, and 
psychological research  into the mechanisms of health behaviour, undermine the 
kind of responsibility  link between an agent and her actions that will be 
required to render her undeserving.34
GAMING
First, I will briefly  consider the cynical bad behaviour claim, outlined earlier. 
This was the argument leveled at trade-type incentives which proposed that 
those being offered incentives might actually  adopt unhealthy  behaviours with 
the very  intention of making some money  from  the incentives they  would 
subsequently  be offered to quit  those behaviours. Effectively, the criticism is 
that incentives are vulnerable to ‘gaming,’ and that those who are willing to 
exploit the system (through wrongful behaviour) will reap the rewards.
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34  Once again, ‘underserving’ here refers to both undeserving of trade-type incentives 
(payments), and undeserving  of  aid-type incentives (healthcare). To be rendered undeserving  of 
these two things is quite different. However, I do not think the discussion  shows that ‘bad 
behaviour’ renders the agent undeserving of either type of incentive.
 This criticism  can probably  only  be resolved through empirical evidence 
that can tell us,  one way  or the other, whether people really  do game the system 
in  this way.  There are other ways that  people may  ‘cheat’ in order  to appear as if 
they  are adopting healthier behaviours, when really  they  are not.  Perhaps one 
could fake being a smoker, or  intentionally  become non-adherent  with one’s 
treatment  regimen in order to be paid to quit or to become adherent. It may  also 
be possible to ‘fake’ the tests of behaviour change, such as the carbon monoxide 
breath test used to assess whether someone has been smoking or not.
 Any  individuals who engage in  these sorts of cynical bad behaviours are 
likely  to be deemed undeserving. However, it is not  clear  how  frequently  people 
are likely  to behave like this in order  to get  at  incentives. Consider  the effort 
required for someone to intentionally  gain weight,  then gradually  lose it  so as to 
earn rewards from an incentive program. In  some cases,  the cost of the 
incentive is unlikely  to cover the direct financial cost  of the ‘bad’ behaviour  (for 
instance, incentives to quit smoking are often less than the cost of a packet of 
cigarettes).
 Without research and evidence about the prevalence of gaming 
behaviours it is hard to say  how powerful this argument is. Given the effort 
required and minimal rewards involved in these forms of gaming I would 
hazard a guess that rates of successful gaming would be minimal, but  such 
speculation is no substitute for empirical evidence on the matter which is, thus 
far, lacking.
 Further, as with the other ethical considerations of health incentives, the 
need to avoid rewarding undeserving  ‘gamers’ should be balanced against the 
potential good incentives can bring about. If only  a very  small proportion of 
those receiving incentives do so through cynical methods, this may  be an 
acceptable trade if other (genuine) recipients are helped.
BLAMEWORTHINESS
There are three arguments I have not yet considered. First, the argument that 
agents do not deserve incentives because they  display  non-cynical bad 
behaviour. This should be distinguished from the cynical bad behaviour  claim. 
In the cynical case, the objection is to the (potential for) gaming behaviour. In 
the non-cynical case, it is proposed that  the behaviour  of failing to live healthily 
is sufficient to render the recipient undeserving of trade-type health incentives.
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 The other two arguments relate to aid-type incentives and have similar  
motivations. One of these asserts that recipients are absolutely undeserving of 
incentives (this is a  judgement about the recipient in isolation, independent of 
facts about other people). The other asserts that recipients are comparatively 
undeserving (a claim  that, in comparison to what others receive, incentive 
recipients get more than they deserve).
 Though these arguments have some different features, there is significant 
overlap. In particular, they  all require that  the agent in question be considered 
blameworthy for her  wrongful behaviour, so as to show that  she is undeserving 
of trade-type or  aid-type incentives. In this section, I will consider this 
accusation of blameworthiness, and the implication that  some who are 
unhealthy might be undeserving (or less deserving) of healthcare.
REACTIVE ATTITUDES
One influential approach to analysing notions such as blameworthiness is based 
upon the ‘reactive attitudes.’ In his seminal article ‘Freedom and Resentment,’ 
Peter Strawson (1963) proposes that our  practices of holding people to be 
blameworthy  and praiseworthy  are expressions of ‘reactive attitudes.’ Reactive 
attitudes are how  we respond to the attitudes held by  other agents, usually  as 
revealed by  their  actions. For instance, if you spill hot coffee on me, and make 
no effort to apologise, I might come to resent you for your  lack of remorse. 
Resentment such as this is a reactive attitude. Other reactive attitudes include 
indignation (where I criticise you for  wronging another agent), and guilt  (where 
I feel I have wronged someone). Holding reactive attitudes such as these and 
expressing them  through the practices of blaming and praising are, according to 
Strawson, central to interpersonal relationships.
 That attitudes such as resentment and indignation lie behind desert 
claims in the media is apparent. The language used in criticising incentives, and 
their recipients, is highly  evocative, and often demonizing of those with 
unhealthy  lifestyles.35 Yet it is clearly  not the case that every  instance where an 
agent experiences resentment will be a case where the subject of that 
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35  A few sample headlines: ‘Pay nurses, not these  mollycoddled tubbies’  The Mirror, 2009; ‘Will 
scheme  turn fatties into fitties?; Should overweight parents be paid to walk their kids to school’ 
Evening Times, [Glasgow], 2008; ‘Why reward the  least deserving?’  Aberdeen Evening 
Express, 2007.
resentment is rightly  to be considered blameworthy.  First, the attitude assigned 
to the agent, based on her behaviour, may  not be the right  one. Second, the 
reactive attitude we hold in response to the agent’s behaviour  may  not be 
correct. Third, the agent  may  not be the appropriate subject of reactive attitudes 
(Scanlon [1986: 161]).
 If any  of these cases holds, it  will not be appropriate to express the 
attitude of resentment towards the agent, nor to blame them. In the discussion 
that follows, I consider the question of how agents come to adopt unhealthy 
behaviours,  and whether or not we should consider them morally  responsible 
for their behaviours.
 Some theories explicitly  include responsibility  in their criteria  for  desert: 
agents must be responsible for the desert bases which convey  praise or blame 
upon them. Those positing that agents who are responsible for their illness are 
not  deserving of treatment place responsibility  central to their criticism. The 
desert  base here is the unhealthy  behaviour, which conveys blame upon the 
agent responsible for it.
 On the reactive attitudes account, the responsibility  status of the agent 
will be relevant to judging the appropriateness of resentment (and thus blame). 
The three factors that  can render reactive attitudes inappropriate - attitude 
assigned to the agent  is wrong, reactive attitude is wrong, agent is not 
appropriate subject of reactive attitudes - could be affected if the agent is not 
responsible for the relevant behaviour. If the agent  was not responsible for the 
action to which the offending attitude has been assigned, the basis for thinking 
that the agent holds that  attitude will be undermined. If the agent does hold the 
attitude for which  we resent her, yet lacks responsibility  for holding this attitude 
then it  might yet be inappropriate to resent her. Finally, if the agent is incapable 
of controlling any  of her  actions in a way  compatible with responsibility,  we may 
think that she will not be an appropriate subject for resentment.
 Responsibility, thus, has relevance for desert-based approaches to 
criticising the provision of health incentives. It seems important, therefore,  to 
consider to what  extent agents are responsible for  their  unhealthy  lifestyles. In 
doing this I shall first look at some of the evidence from  research into the social 
determinants of health, which explores the links between social, environmental, 
and economic factors and health  outcomes.  I will then summarise some of the 
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literature from  psychological research into the mechanisms underlying health 
behaviour, and the barriers to behaviour change.
 In considering the conclusions about health  incentives that we can draw  
from this evidence I will consider how the freedom an agent has in choosing 
how to act  relates to her responsibility  for  her  actions.  I draw  upon Pettit’s work 
on freedom as ‘fitness to be held responsible’ for  this discussion. I then seek to 
connect this discussion of freedom and responsibility  to the discussion of those 
factors influencing health and health behaviour,  and thus the responsibility  of 
agents for their  unhealthy  lifestyles.  Finally,  I seek to connect this back to the 
discussion of blame and desert, and propose that where agents are not fully 
responsible for their unhealthy  behaviour, they  will not be blameworthy, and 
will not deserve the denial of incentives.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS AND HEALTH
Research  has identified clear  links between health and deprivation. Deprivation 
is most commonly  given in terms of the ‘Index of Multiple Deprivation’ (IMD). 
The domains along which IMD scores are calculated are income, employment, 
health, education, crime, access to services, and living environment 
(Department for Communities and Local Government [2011]). IMD scores apply 
to areas, not people, though they  are calculated by  assessing the circumstances 
of those living within that area. Not  all of those living in a  deprived area will be 
deprived, and not all deprived people will live in deprived areas.
 Socio-economic factors are correlated with health: levels of health and 
life expectancy  are lower in more deprived areas than in less deprived areas. 
There is a  gradient such that, for every  move an individual makes up the socio-
economic ‘ladder,’ the better her health prospects will be. A wide range of 
factors, which stem from inequalities in power, money, and resources, 
contribute to this distribution of health outcomes reflecting differences in 
deprivation. These factors include:
[M]aterial circumstances,  the social environment,  psychosocial  factors, 
behaviours,  and biological factors.  In  turn, these factors are influenced by 
social position,  itself shaped by  education,  occupation, income, gender, 
ethnicity  and race.  All  these influences are affected by  the socio-political 
and cultural and social context in which they sit.
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Marmot et al. (2010: 16)
‘Unhealthy  behaviour’ is effectively  a broad term to describe behaviour  which 
exposes the agent to risk factors for  various diseases. For instance, tobacco 
smoke is a  risk factor for lung disease, so cigarette smoking counts as an 
‘unhealthy  behaviour.’ Many  of the sorts of unhealthy  behaviour that incentives 
target are incorporated into everyday  behaviours and general lifestyles, 
including diet,  physical activity,  and smoking. Risk factors in these domains 
tend to contribute to the likelihood of suffering from  non-communicable 
diseases (NCDs).  NCDs include diabetes, cardiovascular  disease, cancer, chronic 
respiratory  disease, and mental disorders. Unhealthy  behaviour, in the context 
of those behaviours targeted by  health incentives, can also include failure to 
adhere to treatment  advised by  physicians, and failure to utilise healthcare 
resources (cancer screening, STI testing, vaccination uptake, and so on).
 Deprivation, exposure to risk factors, and health  outcomes,  interact in a 
complex  fashion. I cannot discuss these intricacies in too much detail here, 
however, a few examples can gesture towards the wider  trends linking socio-
economic and environmental factors to health. Take weight and smoking for 
example: women in managerial and professional groups have a 19% rate of 
overweight and obesity, compared to 29% in routine and semi-routine groups 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics [2007]); 17% of men in professional occupations 
smoke compared to 31% of those in manual occupations (Marteau [2010]).
 Utilisation of healthcare services also tends to be lower  in deprived areas. 
Human Papilloma Virus (HPV) vaccination uptake has been shown to be 
significantly  lower in deprived areas and amongst  ethnic minorities (Roberts et 
al. [2011]). Further, girls who did not receive the HPV vaccine were less likely  to 
have received childhood immunizations such as those for measles, mumps, and 
rubella (MMR).36 Vaccination  against influenza was also shown to have slightly 
lower  rates of uptake in more deprived areas (Coupland et al. [2007]). Cancer 
screening tends to be less well utilised by  the socially  deprived, as shown by 
McCaffery  et  al. (2002) in  the case of colorectal cancer  screening,  and 
Maheswaran et al. (2006) in the case of breast cancer screening.
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36 The HPV  vaccine is  given to girls aged 12-13 as part  of the national vaccination programme. A 
catch-up programme also provides the vaccine to some older girls.
 Such differences in exposure to lifestyle risk factors and use of healthcare 
services tend to manifest themselves in disease prevalence and life expectancy: 
so,  in one of the wealthiest areas of London male life expectancy  is 88 years, 
whilst in one of the poorest  it is 71  years. Throughout England, those living in 
the poorest  neighbourhoods can expect to die seven years earlier  than those in 
the wealthiest; this gap remains at  six years even when the poorest and richest 
five percent are excluded (Marmot et al [2010: 37]).
These data  establish a correlation between various indicators of deprivation, 
exposure to health risk factors (including lifestyle and uptake of health 
services), and health outcomes.  Whilst the patterns are well established in the 
social determinants of health literature, they  are only  general, population-level 
trends, and thus will not apply  to every  individual living in a particular post 
code, or doing a particular job.
 Furthermore,  although compelling, the evidence presented here cannot 
establish causation between deprivation and health (i.e. that those factors 
marking out deprivation, either  directly  or indirectly, cause unhealthy 
behaviour and poorer  health outcomes). It  is possible that there is a common 
cause for  these factors which would explain why  poor health is often seen in 
areas of high deprivation. Indeed, the explanation of these trends still leaves 
room  for  free choice and autonomous agential control over  health  behaviour. 
Thus, the evidence from  research into the social determinants of health might 
lead us to be suspicious of assumptions that people are in control of (and 
morally  responsible for) their  health  behaviour,  but it ought  not to persuade us 
that this is the case.
 The additional information needed in order to make judgements about 
responsibility  relates to why the agent acts as she does; what control she has 
over her behaviour; and could she act otherwise. Psychological research  into the 
mechanisms of health behaviour  and behaviour change can help illuminate 
these kind of issues. Before presenting some evidence from that field of 
research, I will give a brief sketch of Phillip Pettit’s account of freedom, which 
conceptualises freedom as ‘fitness to be held responsible’ (Pettit [2001]).  Pettit’s 
account is helpful in  directing our attention towards those features of free 
human action that  will be necessary  if we are to judge an agent as responsible 
for her behaviour.
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PETTIT: FREEDOM AS FITNESS TO BE HELD RESPONSIBLE
On Pettit’s account, to be free and to be responsible are separate but 
overlapping states. He identifies three aspects of the free agent:
These conditions must be met for  the agent to be considered free. Pettit 
continues: “To be free, in the most  general sense,  is to be fully  fit to be held 
responsible; it is to be fully  deserving of the sort of reactions, say  those involving 
resentment or gratitude, that characterize face-to-face relations.” So freedom 
relates to desert and responsibility,  and the reactive attitudes, in this consistent 
way. Agents who are rendered unfree will not be fully  fit  to be held responsible, 
may  not be the appropriate subjects of the reactive attitudes with which other 
agents tend to respond to them, and may  not deserve praise or blame for  their 
actions. It will also be possible for an agent’s freedom  to be partially 
undermined, where some of the conditions for  freedom  are not met,  or  are only 
partly  met. This would still mean the agent is not fully fit to be held responsible, 
though she may  bear some responsibility  for her  actions (and some desert as a 
consequence).
The first condition of freedom  that Pettit describes is that  of free action.  Actions 
will be free so long as they  are under  the control of the agent. The agent must 
not  be coerced through extreme pressure (such as death threats) or  physical 
force.
 The second condition is that of self identification. In this case, what is 
needed for freedom is that “[t]he agent cannot be detached from  the action, or 
Pettit’s conditions of freedom:
1. Free Action: “the freedom of an action performed by  an agent on this 
or that occasion;”
2. Self Identification: “the freedom of the self implicit in the agent’s 
ability  to identify  with the things thereby  done, rather than having to 
look on them as a bystander;”
3. Social Status: “the freedom  of the person involved in enjoying a social 
status that makes the action truly  theirs, not an action produced under 
pressure from others.” (Pettit [2001: 4])
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from the process leading to the action, in  the way  they  may  be detached from  a 
reflex or  a pathology  or even an obsession or compulsion”  (Pettit [2001: 10]). 
The agent must be able to take ownership of the action she performs; she must 
be able to talk about it in the first-person, and fully  accept that it is she who 
performed it. Agents who act under the influence of drugs,  hypnosis, or  whilst 
asleep are unlikely to meet the criteria for this aspect of freedom.
 The final condition of free action relates to social status  and the absence 
of significant external pressure.  Examples of people rendered unfree in this way 
include those who are pressured into prostitution or crime by  the desperate 
circumstances they find themselves in.
 These different  aspects of freedom will be relevant  to the discussion of 
desert  that  follows because of their connection with responsibility. I will now 
introduce some of the psychological literature that has been directed at 
understanding the connection between social deprivation and poorer  health 
outcomes, by elucidating the mechanisms of health behaviour.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HEALTH BEHAVIOUR
Intuitively, it may  seem  that  it is within one’s power to avoid many  of the health 
risk-factors mentioned. One cannot control who one’s parents are, whether they 
smoke, where one goes to school,  or the foodstuffs on discount in the 
supermarket.  Ultimately, however, each agent can still choose how she lives. 
After all, there are plenty  of individuals who are subject to disadvantage who 
nevertheless manage to lead healthy  lifestyles without  the need for interventions 
from the state.
 Yet, human reasoning has been shown to incorporate the ‘fundamental 
attribution  error’ which produces a “tendency  for attributers to underestimate 
the impact of situational factors and to overestimate the role of dispositional 
factors in controlling behavior.” (Ross [1977: 183]) Thus,  although it is 
intuitively  appealing to assume that we are ‘free’ and ‘responsible’ for  the 
actions we take in our everyday  lives, we should be wary  of assuming this is 
generally the case.
 An extensive literature seeks to explain the psychological mechanisms 
underpinning the social patterning of health.  Some of this evidence leads us to 
question assumptions about people’s ability  to ‘choose’ to be healthy. One of the 
key  insights of this research is that much human nature is ‘automatic.’ The ‘two 
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systems’ psychological model,  as discussed in Chapter Four, proposes that, 
while some behaviour is influenced by  values and conscious reasoning, another 
pathway  of behavioural control operates with little or no cognitive engagement 
(Strack and Deutsch  [2004]).  Where an agent is not  normally  required to 
consciously  control their behaviour, it takes a large and sustained psychological 
effort to then intervene to alter these everyday behaviours and habits.
 This habitual nature of behaviour makes it highly  susceptible to 
environmental influences: factors like a high density  of fast-food outlets, and 
being surrounded by  others who are engaging in unhealthy  behaviours. These 
features can have a considerable negative impact on lifestyle and are typically 
found in deprived areas (Marteau [2010]; Cummins et al. [2005]; Macdonald et 
al. [2007]).
 Agents who live in  deprived areas also tend to be exposed to greater levels 
of stress. The physiological effects on the brain of stressful living  environments 
can cause agents to act more impulsively. The sorts of health risk factors that 
contribute to chronic,  lifestyle-related disease often satisfy  these kind of 
impulsive desires.  The capacity  for  resisting such impulsive behaviours - self-
regulation - is also influenced by  features of the social environment. In 
particular, immediate family  and parenting style can help foster  the 
development of robust self-regulatory  skills. However, the kind of environment 
needed to develop such skills is undermined by  poverty, deprivation, and low 
levels of parental education (Marteau [2010]; Lexmond and Reeves [2009]).
 The greater tendency  for  environmental circumstances to cue unhealthy  
behaviour means that those living in deprived areas must exert greater effort in 
diverting their  ‘automatic’ behavioural system  away  from  unhealthy  behaviours. 
Moreover, such self-regulation will often be harder  for agents who are subject to 
numerous indicators of deprivation because they  are less likely  to possess the 
skills required to curb impulsive behaviour. Kotz and West  (2009) present 
evidence that seems to support  this, showing that smokers from the most 
deprived socioeconomic groups are equally  likely  to attempt to quit smoking 
(and to seek help in doing so),  but only  half as likely  to succeed as those in the 
highest socioeconomic groups.
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FREEDOM AND UNHEALTHY BEHAVIOUR
I have sought to present  some of the evidence from  research into the social 
determinants of health,  and the mechanisms of health behaviour, in  order  to 
help consider questions of whether those who adopt unhealthy  behaviours bear 
responsibility  for doing so; are blameworthy  for  some of the harmful 
consequences that result; are deserving of the ill health they  suffer; and are 
undeserving of health incentives.
 Whilst the sociological research identifies general trends that link aspects 
of deprivation with  poor health outcomes, the psychological research  goes 
further,  suggesting a complex causal relationship connects these factors. The 
issue of relevance for  questions about the desert of agents with unhealthy 
lifestyles is whether this relationship undermines the moral responsibility  of 
those agents for their behaviour.
Let us return to Pettit’s analysis of freedom  as fitness to be held responsible. 
Recall,  the three aspects of freedom  that  Pettit highlights relate to free action, 
self-identification,  and social status. I believe that our best information about 
the mechanisms underlying health behaviour leaves open the possibility  that 
agents are not fully  free in  adopting unhealthy  lifestyles, and that they  are thus 
not fully fit to be held responsible.
 First, consider the requirements for free action. The agent who eats an 
unhealthy  diet is not rendered unfree by  the employees of McDonalds holding a 
gun to her  head and forcing her  to consume endless boxes of chicken nuggets. 
Freedom-limiting influences in the health  behaviour context are less dramatic 
and, invariably, far weaker than this. However,  as I have argued in the context 
of what  should constitute coercion, the important factor is the psychological 
pressure placed on the agent’s will. I think the same holds true here: we are 
interested in whether  the action  is an expression of the agent’s own will,  or of 
factors overriding her will in some way.
 Some unhealthy  behaviours incorporate pathologies of addiction, 
dependence, or  compulsion. In these cases, the pressure to act  in  a particular 
way  (even though that  pressure comes from  ‘within’ the agent) can be extreme. 
In other instances, an agent may  wish to act healthily, yet fail to muster the 
willpower to do so (sometimes described as akrasia). The pressure exerted on 
the agent’s will in  the first set of cases is more extensive, and will compromise 
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the freedom  of any  given action to a greater extent than in the second case. This 
needs to be the case in order to distinguish cases of addiction and compulsion 
from cases of weakness of the will.
 It  is, of course,  not possible to enter  somebody’s mind and experience 
what she experiences, or  to objectively  measure the degree of pressure her will 
comes under to behave in a particular way. We cannot make an objective 
assessment of the effort required for  agents to overcome such pressure, to shun 
unhealthy  behaviours and adopt new, healthier behaviours. The agent herself is 
the only  one with  access to this information, which makes for  a rather 
dissatisfying conclusion for  those wishing  to assess the freedom  of actions (and 
the responsibility  agents should bear for their actions).  Such an  emphasis on 
psychology  also leaves open the possibility  that those who are particularly 
susceptible to pressure on their will, and who are likely  to succumb easily  to 
temptation (for instance, the dieter who gives in  at the merest whiff of a freshly 
baked croissant), will be rendered ‘unfree’ to some extent.
 I would stand by  this assessment: what is significant is the agent’s will, 
the pressure she comes under,  and her  capacity  to resist that  pressure.37 
Further, the strategy  proposed on Pettit’s account  provides three different forms 
of freedom. So far, I have only  made mention of the first: free action. An agent 
whose freedom of action is compromised slightly  on a  given occasion may 
nevertheless be judged largely  ‘free’ in  a more general sense where she suffers 
no freedom limitation along  the other two aspects of freedom. For an agent to 
be fully fit  to be held responsible, she should also be fully free. However, an 
agent may  still be considered largely  responsible where she meets most of the 
conditions for freedom.
The second aspect of freedom  is that of self-identification. Agents are free in 
this sense when they  can take full ‘ownership’ of their actions: see them  as fully 
‘theirs’ and accept them as an extension of a part of their  own character. This 
requires more than the mere fact that  the agent physically  performed an  action. 
Consider  the difference between accidentally  tipping a drink down somebody 
you are having an engaging conversation with, and throwing your drink over 
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37  I do not suggest that this  is all that  matters in making a  moral appraisal  of  the agent. If she 
has cultivated a sensitivity to external  pressures then we might feel  less  inclined to consider her 
‘unfree’ in a fuller sense. The picture will be more complicated than I express it here.
somebody  who has just made a series of insulting remarks to you. In the first 
instance you are unlikely  to see that action as ‘yours’ in any  significant way.38 In 
the second case, you  may  identify  with the action to a greater extent as it was 
intended and an accurate expression of your feelings towards the individual. 39
 When thinking about an  agent’s self-perception, we may  take her  long 
term  goals to be important: how she sees herself and how she wants to be in the 
future (the discussion of autonomy  in Chapter Four is relevant  here).  Rational, 
reasonably  well-informed agents are capable of forming plans about how to 
achieve their short, medium, and long term  desires, and about what it will be 
feasible for  them to achieve. Agents who act in the short term in ways that will 
obviously  disrupt  their  long term plans and harm their interests may  not 
strongly  identify  with those actions, particularly  where those actions are made 
in  ‘the heat of the moment,’ or  in response to fleeting physical or psychological 
stimuli.
Freedom of action and self-identification seem  vulnerable to the effects of 
deprivation that contribute to unhealthy  lifestyles. First, the fact that much 
lifestyle behaviour  is habitual,  and not generally  under conscious control means 
that factors external to the agent are likely  to have a  lot  of influence over certain 
aspects of her  behaviour. This could contribute to the undermining of the 
freedom  of any  given  action (where agents struggle to consciously  intervene and 
redirect behaviour),  as well as damaging the extent to which the agent  self-
identifies with her behaviour.
 The abundance of cues for unhealthy  behaviour is one feature of deprived 
areas that makes it more likely  that individuals in these areas will have their 
freedom  undermined. Further than this,  recall that other  features typical of 
these environments make it  likely  that agents will  have reduced capacity  for 
self-regulation and are more likely  to behave impulsively.  Eating  foods high in 
sugar, fat  and salt, smoking cigarettes, failing to conscientiously  follow a 
treatment  regimen, or to take other precautionary  steps to avoid ill  health are all 
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38 It might even  be inappropriate to call  such  an  occurrence an ‘action’: often the term  preferred 
is a ‘happening’ or an ‘event’ as there is nothing active in the agent’s will.
39 Though, this may be undermined if you acted in  ‘the heat of the moment’, perhaps  if you were 
overcome with  rage at the person’s ignorant comments. You  might say that such  an  action was 
‘out of character.’
more likely  to occur where an agent acts impulsively.  Instances of health-
harming impulsive behaviours could well also be instances where an agent’s 
freedom  of action is undermined, as well as the extent to which she is able to 
self-identify with that action.
The final aspect  of freedom is that  relating to the social status  of the agent, 
specifically, ‘the freedom  of the person involved in enjoying a  social status that 
makes the action truly  theirs, not an action produced under  pressure from 
others.’ Pettit is partly  concerned with political liberty. Hence, the sorts of 
freedom-limiting factors that Pettit  has in mind here typically  relate to 
imbalances in power relations: ensuring that citizens have the capacity  to 
express their preferences without fear  of persecution, and to uphold the ideals 
of democracy.
 The concerns motivating Pettit’s account still resonate in the context  of 
health behaviour. The pervasive connection between socioeconomic factors like 
wealth, education,  and occupation, and health, mean that  some individuals are 
placed in a position of disadvantage from  the instant they  enter the world. A 
lack of resources and power leaves some people vulnerable to health risk factors 
and the poorer health prospects that  attend them. There may  well be instances 
where the powerful and resource rich actors in society  harm  the interests of the 
more deprived through self-interested behaviour. Consider, for instance, the 
placement of fast  food outlets in areas of high deprivation, so that companies 
can maximise profits by  exploiting the fact that residents in these areas are 
more likely to be susceptible to cravings for fast food.
 The thought here is that there is something  particularly  unpleasant about 
freedom-limiting forces coming from exploitation by  other  agents (not merely 
the mindless effects of the environment, or our own weakness of will).  Thus,  the 
exercise of power by  one agent or  group of agents, over  another agent or agents, 
subjugates the interests of one under the other. Where we value freedom  and 
equality, we will generally  strive particularly  hard to avoid the entrenchment of 
such  vastly  unequal power relations.  Thus, we might feel that  the sorts of factors 
which contribute to inequalities in health  are particularly  offensive to our ideals 
of democratic freedom.
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FROM FREEDOM TO RESPONSIBILITY, BLAME, AND DESERT
I have proposed here that  a  better understanding of the contributory  factors to 
unhealthy  lifestyle adoption gives us cause to question the extent to which 
agents who behave in this way  act with complete freedom. I have discussed how 
each of Pettit’s three aspects of freedom may  be compromised when we consider 
the actions of agents who adopt unhealthy  lifestyles, particularly  where agents 
are subject to deprivation.
 Limitations on freedom have implications for  attributions of 
responsibility. The conception of freedom  adopted here is that which conveys 
‘fitness to be held responsible.’ Where freedom  is undermined, the agent should 
not  be considered fully  responsible for  her actions. Responsibility  here is ‘merit-
based,’ and is the kind of responsibility  needed in order to make moral 
appraisals of agents. This can be contrasted with ‘as-if,’ ‘consequentialist,’ or 
‘forward-looking’ responsibility. These forms of responsibility  do not depend 
upon identifying  any  crucial, morally  relevant feature of an agent.  Rather, they 
rest upon the balance of positive and negative consequences likely  to be brought 
about as a result of treating an agent as responsible. So,  if allowing people to 
suffer  the consequences of their  unhealthy  behaviour  as if they  are responsible 
for them causes more people to adopt healthy  behaviours, saving the NHS 
money, then this would constitute a reason for attributing responsibility  to 
those agents. However, insofar as I am concerned with  responsibility  relevant to 
desert, I am not considering ‘as-if’ responsibility.
 Agents who are free in the required way, and who can thus be considered 
responsible, will also be ‘reaction-worthy’ (they  are apt candidates for reactive 
attitudes as described by  Strawson). On the desert-based view, these agents will 
meet the key  initial criteria for  being deserving agents. In contrast, those agents 
who are not fully  free, nor fully  responsible, nor reaction-worthy  in some 
respect, will also not be appropriate subjects for desert. It  is worth  emphasising 
here that these attributions of freedom, responsibility,  reaction-worthiness, and 
desert  can apply  to isolated instances of an agent’s behaviour, and need not be 
judgements passed about an agent  in general. This means that  an  agent may 
ordinarily  act with responsibility  and be an appropriate subject for  desert 
attributions, yet on a given occasion not be.
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The arguments criticising health  behaviour that this discussion is intended to 
respond to are those which suppose that  agents receiving health  incentives act 
wrongfully  in doing so, and are rendered undeserving of health incentives on 
this basis. The key  criteria here is that agents be morally  responsible for the 
desert  base which conveys blameworthiness in this context: the unhealthy 
behaviour. This analysis of the social determinants of health  and mechanisms 
underlying  health behaviour has shown that agents may  well not be fully 
morally  responsible for the unhealthy  behaviours they  adopt. Thus,  agents may 
not  be blameworthy  for their unhealthy  lifestyles. Agents who are not 
blameworthy  in this way  can no longer be accused of being undeserving of 
health incentives on this basis.
 As mentioned earlier, it  is important to remain aware of the 
consequences of attributions of moral responsibility  and blame. In this case, 
blameworthiness (and desert) is used as a justification for either  a) denying the 
opportunity  for agents to be paid to adopt  healthy  behaviours (in the case of 
trade-type incentives), or b) denying  agents access to a healthcare intervention 
which could potentially improve their quality of life (aid-type incentives).
 Although there are some arguments which  are made in support of 
responsibility  (and perhaps desert) as a  criterion for  allocating healthcare 
resources,  it is unusual for the desert of agents to be taken into account either 
when determining general healthcare policy, or the treatment of any 
individual.40  I do not claim that agents are not at all responsible for their 
unhealthy  lifestyles: freedom (and responsibility) may  only  be subject to some 
limitation, not abolition. Nor  do I claim that  this will be the case for all agents, 
nor  even all agents subject to social deprivation. However, I think enough doubt 
can be cast on the assumption of responsibility  and blameworthiness to 
conclude that it would not be right  to deny  (otherwise advisable) preventative 
healthcare interventions to agents who are at risk of developing disease. As 
discussed, the ‘bad behaviour’ argument, in the case of aid-type incentives, 
would have to be sufficiently  strong to overcome the general assumption of 
entitlement to treatment. I do not think it succeeds.
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40  It may be that desert is not explicitly  taken into account at all. It is, however, plausible that 
desert-based concerns could implicitly  drive policy  in a  particular  direction (for  example, if 
curative, rather than  preventative interventions are preferentially  funded), or  in the treatment 
of individuals.
 An alternative version of the bad behaviour argument directed at aid-type 
incentives  drew  upon the comparative nature of desert. In this case, the claim 
was that those receiving incentives were not completely  undeserving of 
treatment,  but that they  were less deserving then some. Once again,  the 
consequence of this argument being accepted would be the denial of aid-type 
health incentives.
 Does the comparative case give us more reason for thinking that 
incentives should not be provided? I do not think so. The analysis presented 
here has sought to cast doubt  on the claim  that  agents freely  adopt unhealthy 
behaviours,  and are responsible for  these behaviours. The responsibility 
requirement would still need to be upheld where the desert assessment is made 
in  comparison to other agents (whose behaviour, we assume, is not subject to 
criticism). It is still the case that we cannot establish with enough certainty  that 
agents are blameworthy  in the way  that is required to deny  them access to 
healthcare interventions. It bears repeating that, in the case of aid-type 
incentives,  we should treat incentives as we would any  other  healthcare 
intervention.  Thus, if agents are undeserving (or less deserving) of this 
intervention, they  must also be undeserving of other forms of health 
intervention directed at reducing unhealthy  behaviours. After  all, these forms of 
intervention also cost  money; money  that  could otherwise be spent on 
alternative healthcare interventions.
 Finally,  the desert-based criticism can be directed towards the use of 
trade-type incentives. The assumption of entitlement is absent here: we do not 
think that agents are entitled to be offered the incentive trade in the way  we 
might think they  are entitled to healthcare. There is a sense in which  agents 
have an entitlement to trade in general,  which ought to be protected. If we 
accept  that  there is no prior entitlement to the incentive trade, specifically, 
blameworthiness will have less work to do here (its consequences do not involve 
denying a prior entitlement, and thus seem less severe). So far  as desert  may 
play  a  role in determining whether or  not it is appropriate to trade with a given 
individual, the threshold for the responsibility  requirement may  be easier to 
attain. To put it another way, even where agents seem  not  fully  responsible for 
their behaviour, we may  still think they  are sufficiently  responsible to be judged 
as blameworthy. If this is so,  then the desert-based criticism  may  be more 
successful when directed at trade-type incentives.
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RESPONSIBILISATION
In this chapter, I have emphasised moral responsibility, and the role this plays 
in  desert (praising and blaming agents for  their actions). My  concern has been 
whether  the appropriate form of moral responsibility  is present  when agents 
adopt unhealthy  behaviours to justify  denying trade-type or aid-type incentives. 
I suggested that the influences that make it more likely  agents will adopt 
unhealthy  behaviours appear  sometimes to undermine their freedom, and to 
some extent, to undermine their fitness to be held responsible.
 There are, however, other  forms of responsibility,  and there may  be other  
values to be gained from  incorporating both moral and other forms of 
responsibility  into healthcare. The requirements for an agent to be morally 
responsible for  her  unhealthy  behaviour must, on my  analysis, be set quite high 
if the potential consequence of attributing responsibility  is blame, and even the 
denial of healthcare.41 But we may  wish to identify  responsibility  in a more basic 
sense, for  instance, I may  be ‘responsible’ for  breaking the vase because it  was 
my  arm  that  knocked into it. This leaves open the question of whether I am also 
blameworthy  (I may  have been pushed by  someone else) or  even praiseworthy  (I 
used the vase to knock out a burglar by  smashing it over her head). Thus, 
responsibility may be used in this less interesting form.
 Further, I have already  mentioned consequential responsibility.  Recall, 
this is where responsibility  is used in order  to bring about desirable 
consequences. So, we may  want people to bear  the burdens (or  reap the 
rewards) of actions they  perform (whether  or  not they  are morally  responsible, 
in  some sense, for  those actions) because this will  alter how they  behave in ways 
that produce more utility.
 There is a  growing trend for ‘responsibilisation’ in  healthcare, and 
policies that claim to promote opportunities for agents to ‘take responsibility’ 
for their  health are popular across political parties (Brown [2009]). An NHS 
‘Constitution’ has been produced, the purpose of which is described thusly:
This Constitution  establishes the principles and values of the NHS in 
England.  It  sets out rights to which patients,  public and staff are entitled, 
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41  These two need not follow from moral  responsibility, but moral responsibility will  be a 
necessary condition if they are to follow.
and pledges which the NHS is committed to achieve,  together  with 
responsibilities which  the public,  patients and staff owe to one another  to 
ensure that the NHS operates fairly  and effectively. All NHS bodies and 
private and third sector  providers supplying NHS services are required by 
law to take account of this Constitution in their decisions and actions.
NHS (2012: 2, emphasis in original)
The impression is given of a  cooperative service where different actors have 
duties and responsibilities, as well as rights and expectations, regarding the 
provision of healthcare. Fairness is mentioned here, and seems to relate to the 
idea of solidarity  - that we all ought to realise that our outcomes are dependent 
upon others, and theirs upon our behaviour, and that this should encourage 
pro-social behaviour.
 Responsibility  may  also be a means to efficiency. First, if agents can 
successfully  be encouraged to do what is within  their own capacity  in order to 
promote their own health, without  the need for costly  interventions and 
medications from  the health service, the NHS will save money. The extent to 
which agents will actually  be capable of ‘taking responsibility’ for their 
behaviour may  be limited, but encouraging the belief that they  have control over 
their behaviour (encouraging self-efficacy) may  improve the extent to which 
agents are able to control their behaviour.
 Second, if the outcomes of agents’ actions are felt most acutely  by  the 
agent (so the burdens or  benefits her behaviour creates are not distributed 
equally  across all individuals served by  the health service) then this will limit the 
action of ‘moral hazard.’ Moral hazard arises when the burdens of costly 
behaviour are spread amongst a large group. Consider, for  example, when a lot 
of people go out for dinner: invariably, some of the party  will eat  three courses 
(generally  including steak) and drink as much  champagne as possible,  knowing 
that their  indulgence will be subsidised by  the group.  Linking behaviour and 
outcome by identifying responsibility can help to avoid costly effects like this.
 There may  be yet further  benefits to responsibilisation strategies in 
healthcare, as Brown asserts:
Personal responsibility  can  matter  for reasons of fairness, but  it  can also 
matter  for  reasons of utility, self-respect, autonomy,  human  flourishing, 
natural duty and special obligation.
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Brown (2009: 6)
It  is easy  to see why  the rhetoric of responsibilisation is popular amongst 
healthcare policy  makers, given the prospect of such benefits. Yet, my  earlier 
analysis suggested that it  may  often be mistaken to hold agents to be fully 
morally  responsible for unhealthy  behaviours, given the influence of social, 
environmental and economic factors on those behaviours,  as well as the 
importance of the impulsive system  of behavioural control (not readily  altered 
by the agent’s values and considered preferences).
 I do not wish to enter into a  discussion  about the requirements for  other  
forms of responsibility, and what kind of conditions must hold for particular 
consequences of identifying responsibility  to be justified. However, we might be 
suspicious of claims that policies claiming to enhance responsibilisation will 
result in greater  ‘self-respect,’ ‘autonomy,’ and ‘human flourishing,’ given the 
potential for moral responsibility in relation to some health-related behaviours.
 Regardless of the outcomes of an analysis directed at the potential for  
responsibilisation strategies to produce these benefits, it  seems unlikely  to do 
much harm. At least,  it looks more benign than strategies to incorporate moral 
responsibility  into healthcare with a view  to rewarding or  punishing  behaviour 
as deemed deserving. Responsibilisation may  involve additional efforts at 
education and information provision, in an attempt to create citizens who are 
well informed about the health-related consequences of their behaviour, and 
what they can do to be healthy.
 Further, the move towards increasing ‘personalisation’ of healthcare, 
whereby  agents are (supposedly) given more control over what  healthcare they 
receive, where, and from  whom, can be seen as an additional push towards 
responsibilisation. It  is not clear the ways and extent to which such additional 
input into healthcare will always be beneficial to the agent, and it may  be that 
there are also harms associated with greater personalisation,  as well as benefits 
(Cribb and Owens [2010]; Owens [2012]).
 Incentives, too, might be seen as a form  of responsibilising healthcare, in 
that they  encourage behaviour change in recipients. This can be seen both as an 
encouragement to avoid ill health: ‘responsible’ in the sense that one does not 
burden others but acts solidaristically; and as a way  of providing  for  one’s own 
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healthcare needs; ‘responsible’ in the sense of independence and self-
sufficiency.
 It  is not too much of a stretch to think that incentives could be accused of 
undermining responsibility: rather than allowing (and encouraging) individuals 
to choose their own lifestyles,  incentives prod them  into making what some 
other agent deems to be the ‘right’ decisions. Incentives also require healthcare 
resources that would be spared if agents were able to change their behaviour 
independently.
 The problem here is that the term ‘responsibilisation’ and the 
interpretation of the effect  of incentives are sufficiently  plastic as to make it easy 
to argue in either direction and difficult to settle on a conclusion. I do not have a 
particular interest in arguing either  way. I do, however, think that  the extent  to 
which (aid-type) incentives support agents to act in line with their  considered 
preferences regarding health  behaviour; engage with their  own capacity  to 
control their behaviour (and acknowledge other  factors likely  to influence their 
behaviour); understand the risks and benefits associated with lifestyle choices; 
and assist people in adopting healthier behaviours (and reduce disease 
prevalence); incentives will offer  many  of the benefits available through 
‘responsibilisation’ strategies.
 In contrast, incentives which  offer little support other than payment of a 
reward, and which target  individuals who have no prior  interest  in altering 
behaviour (trade-type incentives) are likely  to lack such benefits. Moreover, 
these incentives might have the kind of negative effects on the potential for 
agents to ‘take responsibility’ for their actions that critics are concerned about. 
In particular, those incentives that looked likely  to be impermissible according 
to the account of different  means of influence in  Chapter  Four (coercive, highly 
pressuring, deceptive or  otherwise objectionably  manipulative incentives) are 
likely  to disrupt  the potential for  an agent to be responsible for her actions in  an 
important sense.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has considered the criticism  that those receiving health  incentives 
are not deserving of them. Desert  plays a role in considerations of fairness (and 
justice). Although many  contemporary  political philosophers tend to leave 
desert  out of their schemes of distributive justice, the idea that people should be 
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treated according to their just deserts  is important to our  everyday  conceptions 
of fairness. The intuitive importance of desert, and the prominence of 
responsibility-based rhetoric in both responses to health incentives and 
healthcare policy  development more generally, motivated the discussion in this 
chapter.
 In discussing whether or not recipients of incentives might be thought to 
deserve them, I have drawn out  a few different claims. These related to both 
trade-type and aid-type incentives, and located the problem with incentives in 
various aspects of the size of the incentive, the desert base, and the moral worth 
of the recipient. It is this last aspect that motivated the discussion  of freedom 
and responsibility, and the information we might glean from research on the 
social patterning of disease and the mechanisms underlying health behaviour.
 This evidence on the social determinants of health and mechanisms of 
health behaviour  suggests that assumptions that individuals are largely  able to 
control their health behaviour might be misguided. The pervasive effects of 
deprivation make it  far more likely  that those subject to indicators of 
deprivation will suffer poorer health outcomes.
 I considered how  the freedom  of an agent’s health-related behaviour (her  
freedom  to ‘choose’ to live a healthy  life) might be compromised along the three 
aspects of freedom described by  Pettit. I argued that, given the likely  impact  of 
social and environmental factors on people’s ability  to choose to adopt  healthy 
lifestyles, it is quite possible that their freedom, and thus fitness to be held 
responsible, will be undermined. This will not be true for every  agent  subject to 
the pernicious effects of deprivation, and nor will those of higher socio-
economic statuses be immune from  such influences. Indeed, it might  be that we 
should consider  those with healthy  lifestyles (largely  as a result of 
environmental influence) are perhaps not very  ‘free’ in terms of the choices they 
have made.  However, I was concerned to look at the extent to which those with 
unhealthy  lifestyles might be blamed, and it looks like, at least some of the time, 
agents who adopt unhealthy  lifestyles should not  be considered fully  free in 
those actions.
 Considering the potential consequences of blaming agents for  their poor  
health (i.e.  at the most extreme, reducing  their access to healthcare), I argued 
that it  will not  be appropriate to blame agents for unhealthy  lifestyles and 
resultant  poor health. The case is probably  clearer where we are considering 
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aid-type incentives, and we assume there is a prior entitlement to healthcare. In 
this case, denying people access to incentives on the basis that they  do not 
deserve such an aid seems to be based on a  false assumption about moral blame 
and desert, and would itself be an injustice.
 Finally,  I considered the relevance of health policy  discussions relating  to 
‘responsibilisation’ in healthcare. This implies that further benefits can be 
gleaned from developing policies which link agents to their  actions. The actual 
benefits possible from such styles of policy  are unclear,  and the sorts of factors 
that undermine moral responsibility  that I have discussed could hinder the 
prospects for other  efforts at incorporating responsibility  into healthcare 
provision. I argued that some of those benefits thought  to arise from 
responsibilisation may  plausibly  arise from  incentives,  particularly  where these 
are of the aid-type variety  and tend towards supporting agents to alter 
unhealthy habits.
 There may  be further  value to efforts at  responsibilisation where 
interventions aim at encouraging considered choice-making by  agents.  Scanlon 
(1986) in particular, thinks there are a number  of ways in which choices can be 
valued, and this may  be of relevance to healthcare provision and incentives.  I 
will discuss the value of choice, along with other values in the next chapter, 
which considers whether  the introduction of money  into healthcare can have 
corrupting effects.
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SIX
DOES MONEY CORRUPT? VALUES, REASONS, AND MOTIVATION
INTRODUCTION
Thus far,  I have considered three general themes of argument criticising the use 
of health incentives.  These themes were derived from media criticism 
specifically  directed at incentive schemes, combined with philosophical 
arguments relating to the ethics (including political and moral philosophy) of 
healthcare interventions more generally.
 Chapters Three to Five covered concerns relating to efficiency, the proper  
ends of state action and limitations of the state in pursuing those ends; the 
influence incentives have on the individual and the impact  this might have on 
agents’ autonomy  and liberty; and the extent to which agents engaging in 
unhealthy  behaviours are responsible, in some sense,  for their  poorer health 
outcomes, and whether  they  are any  less deserving of healthcare because of 
their actions. In many  instances, the criticisms of these chapters have been 
applicable to healthcare interventions quite widely, rather than applying 
narrowly to health incentives.
 In this penultimate chapter  I will consider  a complaint  more specific to 
health incentives: that the involvement  of money  in healthcare interventions 
corrupts something that we value. It  is not entirely  clear what,  precisely, is 
vulnerable to corruption, nor how this happens when money  is used in 
healthcare,  and often part of the appeal of arguments referencing ‘corruption’ of 
some sort  is their  vagueness, hinting toward a  ‘funny  feeling’ that the use of 
money  just isn’t quite right in these circumstances.  I will seek to clarify  what the 
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criticism  is, and how it applies to health  incentives; it will be interesting to see 
whether  this criticism  bears up under scrutiny,  or  whether its attraction fades 
along with the rhetoric.
 In the press, health incentives are variously  referred to as incentives, 
vouchers,  tokens, payments, bribes, rewards, gifts, sweeteners, carrots, nudges, 
benefits, aids,  grants, bonuses, boosts, freebies,  prizes, and more descriptions 
besides. Clearly, there is some uncertainty, or at least variation, of opinion 
surrounding how  we ought to conceive of health incentives. This is perhaps fair, 
as the use of incentives elides two (usually  distinct) worlds of monetary 
transactions and healthcare.  This unfamiliar  fusion may  lead to hesitation, 
apprehension, suspicion and hostility. Of course, the opposite may  be true, and 
were the new intervention considered innovative and novel in a positive way 
then it might be responded to more charitably.
 First, I will introduce the corruption criticism as presented by  Sandel, 
and seek to identify  where in the process of monetary  transactions Sandel 
recognises the problem  of corruption as occurring. I identify  two processes 
through  which  corruption  seems to be thought to arise: incommensurability 
and diminishment, and discuss the extent to which these processes seem likely 
to have the harmful effects proposed.
 Next, I discuss what it might mean to act from  the ‘right reasons’ as 
opposed to acting from the wrong ones,  and I briefly  introduce some of the 
theory  on practical reason. Next, I consider what values might be candidates for 
forming the basis of ‘right reasons’ (those values the promotion of which ought 
to motivate people to adopt healthy  behaviours). I consider the plausibility  of 
the claim  that reasons for action based on these values are preferable to reasons 
based on incentives. Further,  I discuss the criticism  that  to act from certain 
reasons is degrading to the individual, and should be prohibited.
 Finally, I assess the claim that motivation for  adopting healthy  
behaviours can be distinguished according to its degree of ‘intrinsic’ or 
‘extrinsic’-ness, and that  the former  kind of motivation is preferable. This 
section draws upon evidence (and lack of it) from research in behavioural 
economics into motivation crowding theory. I discuss how  trade- and aid-type 
incentives might  differently  act as reasons,  and motivate agents to alter  their 
behaviour, and the significance of this for an ethical analysis of incentives.
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THE CASE AGAINST: SANDEL’S DISTASTE FOR MONEY
Attitudes towards money  differ between individuals, contexts, and cultures. 
What is appropriate in  one context (paying for food in a  restaurant) is not 
appropriate in another  (paying for food at a friend’s house). Money  may  be used 
to purchase (or  at  least make more accessible) objects, experiences, statuses, 
and relationships,  previously  available only  via  other avenues.  Michael Sandel 
(1998, 2012), a philosopher who has achieved prominence beyond academia 
over the last few  years,42  opposes what he views as a continuing infiltration of 
money into all aspects of life:
[T]he extension of markets and of market-oriented thinking to 
spheres of life once thought to lie beyond their  reach... is by  and large 
a bad thing, a development that should be resisted.
Sandel (1998: 93-94)
Sandel has two reasons for suggesting the reach of money  markets should be 
circumscribed. First, Sandel is concerned that money  often results in coercion, 
and second, that monetary exchange can corrupt those values it encounters.
 I wish  to focus on this second, corruption, argument here. It  is, however, 
worth noting that the coercion argument  Sandel presents is slightly  different 
from that discussed in Chapter Four. My  focus was on the potential for  a 
monetary  exchange to place sufficient  pressure on the recipient’s will such that 
freedom  becomes compromised. Sandel’s concern is focused at the societal, 
rather than individual,  level.  The worry  here is that the creation of markets 
where some agents are inevitably  worse off than others creates large disparities 
in  power. Those with more resources thus wield more influence over those with 
fewer resources. Sandel is concerned that the imbalance in wealth and power 
that results from  background economic conditions can lead to pervasive 
coercion and exploitation of the weakest, across many  different contexts of 
human life. If incentives were to contribute to this general imbalance of wealth 
and power, or perhaps more modestly  to contribute indirectly  through the 
normalisation of market forces,  then they  may  result in these socially  realised 
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42 Including presenting  the Reith lectures in 2009, being  the BBC’s ‘public philosopher’ in  2012, 
and authoring a number of popular books.
coercive effects.  I do not consider the severity  of this concern  here, though there 
is scope for further investigation.
 Much of Sandel’s corruption argument centres around social norms, and 
the detrimental effect that  introducing money  into certain areas of life can have 
on these norms. Such norms control the ways we ordinarily  interact with  people 
in  social situations and determine what will be an appropriate way  to behave. 
Sandel argues that when money  is introduced as a way  of influencing behaviour, 
it  can ‘crowd out’ (effectively  diminish or abolish) these norms. In some cases, 
the destruction of social norms may  have a detrimental effect on a particular 
behaviour, such that incentivisation results in less of that behaviour being 
shown, rather than more. If this happens, then incentivising a behaviour may 
not be a good way of promoting it.
 The example often provided by  Sandel here is the case of an Israeli day-
care centre where a  fine was introduced for parents who were late collecting 
their children (Sandel [2012: 119]; Gneezy  and Rustichini [2000]). The 
expectation was that the fine would discourage parents from  being late, and 
reduce the number of late pick-ups. However, the opposite occurred and 
children were collected late more frequently. Sandel’s explanation of this effect 
is that, whilst  previously  parents felt guilty  for collecting  children late (and 
made a concerted effort to be on time),  the introduction of the penalty  seemed 
to legitimate being late. Parents now felt  it was ok to arrive late as they  were 
paying the staff extra money for looking after the children overtime.
 We might question the way  Sandel interprets the evidence here, in terms 
of ‘crowding out’ a useful social norm. There are other  explanations for  the 
observed increase in late pick ups from the day-care centres. For  instance, Frey 
and Jegen seem  to agree with Sandel that the day-care centre case involves an 
unfortunate monetisation, arguing that “The introduction of a monetary  fine 
transforms the relationship between parents and teachers from  a  non-monetary 
into a  monetary  one.” Yet in the original paper, Gneezy  and Rustichini describe 
how the day-care centres where the trial was conducted were all private ones, 
meaning that parents directly  paid the centres for the services they  provided 
(Gneezy  and Rustichini [2000: 3]).43  Moreover, when fines for  late pick-ups 
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43  The authors also describe that day-care centres  in Israel, where the trial took place, are 
composed of a mixture of public and private centres.
were paid this was added onto the regular monthly  bill and paid to the owner. It 
therefore doesn’t look quite so obvious that there was a clear change in  the 
relationship between parents and day-care centre staff.
 It  is further worth pointing out Gneezy  and Rustichini’s own explanation 
for the observed effects. They  suggest  that, prior  to the introduction of a fine, 
the relationship between parents and day-care centres represented an 
incomplete contract (Gneezy  and Rustichini [2000: 10]).  That is, parents were 
unsure what would happen if they  arrived late because this was never specified. 
After the introduction of the fine, however, parents knew exactly  what the 
consequences of arriving  late were, and perhaps decided that  these were not so 
bad (at  least, less bad than having their  child expelled, for instance). The 
completion of the contracts may  have had the effect of reassuring parents, 
causing them to become more relaxed about arriving late.
 There are alternative explanations that could be provided for the day-care 
centre study, and we need not  assume that  Sandel is correct  in his assertion that 
here some ‘desirable’ social norm  is destroyed and replaced by  some less 
desirable one.  However, it could yet  be the case that,  in some instances, 
incentives or disincentives may  have peculiar effects,  encouraging the penalised 
behaviour or  discouraging the rewarded behaviour.  This need not require 
explanations in terms of social norms in the way  Sandel presents it. I will 
provide some more discussion later in this chapter  in the section on intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation.
Further to this efficiency-diminishing effect that money  may  have, Sandel also 
argues that when we corrupt  these social norms through commodification we 
lose something else of value. Sandel states that  whether  or  not  an instance of 
commodification will be morally  objectionable will depend on the nature of the 
thing commodified:
In  the cases of surrogacy, baby-selling,  and sperm-selling, the ideals at 
stake are bound up with  the meaning  of motherhood,  fatherhood, and the 
nurturing  of children.  Once we characterize the good at  stake,  it is always a 
further  question  whether,  or  in what  respect, market  valuation  and 
exchange diminishes or corrupts the character of that good.
Sandel (1998: 104)
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There are many  examples provided by  Sandel (2012) of instances where the use 
of money  makes us feel a bit squeamish. A variety  of activities are identified, 
including paying to be able to queue jump at  airports and amusement parks; 
upgrading to a nicer jail cell; paying drug addicts to get sterilized; monetary 
rewards for  children who get good exam  grades; trading rights to pollute the 
environment; hiring people to act as friends; and paying to be able to kill an 
endangered rhino. Amongst these examples are “bribes to lose weight”, also a 
case where Sandel objects to the use of money (Sandel [2012: 55-60).
 There look to be a lot of different things going on with these examples. 
For  instance, killing  an endangered rhino looks problematic, quite aside from 
the fact somebody  might pay  to do it.  It seems that the examples Sandel 
provides could prove wrongful according to various different moral arguments, 
some of which have been discussed in earlier  chapters (treating people fairly 
and ensuring distributive justice, and avoiding harm  to others in particular). It 
is a simple point,  though one which bears repeating, that  beneficial outcomes 
will not always outweigh wrongful actions needed to create those outcomes. The 
complexity  of Sandel’s examples means that it is not  clear why  money,  and its 
corrupting effect on social norms, is a  particular  problem. I will now discuss 
further  how commodification and the introduction of money  into certain areas 
of life is supposed to bring about an undesirable corruption of values.
COMMODIFICATION : INCOMMENSURABILITY AND DIMINISHMENT
Sandel argues that when we introduce monetary  transactions into areas 
previously  governed by  social norms we engage in commodification of those 
norms and values involved. Commodification means that something that was 
previously  not tradable becomes something that can now be bought and sold 
and traded with  other  things; it becomes a  commodity. Sandel’s objection rests 
on the claim that turning certain things into a commodity  corrupts their  value 
(Sandel [1998: 95]).
 Clearly, not all instances of commodification are objectionable, and this 
practice is commonplace and plenty  of commodities are considered extremely 
precious (and not  thought  of as inherently  ‘corrupted’ due to their  commodity 
status). Radin (1993) distinguishes between ‘fungible’ and ‘personal’ property 
which are valued quite differently.  Using Radin’s taxonomy, Duxbury  describes 
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the distinction thus: “Whereas fungible property  has a purely  economic or 
instrumental value, personal property  is that  with which the owner becomes 
bound up to such a degree that its loss would cause him  or her  pain that could 
not  be relieved simply  by  replacing the object with  other  goods of equal market 
value.” (Duxbury [1996: 333])
 Clearly, the market value of something (when treated as a fungible 
property) may  fail to capture its value in the fuller  sense (when we take into 
account its role as personal property  as well). Consider a  Van Gogh painting: 
this would seem  to cross many  domains of monetary, personal, sentimental, 
aesthetic, and symbolic value. Putting a £-value on a  Van Gogh may  only 
capture one aspect of its value (particularly  where this £-value is determined 
simply  by  market  forces). When commodified,  then, objects or activities may 
have their  value ‘downgraded’ because their  ‘full’ value is incommensurate with 
a single, monetised metric. This is the incommensurability claim.
 Incommensurability is part of the problem where metrics like QALYs are 
used, as it  seems very  difficult to capture the full value of treating some disease 
in  these terms. The worry  is that when systems of measurement like QALYs are 
commonplace, their imperfections may  be overlooked: we start to assume that 
the QALY value of an intervention just is its full value. Even if we avoid this 
trap, the work QALYs are put to in developing policy  will mean that  certain 
interventions will  not  succeed in having  the right amount of influence because 
we have failed to value them properly.
 Slightly  different to the incommensurability claim  is the diminishment 
claim. In this case, the mere act  of placing a monetary  value on an object 
through  commodification diminishes the ‘full’ value of that object. In terms of 
the Van Gogh, one might suppose that by  placing a monetary  worth on it  and 
thus valuing it as a  tradable commodity  we diminish some (or all) the value it 
holds as an art work, in terms of its aesthetic, sentimental, or  symbolic value. 
Much discussion of this diminishment problem arise in debates around 
commercial surrogacy. For  instance, Radin (1987) and Anderson (1990) argue 
that arrangements where a woman is paid to carry  a child to term treat  the 
surrogate as a ‘baby  maker’ and reduce the parent-child relations of love and 
protection to ones of contracts, ownership rights, and exchange.  They  argue that 
to do this is to diminish  the value of such agents and interpersonal 
relationships.
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 Commodification results in the improper  valuation in both the 
incommensurability and diminishment cases. In the first, the assignment of a 
monetary  value to the object is simply  to fail to value it  properly: its worth 
cannot be captured in  monetary  terms. In the second case, to involve the object 
in  a monetary  transaction is not to treat it  properly, and diminishes the (non-
fungible) value that object has. The effects of incommensurability and 
diminishment may  be to permanently  corrupt the valued object, although it 
seems that sometimes the full value may be reinstated.
I think these stories about incommensurability and diminishment sound 
plausible, though not very  convincing. It is not clear  how valuing something in 
terms of its monetary, tradable value will necessarily  (or ordinarily) be 
problematic where we also value that thing for other  reasons. As described, we 
often value things both in terms of their worth as fungible and as personal 
property. In the vast number of cases it seems we have little problem 
discriminating between the value of something on the open market as a 
commodity, and its value in  other ways. The work to be done by  shared intuition 
here is too great: Sandel, Radin, Anderson et al. rely  on us having shared 
intuitions that to pay  for  friendship,  queue jumping, surrogacy, gametes, and so 
on will be to engage those things in monetary  transactions in an inappropriate 
way; will fail to value those things properly; and will corrupt the good in 
question such that its non-fungible value is diminished.
 It  may, however, be possible to supplement (and strengthen) this 
argument with another  claim: that to act  for the wrong reasons  may  be to fail to 
value something properly, and may  result in corruption. In the next section I 
will introduce briefly  what it is to act for  a reason, and indicate how it might 
matter  what reasons motivate our action. In the following sections I consider a 
number of candidate values which,  it might be argued, are vulnerable to 
corruption by the use of incentives to encourage healthy behaviour.
RIGHT REASONS FOR ACTION
One might worry  that,  when agents act  to adopt healthier  behaviours and 
discard unhealthier ones they  do so for the wrong reasons.44  That is, it is 
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inappropriate that incentives motivate people to change their behaviours, whilst 
other things do not. I think formulating the concern in terms of what  agents 
take to be reasons for acting can give us more of a grip on the corruption claim.
 Without the involvement of reasons, the corruption criticism looks weak: 
as I have argued, simply  valuing something in terms of cash, or  as a  commodity 
does not generally  destroy  the value of that thing separate from  this valuation. 
We are quite adept at distinguishing the market value and personal value of 
things. Further the process of valuation is highly  social: much of the time, values 
are created through the processes of exchange with  other agents, and the way 
we are seen to treat objects,  relationships, and states as valuable.  Our 
experience of things as valuable or disvaluable in particular ways affects how we 
value them. In turn, the way  in which we value these things is expressed 
through  our  treatment of them and the attitudes which we hold with regard to 
them (Anderson [1993]).
 Attitudes and valuations can be expressed through acting upon reasons. 
If I choose to avoid eating meat for  reasons of concern about the environmental 
impacts of the meat industry  then this provides an insight  into the values I hold 
about the environment and food. Similarly, if my  vegetarianism is motivated by 
a dislike of the flavour of meat, or the expense of meat, or a desire to ensure as 
many  vegetables are killed as possible, then quite different information about 
my values may be inferred.
 In terms of health incentives,  then, choosing to act  in the presence or  
absence of monetary  rewards may  indicate the value an agent places on goods 
relating to health. The criticism from the point of view of corruption is that 
adopting healthy  behaviours, when this is motivated by  the prospect of 
monetary  gain,  fails to express the appropriate attitude (valuation) of health and 
health-related goods; in expressing inappropriate attitudes towards these goods, 
the agent contributes to the corruption of the values of those things. This 
complaint will be amplified when the offensive attitudes are expressed publicly, 
by  those in positions of authority  (including the state and healthcare 
professionals).
It  will first be worth giving a  little background as an introduction to the idea of 
acting from  a  reason, in order  to consider what it is to act  from a ‘wrong’ reason 
(or to fail to act from  a  ‘right’ reason). I will then consider the sorts of things 
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that might count as ‘good’ reasons for  adopting healthy  behaviours, and whether 
failing  to act  for these reasons (and acting instead because an incentive has been 
offered) corrupts the value of those things in some way.
 There is a considerable philosophical literature on the topic of practical 
reason (reasons which guide action),  and I can only  give the barest of 
summaries here.  Hopefully,  this will be sufficient to shed some light  on  the 
status of health incentives in this context. One of the most influential 
philosophers of practical reason is Donald Davidson, who proposes that:
Whenever  someone does something  for  a  reason...  he can  be characterized 
as (a)  having  some sort  of pro attitude toward actions of a  certain  kind, and 
(b) believing  (or  knowing,  perceiving, noticing,  remembering) that  his 
action is of that kind
Davidson (2001: 3-4)
According to Davidson, when agents act on reasons that meet  the criteria 
described above those reasons rationalise their actions. That is to say, a reason 
provides both an explanation for why  the agent acted as she did, and a 
justification for her  actions. We can  distinguish between these two functions of 
a reason, which may  be more or  less conceptually  connected (more, on 
Davidson’s account).  So,  we can identify  reasons that are motivating (or 
explanatory), and reasons which are normative (or justifying).
One problem  with accounts like Davidson’s where reasons are based upon pro-
attitudes (such as desires) is that, in fact, it  seems one can have reasons one is 
unaware of,  or that one does not consider  to be reasons; thus, one may  have 
reasons for  things that one lacks a pro-attitude about. For example,  Lord 
Grantham  loves pavlova,  particularly  made by  Mrs Patmore. However, on one 
occasion, Mrs Patmore’s poor  eyesight means that she accidentally  sprinkles salt 
on the pavlova rather than sugar. Eating salty  pavlova is something generally  to 
Normative reasons - count in favour of or against  some prospective 
action; justify why the agent did what she did
Motivating reasons - those things which motivated the agent to act; 
provide an explanation for why the agent did what she did
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be avoided in  Lord Grantham’s opinion, but unless he believes the pavlova in 
front of him  to be a specimen of salty  pavlova, he will not have a pro-attitude 
towards not eating it (quite the reverse). Yet  it  seems Lord Grantham  does  have 
a reason for not eating this helping of pavlova.
 To avoid this problem, some theorists introduce further conditions for an 
agent to have a reason. Often, these involve idealised versions of the agent or 
the situation. For example, an agent might have a reason when she has a pro-
attitude plus a  belief and she is in possession of all the relevant information, or 
she may need to be perfectly rational, or perfectly virtuous.
 Another  worthwhile consideration is that  of a  ‘primary  reason.’ Consider: 
an agent could have a  reason to perform  an action, be aware of this reason, 
recognise it  as a reason for her  to act,  be sufficiently  rational to act on such 
reasons generally, and so on, and yet  still not be motivated to act by  this reason. 
The agent might have a conflicting reason that pulls her in another  direction; or 
she might be ‘weak-willed’ and fail to act; or, she might even perform the action, 
but on the basis of another (better) reason. Thus:
Actions can be subjected to philosophical scrutiny  as well. In the context of 
practical reason, it is important to distinguish between ‘actions’ and mere 
‘happenings’ or ‘goings on.’ Korsgaard (1999) insists on the importance of 
ownership: an ‘action’ must be authored by  some agent. This requires that  it  be 
attributable to an agent  as a whole, and not merely  to some sub-personal part of 
that agent. For Davidson (2001) the involvement of the agent in the action is 
also significant, this time requiring intentionality  on the agent’s behalf to bring 
about the action.
 There are grey  areas in determining what will properly  count as an  action 
and what will not.  For  instance, my  spilling soup on you  because somebody 
bumped into me will not be an action; intentionally  upending my  soup onto 
your shoes will be an action. If I throw my  soup on your shoes because I 
mistakenly  think that they  are on fire (they  aren’t), and my  intention is to rescue 
your feet, then I have acted intentionally, but just  not with the results I hoped 
Primary reason - this is the reason why  an agent acts (not just 
a reason counting in  favour of the action). Primary  reasons 
are thus necessarily connected with motivation.
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for. If we think intentionality  is crucial to action, then throwing the soup over 
you will count as an action because of the involvement of intentionality. In cases 
where there is an ‘action’,  the agent ‘does something’ in a significant  way, rather 
than just being involved in its coming about.
VALUES
I now want to consider some of those values which, in the context of health 
incentives,  might be thought vulnerable to corruption when agents act for  the 
‘wrong reasons.’ I will discuss: the intrinsic value of heath itself; the importance 
of avoiding harming others; solidarity; and the value of choice. I will  introduce 
each in turn and briefly  consider  how the use of incentives to encourage healthy 
behaviour might be considered to corrupt  that value in some way. My  aim 
initially  is just to characterise the values at issue; I will give a more generalised 
account of incentives and the corruption objection (in relation to reasons) after 
discussing these values.
 The first claim is that health is valuable in and of itself,  and that it ought 
to be a  sufficient reason to motivate behaviour  change, independently  of 
instrumental benefits it may  bring like incentives. Second is the idea that we 
ought to adopt healthy  behaviours because failing to do so may  directly  or 
indirectly  harm the interests of others. Third is a  claim  deriving from  the value 
of solidarity: we ought to aim to be healthy  so as not to place unnecessary 
burdens on  the healthcare system which must support us all. Finally,  I will 
discuss the value of choosing itself, and how this process might be corrupted by 
the introduction of an incentive.
Health
Health is clearly  of huge importance and value in making an agent’s life go well. 
There are criticisms that to value health in terms of metrics such as QALYs is to 
fail to value it  properly: I have discussed some of the controversy  relating to 
QALYs in Chapter Three. The account I described initially, that identified 
corruption in  incommensurability and diminishment suggests that  processes 
like QALY calculation or exchanging health or  healthcare for  money  could result 
in  the corruption of the ‘full’ value of health. As mentioned, however,  I do not 
think this version of the complaint  has much bite: to value health in terms of 
QALYs may  well be to do a disservice to its true value, and may  further be an 
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undesirable way  of incorporating the value of different  healthcare interventions 
into comparative policy  decisions. Yet, I see no reason why  this should be seen 
as unavoidably corrupting the value of health in some important sense.
 Money  must play  a role in healthcare provision - the labour of physicians 
and nurses and other staff must be paid for, equipment must be manufactured 
and installed, drugs must  be developed and produced, and so on. But the mere 
buying and selling of the paraphernalia surrounding health and healthcare does 
not  change how  important health  is to me, nor  to any  one: the value of health, in 
this sense, remains in tact.
 I also think there is an ambiguity  when supposing that ‘health’ is 
commodified through the use of incentives. It is not  clear at what this criticism 
is targeted: is it the state of being  in good health itself that  is commodified; or is 
it  the behaviour that leads to good health (eating a healthy  diet,  exercising, 
getting vaccinated, and so on); or is it  the delivery  of healthcare in terms of the 
relationship one engages in with the healthcare provider? In the former  case, 
incentives may  miss the mark, as they  are targeted at quite specific changes in 
behaviour. It  is difficult  to see how rewarding an agent for, say, receiving a 
vaccination can be characterised as commodifying ‘the state of being in good 
health.’ Incentives will not guarantee good health, but may  increase the 
likelihood that one will experience better health in the future.
 If we take it that the behaviour is subject to commodification (the 
quitting of smoking or the consuming of a healthy  diet), then I think we struggle 
to see the problem. What is the deep value inherent  in the action of attending a 
clinic to be screened for  cancer or an STI? It  is not clear that these behaviours, 
in  and of themselves, hold value that we should be concerned about 
commodifying. That is not  to say  that  values related to these behaviours, such as 
health itself or  a concern for the welfare of others, have value (which could 
plausibly  be corrupted), but  that  seeking to locate the value in the behaviour 
itself seems misguided.
 Finally,  the kinds of interpersonal relationships involved in  healthcare 
encounters may  be something of value that could be corrupted through 
commodification. I think this criticism has the most purchase: the way 
physicians and patients interact  matters greatly  to the comfort of both 
individuals, the capacity  for  the physician to provide good healthcare and the 
extent to which the patient is able to benefit from  those efforts. Care (or 
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benevolence) is a central feature here, as is trust, autonomy, professionalism, 
and so on. All of these values are (or ought to be) promoted through the way 
physicians and patients interact. One might worry  that if physicians began 
offering patients money  to adopt healthier  behaviours then the fostering  of 
these values through physician-patient encounters could be disrupted.
 I think this is a  real concern, though I do not think expressing it  in terms 
of ‘commodification’ quite captures the problem. We are not worried that the 
physician-patient relationship itself becomes ‘commodified,’ but rather, that  the 
role played by  a physician who offers incentives to her  patient is not compatible 
with  interactions where care and trust are of primary  importance.45  The most 
obvious problem looks to be one of inferred paternalism.  That is,  the patient 
perceives the physician’s offer  of incentives as paternalistic because it  appears 
as if the physician is simply  trying to ‘push the patient’s buttons’ to get her to 
behave how  the physician thinks she ought to behave. Such inferred paternalism 
might be experienced as disrespectful, overbearing,  infantalising, and 
manipulative in  a way  that offering the patient a more conventional therapy 
such  as drugs or a treatment programme or support group, is less likely  to be 
(Goold and Lipkin [1999]; Goodyear-Smith and Buetow [2001]; Goold [1998]).
 Clearly, it  will matter very  much how incentives are presented to agents. 
Trade-type incentives,  targeted at any  agent displaying ‘unhealthy’ behaviour, 
seem  likely  to engage these feelings of being subject to undesirable paternalism. 
This is the case where the incentive is used as a  ‘payment’ to get people to 
change their  behaviour, and would seem likely  to disrupt  the kinds of values 
involved in  the physician-patient relationship described. Yet in  the case of aid-
type incentives, the incentive can be seen as one amongst a number of 
supportive interventions to help people alter  their  behaviour. If presented 
carefully, with an explanation as to why  incentives may  assist  with behaviour 
change (by  providing short term goals and rewarding feedback), then they  may 
be perceived as falling within the scope of ‘conventional’ medical care.
 Further, incentive schemes may  be presented as part of a supportive 
behaviour change scheme. So,  a smoking cessation or  weight loss programme 
213
45  There are related worries that an explicit involvement of money in healthcare encounters 
could corrupt the physician-patient relationship. For instance where patients understand that 
their General Practitioners are responsible for  commissioning particular  healthcare treatments 
they may feel pressure to ‘make their case’ for why they should receive a particular treatment.
may  involve incentives, as well as frequent meetings where advice and support 
can be provided. It may  be that providing incentives in  forms other  than cash 
dilutes the negative effects of raising the offer  of incentives. Or it  might be better 
that such  interactions are distanced from  the physician-patient relationship, 
and that incentive schemes should be provided though means other than an 
individual’s GP or other physician.
 It  is very  difficult to predict how health incentives could affect the values 
central to physician patient relationships.  This becomes more complicated still 
when we consider the variety  of forms incentives can take and the behaviours 
they  can target.  It may, for instance, be a  very  different thing  for  an agent to be 
offered cash to take her anti-psychotic medication and for  her to be offered an 
Amazon voucher  for completing an STI test. The way  individuals personally 
experience these interactions,  as well as the way  physicians experience them 
and behave, will be of central importance, and will be very difficult to predict.
We might supplement the mere involvement of money  in health-related 
domains with the claim that to act for a reason other  than the promotion of the 
good of health itself is not to value it properly. Alternatively, we might frame 
this as there being something corrupting about taking money  as a  reason for 
action. The suggestion is that to fail to take good health as a  reason for  adopting 
healthy  behaviours is to fail to value it  properly,  and to express an indifference 
to this good which eventually results in its corruption.
 The problem as I perceive it  is that health is enormously  important for a 
whole variety  of reasons.  First, health  may  have an intrinsic value of its own. 
This can be a rather tricky  notion,  but I do not think we need be too concerned 
with  it here because the overwhelming instrumental value of health is surely 
more pertinent. That is, a certain  amount of health is fundamental to almost 
anything anybody  wants to achieve in life.  The value of being healthy  is just so 
pluralistic and so significant that it doesn’t  seem  vulnerable to the kind of 
corruption we are worried about. In part,  this is because health will clearly  be of 
value even when we fail to consciously  value it.  Our obliviousness to its great 
value need not, however, diminish its value.
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Avoiding Harm to Others
Unhealthy  behaviour may  result in harm being caused to others. This may  be 
relatively  direct, through passive smoking, or failure to receive testing  and 
treatment  for  STIs, for  example. Harm  brought to others may  be indirectly 
caused by  unhealthy  behaviour,  for instance,  if one’s own poor  health requires 
resources from the health service which are then unavailable to others. In  all of 
these instances the behaviour of the individual is likely  to impact on other 
agents in negative ways.
 The imperative to avoid harming others will often require agents to 
behave in particular ways. Some of these are of sufficient importance to be 
incorporated into law, such  as requirements not to assault  others or  to drive 
under  the influence of drugs or alcohol.  Other times,  one is morally,  though not 
legally, obliged to constrain one’s actions in order to avoid harming others, such 
as where I ought not to insult you for no reason.
 There must be limitations on the obligations to avoid harm, otherwise we 
would be obliged to forego most  of our  everyday  activities. Feinberg (1984) 
describes harm in terms of a  setback to the interests of an agent.  When we talk 
of obligations not to harm  others, this does not usually  refer to a requirement to 
avoid setting back others’ interests, but rather, to avoid the wrongful setting 
back of their  interests.  If we do not  include the wrongfulness stipulation,  then 
driving a car down the street,  choosing to read the newspaper  online rather  than 
buy a hard copy, and many other activities would become impermissible.
 The kind of health behaviours where the harm claim  becomes relevant, 
then, may  be a much smaller subset of those behaviours that may  be targeted 
for health incentives. One of the most likely  candidates is surely  smoking whilst 
pregnant. In this case, there is a  clear  risk of harm to an identifiable individual, 
and the sacrifice required of the harmer (the mother) is, I would contend, 
acceptable given the benefits it would be likely to bring about.46
 The commodification-based criticism  applies here where the obligation to 
act in order  to avoid harming others is replaced with a  payment: rather than 
valuing the rights of others not to be harmed, the agent values actions only 
215
46  The evidence of harm  resulting  from smoking during  pregnancy  is clear, indicating a wide 
variety of  problems are more likely  to arise in  children whose mothers were exposed to tobacco 
smoke whilst pregnant. See, for  example, Olds  et al  (1994); Ward et al. (2007); Montgomery  and 
Ekbom (2002).
insofar as she may  materially  benefit from  the outcome. On this account, the act 
of paying people to avoid harming others destroys the value inherent in  that 
action.
 Once again, I am not sure this will always be the case. The opposite could 
plausibly  be true, for consider, if I am  willing  to pay  you a great deal to stop you 
from harming another, does not  that indicate my  concern for that other 
individual’s well-being? Placing a high instrumental value on certain goods may 
highlight their importance.
 If we consider the importance of reasons here, we might take the concern 
to be partly  that  agents fail to be motivated by  a  need to avoid harm, and partly 
that they  succeed in being motivated by  money.  The reasons behind actions can 
express agents’ attitudes towards others and valuations of others’ interests. A 
pregnant woman who takes as a reason to quit smoking the fact that she will be 
given a  cash reward if she does so, but who does not take the risk of harm  to her 
child as a reason shows a callous attitude toward her  child, incompatible with 
the values of motherhood, compassion, and love.
 This seems undesirable: it  is surely  preferable that mothers act out of 
love for their children rather than being motivated by  avarice. Yet, I see a 
problem with the proposal that incentives are the wrong-making property  in 
this situation. For consider, in the absence of the incentive offer,  the mother is 
not  sufficiently  motivated by  a concern to avoid harming her unborn child to 
quit smoking. This behaviour might be taken to express the attitude ‘avoiding 
harm  to my  child is not a good reason for  me to give up smoking.’ Already, we 
seem  to have a problematic expression of disvaluing the avoidance of harm  to 
the child. The corresponding expression that the incentive is a good reason to 
give up smoking seems superfluous here.
 It  is possible that the incentive does make a difference. First,  it  may  be 
more corrupting to the value of avoidance of harm  that agents both fail to act 
from this reason and succeed in  acting from the incentive-reason; there may  be 
an additional expression of comparative attitudes which  undermines the value 
of avoiding harm  further. Second, there is also the possibility  that offering 
incentives makes it less likely  that  the value of avoiding harm  will motivate 
future agents to act. This second point is related to discussions of intrinsic 
versus extrinsic motivation which I will discuss later in the chapter.
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 As with the value of health, we must consider both  the value the 
avoidance of harm might  have in  itself, and the value it has as an instrumental 
contributor. So, there may  well be value to be had from agents acting from  the 
motivation of wishing to avoid harming others, but there is also a huge amount 
of instrumental value to be derived from people actually avoiding harming 
others. The benefits brought about by  a  pregnant  woman who quits smoking are 
likely  to be significant, as are the benefits of successfully  getting more people to 
be tested for STIs.  We should not overlook these benefits (and the costs of 
foregoing them) unless we are convinced of the negative implications that the 
actions required to bring these benefits about will have.
Solidarity
Solidarity,  as a  good, appears slightly  different from the values of health and 
avoiding harm. Both these first two goods should be valued, I have argued, 
primarily  for the instrumental benefits they  bring. Solidarity,  however, is a good 
where much of its value derives from the expressive significance it  plays in 
interpersonal relations. One aspect of solidarity  is the notion that one ought to 
avoid harming others, insofar as one recognises and respects the interest of 
other agents. But further  than this, solidarity  involves a more communal view  of 
obligations between agents in  a  shared society. Solidaristic feelings are ones of 
‘we are all in it  together,’ and bind people’s interests to those of society  as a 
whole. Hans-Martin Sass characterises it as:
A  richer notion  than  either  social or  legal reciprocity  among  freely 
contracting  individuals,  it  is both  pre-supposed by  the sphere of self-
interested social  interaction,  because it is a  personal virtue,  and 
complementary  of that  sphere, insofar  as it is a  principle of social morality, 
justifying institutions of social justice and welfare.
Sass (1992: 367-368)
Understanding that others experience suffering in the same way  that we do,  and 
acknowledging values such as empathy, loyalty, and fraternity  leads us to 
solidaristic systems, such as a socialised healthcare system, which invoke a 
strategy  of risk-sharing (Weale [1990]; Segall [2007]). The continued 
importance of solidarity, as a means of creating obligations to care for  the sick; 
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promoting social cohesion and ‘togetherness’; to avoid draining resources from 
the healthcare system; and as a means by  which  to criticise selfish behaviour,  is 
gestured at  by  a number of theorists writing about medical ethics and healthcare 
policy (Buyx [2008]; Segall [2007])
 The reciprocal nature of solidarity  means that members of a solidaristic 
system are expected to avoid taking too much out of it.  That is, if we can easily 
avoid placing extra  pressure on the healthcare system then we ought to do so. 
Once again, it is not clear what the extent of our  obligations are in this case. It 
would be unreasonable to expect people to refrain from a lot of the activities 
they  enjoy  just so as to avoid even a small risk that they  might become unwell 
and require medical attention. Yet people who frequently  fail to attend GP 
appointments, and unnecessarily  waste NHS resources clearly  do not meet their 
solidaristic obligations.
 Some small changes to lifestyle could be thought appropriate under  
solidarity, so it is possible that  this value is instantiated where agents make such 
changes voluntarily. Thus, the offer of incentives could act to disrupt the way 
solidarity is valued in these circumstances.
 Indeed, solidarity  looks quite incompatible with payment: paying an 
agent to act with solidarity  may  very  well be to miss the point of what solidarity 
is about. For to act on the basis of incentives is to act in one’s own interests,  and 
not  to act with the intention of promoting the interests of society  in general. In 
this sense, it is plausible that incentive payments could diminish the extent to 
which solidarity operates as a value worthy of motivating action.
 Once again, an agent who fails to act solidaristically  also fails to do so in 
the absence of incentives. Thus, the criticism  starts to bite only  if the 
introduction  of incentives adds a further  layer  of corruption, which  it is not clear 
that it does. If,  however, as mentioned above, the offer  of incentives gradually 
diminishes the tendency  for solidarity  to be valued as a motive for  action,  and 
reduces the tendency  for solidarity  to be expressed through action, then 
incentives could play  a more active role in  this corruption.  Such  a story  sounds 
like it could make sense, but I cannot  make a judgement about the likelihood 
and extent to which this would happen.
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Choice
The final value I wish to discuss is the value of choice, and to consider whether 
there is value inherent to the act of choosing that is corrupted by  being offered 
health incentives. It  is often thought desirable that agents are able to choose 
certain things about  how they  live their  lives and what healthcare treatment 
they  receive. Choice is often characterised as being a necessary  feature where we 
are interested in linking an agent  to her actions via responsibility, and where we 
want to maintain the freedom  and autonomy  of an agent (to ensure that her 
actions are not controlled by others in objectionable ways).
 Scanlon (1986, 1998) proposes three distinct  values of choice: predictive, 
demonstrative,  and symbolic. The first, predictive value of choice, depends upon 
the agent being a  good predictor of what will make her  life go well.  There is thus 
value in  being able to chose how  to act  in that the agent will be more likely  to get 
what she prefers than if someone else tries to judge what  is best for  her (Scanlon 
[1986: 178]).
 The demonstrative value of choice rests upon the desire to have a 
particular outcome be attached to aspects of one’s character and to the action of 
choosing. The example Scanlon provides is the demonstrative value of choosing 
an anniversary  gift for one’s partner: is it important that one chooses the gift 
oneself,  even if some other  agent might be capable of making an equally  good or 
better choice in terms of what one’s partner will enjoy (Scanlon [1986: 179]).
 Finally,  the symbolic value of choice lies in the importance of being seen 
as an agent  who is capable of choosing. In contrast, being denied choice may 
indicate that one “fell below the expected standard of competence.” Thus, even 
where one is unable to instrumentally  improve one’s lot effectively  through 
choice,  or  where one is unable to make a choice that  effectively  represents some 
feature of one’s character in the choosing, one may  still  appreciate being treated 
as an agent who is capable of choosing (Scanlon [1986: 180]).
 The expressive values of action might be understood to be instantiated in 
both the demonstrative and symbolic values of choice described here: to be able 
to demonstrate something about one’s character through the choices one makes 
is to express one’s attitudes about certain things to other agents. To treat 
another  agent as capable of making  a choice (and so to allow her to enjoy  the 
symbolic value of choice) is to express an attitude towards her precisely  of a 
moral agent capable of making a choice.
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 In Chapter Four I discussed whether the influence of incentives was 
compatible with  the values of autonomy  and freedom. The concern about choice 
is related: is the influence of incentives on behaviour compatible with the value 
of choosing? This could be the case if choice is considered ‘commodified’ in 
some sense through the use of incentives, with the result that  the value of choice 
is corrupted. Or, alternatively, if acting for reasons based on incentives 
expresses an indifference towards making independent  choices and undermines 
the value of choosing.
 The predictive,  instrumental value of choice is not,  I think, likely  to be 
much threatened by  incentives. This would occur in the cases discussed where 
sufficient pressure is placed on the agent  to choose in a particular way  that she 
is no longer able to make choices that will track her interests.
 The demonstrative value of choice may  be disrupted by  casting a doubt 
over the agent’s reasons for action. If an agent chooses to adopt  a  healthy 
behaviour, this might ordinarily  express her  valuation of the goods and values 
associated with this behaviour, perhaps those of solidarity, avoidance of harm, 
or health itself discussed above. Once an incentive becomes involved, the agent 
may  be perceived as expressing a favourable attitude towards money  and 
wealth, rather than towards those other values. We might well respond 
differently  to an agent we perceive as acting ‘for the money,’ than to an agent 
acting on the basis of other values.
 It  will of course depend on how the incentive influences the agent’s 
choice as to whether we are right to infer  what we do into her  choices.  An agent 
receiving an  aid-type incentive, for instance, may  be motivated by  a  variety  of 
reasons (including those values discussed), and not merely  (or even mostly) by 
the incentive. To assume such an agent’s actions in accepting  the incentive and 
altering her behaviour express an indifference to those values and a love of 
money  would be mistaken. Yet another agent might hold exactly  those attitudes, 
and consider the incentive a  good reason for acting but the alternative values 
not  good reasons. It seems that our  response to these agents - our  interpretation 
of the attitudes expressed through their  actions - will not cleanly  track the 
attitudes they actually hold.
 The symbolic value of choice is also reliant on agents being perceived as 
fit choice-makers (and not simply  being fit choice-makers). Incentives look 
plausibly  to obstruct this value of choice as well, because recipients of incentives 
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may  be viewed as incapable of making a  choice in the absence of incentives,  or 
as not being firm in their choices (and thus being swayed by  the incentives),  or 
for a similar reason that suggests recipients of incentives are inferior choice-
makers in some way.
 The problem for the symbolic value of choice here lies in how we 
interpret the actions of the incentive-provider, what we believe her reasons for 
acting to be, and what we interpret her  as expressing through those actions 
(what her attitude towards the incentive recipient are). We might think 
something like this: the incentive provider does not believe the recipient is 
capable of making the right choice about  her health behaviour; the incentive 
provider thus decides to seek to control the recipient’s behaviour by  guiding her 
choice; the offer  of an incentive expresses the provider’s attitude that the 
recipient is not a moral agent capable of making good choices independently.
 This may  be experienced in the first  person, as well as the third. So, if 
someone offers me an incentive to alter my  behaviour I might  infer from this 
that she thinks I am  not an agent capable of making good decisions in the 
absence of incentives and guidance from others. In both the third and first 
person cases the recipient may  experience a loss in  the value of symbolic choice. 
Moreover, the attitudes perceived as being expressed in relation to incentives 
and a particular  form of behaviour may  be generalised, and have broader, 
knock-on effects. Being perceived as an inadequate choice-maker in  one 
situation (with  regards, say, to receiving a vaccination), may  detract from one’s 
overall status as a moral agent and competent decision-maker.
DEGRADATION
Criticisms are made by  those such as Sandel,  Radin, and Anderson that the use 
of money  to influence behaviour in certain situations can have a corrupting 
effect. Often these criticisms, although superficially  appealing, seem  to lack a 
thoroughgoing theoretical underpinning that can tell us what is corrupted, in 
what circumstances it is corrupted, how this corruption comes about, and what 
significance this corruption holds. I have sought to make this a  little clearer in 
the preceding sections. Sometimes, it seems to be claimed that the mere 
involvement of money  can result  in the objectionable commodification of some 
good, through commodification leading  to incompatible valuations (corruption 
due to incommensurability and diminishment).
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 I supplemented this discussion with some theory  from  work on practical 
reason.  I argued that the way  we take certain  things to be proper reasons for 
action, and the attitudes we express by  acting on reasons (and not acting on 
other reasons) may be important to our lives as social beings.
 Finally  I discussed a  few examples of values that might be at stake in the 
case of health  incentives: some of the things we might worry  about getting 
corrupted when incentives are offered to people in exchange for the adoption of 
healthier  behaviours.  Inevitably,  this discussion will be very  limited, dealing 
with only a few values when there will clearly be many more candidates.
 There is a  final sense in which corruption may  have negative effects that  I 
wish  to discuss.  The focus thus far has been on the values, which in some cases 
may  be discussed relatively  independently  from human agents. In some 
instances - in particular when thinking about the value inherent in choosing, for 
example - part of the significance of these values relates to the impact they  have 
on the moral status of the agent. There is, then,  a sense in  which the corrupting 
effect is imposed on  the agent herself. This can be described as degradation, 
and can occur either because some aspect of the agent is ‘commodified,’ or 
because the agent acts for particular reasons.
 The ‘commodification’ of the agent  is sometimes thought to happen in 
cases of commercial surrogacy  or  where there is a market  in organs, tissues,  or 
gametes.  This idea was touched upon in the section on the value of health, 
above, where I questioned what exactly  about ‘health’ might be commodified. 
Possibly  this could refer  to the act of the agent in altering her behaviour. This 
sounds quite similar  to commonplace arrangements where employers pay 
employees a salary  in order to direct their behaviour in particular ways. When 
labour  is commodified in these cases we generally  find it unproblematic, 
although there are exceptions. Where the employee is underpaid and exploited, 
or where the work she is asked to perform is very  risky  or demeaning, we may 
find the employment contract unacceptable.
 The behaviours involved in health incentives do not, themselves, appear  
demeaning (eating broccoli or  going for a run are fairly  acceptable everyday 
activities). Nor is it clear  we can describe the payments as exploitative, given 
that there is no clear market  to determine the worth  of these behaviours and 
they  would also ordinarily  take place without any  payment being made. Also, it 
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is just  not  obvious that people,  or  their behaviour, or  their  health or some other 
aspect of them is actually commodified in the way proposed.
 The other opportunity  for degradation arises from the expressive 
importance of acting  for reasons, and the proposal that to adopt healthy 
behaviours ‘for the money’ is a degrading thing to do. Sandel (2012) frequently 
uses words like ‘distasteful’ and ‘unsavoury’ in  describing  the exchanges taking 
place for  money  in  certain cases. The problem seems to be that, in some cases, 
and perhaps where health incentives are offered, the monetary  exchange is 
viewed as being beneath human dignity. It might be thought similarly 
‘distasteful’ to have sex in exchange for money,  or to drive around in a  souped-
up sports car.
 However,  rarely  does this kind of disapproval alone justify  forbidding 
agents from engaging in  a practice.  The point  here is that there is just too much 
variation between different people as to what is considered acceptable 
behaviour, and what is to be deemed unacceptable, demeaning, and to be met 
with  disapprobation. There are some cases where the freedom  of agents is 
restricted in order to avoid causing offence to others. I am  thinking of occasions 
where entertainment media is censored if it includes explicit  material. Further, 
people may  find jobs and friendships at stake if they  use racist language or 
otherwise offensive terms. Thus, more or  less informal mechanisms may  be in 
place to define the parameters of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.
 These restrictions of freedom, where they  are knowingly  and 
intentionally  imposed, may  be done both in order to protect  others from  harm, 
and for paternalistic reasons (where the agent’s freedom  is restricted for her 
own good). Punitive responses to offensive behaviour  are an example of the 
former,  whereas outlawing the solicitation of clients by  prostitutes is an 
example of the latter, paternalistic reasons for restricting freedom.
 Formal restrictions (that can be met with institutionalised punishments) 
based on harm  to others and paternalism  will be relatively  rare, as it  must be 
shown that the suffering in  each case warrants the restriction of freedom. It will 
be particularly  hard to restrict freedom  on the basis of disapproval where the 
agent herself is deemed to be at risk of harm through degrading herself: if the 
individual experiences no disgust towards her actions then how can another 
judge her to be degraded,  and harmed by  that degradation? I might think it 
223
degrading for  people to get drunk and act like morons, or  to enjoy  watching 
Jeremy Clarkson, but this alone is clearly no reason to ban these activities.
 It  is, of course, possible that agents will later  come to be embarrassed by  
their debauched behaviour,  but unless this regret is likely  to be in the extreme, 
and unless third parties are capable of reliably  judging when this will be the 
case, there is little chance interference to restrict an agent’s liberty  will be 
justified. There may  be a very  few instances where individual liberty  should be 
restricted on this basis. Arneson (1992) provides one example:
I would agree that  some possible contracts involve  a  degrading 
subordination  and that the human  dignity  of the contractor  who would be 
degraded demands that such contracts be condemned and prohibited. 
Without arguing  the specifics of the case, I suppose that  slavery  contracts 
should be banned on this ground.”
Arneson (1992: 161)
There may  actually  be rather a lot wrong with slavery  contracts, and the 
degrading effect on the subject may  not be the best  reason for prohibiting them. 
However,  this may  still be an instance where paternalism, on the grounds of 
degradation, is sufficient reason to limit another’s freedom.
 It  is not clear, however, that  incentives provide us with sufficient grounds 
for worrying about  the recipient’s dignity  so as to restrict their use. It  might  be 
argued that agents who accept monetary  payments as reasons to alter their 
health-related behaviours are degraded by  doing  so. But, as a criticism of an 
intervention with potential benefits to contribute to agents in terms of well-
being and health, this seems weak and unlikely  to provide sufficient reason to 
prohibit the use of health incentives.
TRADE-TYPE AND AID-TYPE INCENTIVES AND REASONS
As argued, different sorts of incentives will interact with money,  reasons, social 
norms, and other features that will be important to determining whether 
corruption is likely  to take place. Context is thus very  important, including the 
nature of the incentive, the recipient and provider, the behaviour  incentivised, 
the situation in which the incentive is offered, and so on.  All of these factors 
could influence how the incentive is perceived and experienced, and so the 
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extent to which it  has the potential to corrupt  the agent herself or some other 
thing that we value.
 I want now to look briefly  at how the distinction between how trade-type 
incentives and supportive, aid-type incentives fit into this account. I think the 
key  difference here is the distinct ways these incentives provide reasons for 
agents to alter their behaviour.
 In the trade-type case, the agents have little or no prior intention of 
altering their  behaviour and it  is only  the offer  of the incentive that brings about 
any  change.  In  contrast, aid-type incentives involve agents who already  have 
some wish to change their  behaviour, but have failed (so far) to successfully  do 
so.  Here, the incentive increases the likelihood that agents will succeed in 
changing their behaviour.
 In both the trade- and aid-type cases the agent  may  have reasons she is 
unaware of, or  that she does not  recognise as reasons, to change her behaviour. 
For  instance, smokers could be unaware of the health risks of smoking, or 
underestimate the personal risks to themselves. Clearly, unknown reasons such 
as these cannot motivate an agent to act.  It is also the case that agents do have 
reasons which they  recognise as such, but which still fail  to motivate changes in 
behaviour. This will be the case where those normative reasons are just some 
amongst many,  and overall,  the agent is not motivated to alter her behaviour. 
Or, the agent may  think she should change her behaviour,  but  is unable to do so 
(through weakness of the will or  other barriers to behaviour  change). In all of 
these cases where the agent does not alter her behaviour, she has normative 
reasons but lacks motivating ones.
 Trade-type incentives act both as a normative reason and as a  motivating 
reason for agents to alter their behaviour. Recall that normative reasons are 
those which justify  the agent’s actions, whereas motivating reasons are those 
which explain  why  she acted as she did. Aid-type incentives may  also act as both 
normative and motivating reasons, but  in this case,  the agent has plenty  of other 
normative reasons she does take to be reasons. We might  further say  that this 
agent has a preference to act upon these reasons: she wishes her normative 
reasons to also be motivating  reasons,  whereby  this results in her successfully 
changing her behaviour.  It  seems sensible to say  that the normative reasons this 
agent had prior to the incentive are sufficient to justify  her behaviour change. 
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However,  in  order to explain it we have to include the incentive, for without  the 
incentive the change would not have come about.
 The difference between trade- and aid-type incentives seems to be that 
the trade-type incentive provides the primary  reason for  an agent to alter  her 
behaviour, whereas the aid-type incentive provides one amongst a number of 
reasons for behaviour change. Clearly, behaviour control is influenced by  a 
whole variety  of interacting reasons: agents will rarely  be straightforwardly 
motivated by  a  single reason, with no counter-reasons operating in the opposite 
direction. Yet it seems that trade- and aid-type incentives play  quite different 
roles within the matrix of reasons an agent has.
 Health behaviours are often very  complicated: for instance, dieting 
involves a number of other  behaviours, such as what food one buys in the 
supermarket,  or selects in the canteen, or whether  one chooses to cook for 
oneself or eat in a restaurant  with friends. It could be that  an agent is motivated 
to eat healthily  when selecting food from the canteen or  cooking for herself,  but 
when dining out with friends in the evening she typically  selects unhealthy  food 
options. The introduction of an incentive might successfully  change her 
behaviour so that, even when dining out, she tends to select healthier options. 
For  this agent, it  would seem  that most of the time the reasons guiding her 
behaviour are those normative reasons relating to things she values about eating 
healthily, aside from the incentive.
 The time sensitivity  of reasons seems significant here as well. Where 
agents struggle to alter health behaviours, this is often because their preferences 
appear  to alter depending on whether they  are tired, hungry, emotional, or a 
whole variety  of other  factors. This may  be due to the increased influence of the 
impulsive system over  an agent’s behaviour in certain circumstances. Whatever 
the underlying behavioural control mechanism might  be, again, it seems that 
incentives provide the right sort of reason to motivate action at  the important 
time.
 At the very  least, this complex involvement of incentives with  an agent’s 
normative and motivating reasons and her actual actions complicate criticisms 
of incentives based on the idea that  agents act for the ‘wrong reasons’; that 
being motivate by  incentives will corrupt an agent’s integrity  or undermine her 
dignity  in  some way. Because of their more central role as both  normative and 
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motivating reasons, trade-type incentives will more frequently  be exposed to 
these sorts of criticisms than aid-type incentives.
 There is still the concern (mentioned earlier) that providing incentives 
will actively  reduce the tendency  for agents to be motivated by  other  reasons 
they  have to act.  This could result either  in an overall decrease in motivation, or 
just  decrease motivation from a certain set of (non-incentive-based) reasons. I 
will turn to this question in the next section.
‘INTRINSIC’ VERSUS ‘EXTRINSIC’ MOTIVATION
The Wrong Message argument  from the media  (Parke et al.  [2011]) included the 
claim that ‘rewards undermine intrinsic motivation.’ This will be a  negative 
feature of incentives if and when rewards undermine intrinsic motivation for 
performing the healthy  (desired) behaviour, resulting in an overall decrease in 
motivation and reduction in the likelihood that the agent will adopt the 
healthier  behaviour. Alternatively, an argument could be made that intrinsic 
motivation is somehow preferable to extrinsic motivation, thus, even if overall 
motivation (and likelihood that the desired behaviour will  be performed) 
increases, this may  not fully  compensate for the loss of intrinsic motivation (in 
terms of what is a desirable outcome).
 The former argument is slightly  more straightforward, and turns on 
whether  or not incentives actually  succeed in increasing the adoption  of healthy 
behaviours.  The complexities here lie in measuring this over  time to see if there 
are long term  effects on  motivation; effects on motivation in other areas of life 
(for  example, the target  behaviour  may  be successfully  promoted, but other 
health related behaviours may  suffer); the wider  effects on the motivational 
tendencies of other individuals, and so on.
 The latter argument requires that intrinsic motivation  be shown to be 
more valuable than extrinsic motivation in some way. It must also be shown 
that such ‘valuable’ intrinsic motivation is lost when extrinsic motivators are 
introduced, and that this is not compensated for  by  gains in healthy  behaviour. 
This latter  argument relates to the criticism that to take incentives as a reason to 
act is not to act for the ‘right  reasons’: that the reasons we would prefer people 
to be motivated by  when they  act  are eroded by  the effects of introducing 
motivating reasons such as incentives.
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 Quite a lot of empirical research  has been conducted which  seeks to 
explore and explain the effects of extrinsic motivators on intrinsic motivation. 
Social psychologists and behavioural economists have established a  tradition of 
study  that  looks at  the phenomenon of ‘motivation crowding.’ Deci and Ryan, 
and colleagues have developed what they  describe as “Self-Determination 
Theory”  (Deci and Ryan [1985]) which provides a framework for understanding 
how different sorts of motivations can be based on different reasons for action. 
This all begins with the observation that, contrary  to what is predicted by  the 
‘relative price effect’ (where increase in  reward simply  leads to increase in 
effort), people sometimes respond differently to incentives:
The Motivation Crowding Effect suggests that external  intervention  via 
monetary  incentives or  punishments may  undermine, and under  different 
identifiable conditions strengthen, intrinsic motivation.
Frey and Jegen (2001: 589)
‘Intrinsic’ motivation here “refers to doing something because it is inherently 
interesting or enjoyable”, whilst ‘extrinsic’ motivation “refers to doing 
something because it leads to a separable outcome” (Ryan and Deci [2000: 55]). 
Further, Ryan and Deci (2000: 56) assert that: “when intrinsically  motivated a 
person is moved to act for  the fun or  challenge entailed rather  than because of 
external prods, pressures, or rewards.”
 The term  ‘intrinsic’ motivation is often used more freely  in the literature 
than this definition would allow.  In fact, many  discussions of motivation 
crowding use the term ‘intrinsic motivation’ to refer to what should probably 
more accurately  be described as ‘more autonomous extrinsic motivation’ (and 
‘extrinsic motivation’ is often used to refer to ‘less autonomous extrinsic 
motivation’). This is because,  as described by  Ryan and Deci (2000), the vast 
majority  of human action is extrinsically  motivated: generally, we do not act for 
the pleasure of the activity  itself. A spectrum  of autonomy  is thus used to 
distinguish between different sorts of extrinsic motivations.47
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47  Autonomy  here is taken  to be the psychological  construct, for which  there are a particular set 
of measures used to assess autonomy empirically. For a discussion  of the merits of some 
different measures of autonomy in psychology, see Lifton (1983).
 Ryan and Deci provide a  diagrammatic taxonomy  of extrinsic human 
motivation which shows external regulation to be the least autonomous form  of 
motivation, where behaviours are performed “to satisfy  an external demand or 
to obtain an externally  imposed reward contingency.” (2000: 61) At the other 
end of the spectrum is identification, where “the person has identified with the 
personal importance of behaviour  and has thus accepted its regulation as his or 
her own.” (2000: 62)
 To what extent should we take ‘intrinsic,’ or ‘more autonomous extrinsic 
motivation’ to be preferable to ‘extrinsic’ or ‘less autonomous extrinsic 
motivation’? Further, to what extent do the former sorts of motivation overlap 
with  being  motivated by  the ‘right’ sort of reasons, and the latter  with the 
‘wrong’ sort of reasons? I propose that there is nothing  in-built to these classes 
of motivation that makes one always preferable to the other. Intrinsic 
motivation could easily  be directed towards undesirable ends (for  instance,  if 
one derived pleasure in torturing others). There is nothing inherent  in intrinsic 
motivation that ensures it  will always be a good thing that people are motivated 
intrinsically. Thus, we should not suppose that agents who are motivated 
intrinsically  are more likely  to be motivated by  the sorts of reasons described in 
the first  part  of this chapter, factors like the value of health, the need to avoid 
harming others, a desire to honour solidaristic obligations and to act as a 
competent decision-maker. Agents may  identify  with these reasons, and be 
motivated by them in a ‘more autonomous’ way, or they may not.
 It  may  yet be preferable that agents not be motivated to act by  external 
factors they  experience as alien to them. For instance, influences such as 
coercion, or those which preclude rational deliberation over  one’s actions (see 
Chapter  Four). Ryan and Deci claim that intrinsic (or more autonomous 
extrinsic) motivation “is associated with  greater engagement...,  better 
performance...,  less dropping out...,  higher  quality  learning..., and greater 
psychological well-being (2000: 63). Thus, more autonomous extrinsic 
motivation may  be a preferable way  of promoting a  desired behaviour because 
of these instrumental benefits. This might mean it  is better if agents are able to 
endorse the reasons motivating them, and identify  those reasons as being 
consistent with their general character.
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These different  sorts of motivation may  also interact in peculiar ways. 
Motivation crowding theory  seeks to explain phenomena where ‘intrinsic’ 
motivation is supposedly  undermined (eroded) by  ‘extrinsic’ motivation. This is 
described as ‘crowding out.’ The opposite effect  may  occur, whereby  an extrinsic 
motivator enhances the effects of an intrinsic motivator, and this is called 
‘crowding in.’ Frey  and Jegen outline the conditions under which motivation 
crowding of these sorts are supposed to occur:
Frey  and Jegen argue that  the effects of motivation crowding are “empirically 
well-founded and have been observed in many  different  and important areas of 
the economy  and society” (2001: 591). They  provide a number of examples 
where motivation crowding is said to be identifiable.  The case of daycare 
centres, mentioned earlier  as an example often used by  Sandel,  is provided by 
Frey  and Jegen as a case of crowding out.  Recall, fines were introduced to 
discourage parents from arriving late to pick up their children. However, the 
perverse effect is seen whereby  the number  of parents arriving late to collect 
their offspring actually  increases, after  the fine is introduced.  The explanation 
given by Frey and Jegen is this:
The introduction  of a  monetary  fine transforms the relationship between 
parents and teachers from  a non-monetary  into a monetary  one.  As a result, 
the parents’ intrinsic motivation  to keep to the time schedules is reduced or 
is crowded out altogether; the feeling  now  is that  the teachers are ‘paid’ for 
the disamenity of having to stay longer
Frey and Jegen (2001: 602)
External interventions crowd out intrinsic motivation if the individuals 
affected perceive them  to be controlling. In that  case, both self-
determination and self-esteem  suffer, and the individuals react by 
reducing their intrinsic motivation in the activity controlled.
External interventions crowd in intrinsic motivation if the individuals 
concerned perceive it as supportive. In  that case, self-esteem is fostered, 
and individuals feel that they  are given more freedom  to act, thus 
enlarging self-determination.
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In their concluding remarks,  Frey  and Jegen assert that  strong empirical 
evidence exists to show that motivation crowding occurs in a wide range of 
circumstances, including “children’s learning behaviour; patients’ readiness to 
take prescribed medication; monetary  and symbolic rewards for  undertaking 
various laboratory  tasks; the tendency  to reciprocate in  the laboratory  setting, 
reflecting work conditions in a firm; the amount of trust exhibited in a 
laboratory  situation of incomplete contracts; the reaction of managers to 
various forms of supervision by  their superiors; the readiness to offer  voluntary 
work; the observation of time schedules in  daycare centres; the on-time flight 
performance in the airline industry; the readiness to accept nuclear waste 
repositories (and other locally  unwanted sites); and the amount  of civic virtue 
exhibited, in particular with  respect  to fulfilling one’s tax  obligations (tax 
morale).” (2001: 606)
 The empirical evidence for  motivation crowding theory  is disputed, 
however. Meta-analyses by  Cameron and Pierce (1994), and Cameron, Banko, 
and Pierce (2001) oppose the conclusions made in a meta-analysis conducted by 
Deci, Koestner and Ryan (1999).
Results indicate that, overall,  reward does not decrease intrinsic 
motivation...  [V]erbal praise produces an  increase in  intrinsic motivation. 
The only  negative effect appears when  expected tangible rewards are given 
to individuals simply  for  doing  a  task.  Under  this condition,  there is a 
minimal negative effect  on intrinsic motivation as measured by  the time 
spent on task following the removal of reward.
Cameron and Pierce (1994: 363)
Our  results suggest  that, in  general,  rewards are not  harmful to motivation 
to perform  a  task. Rewards given  for  low-interest  tasks enhance free-choice 
intrinsic  motivation. On high-interest tasks, verbal rewards produce 
positive effects on  free-choice motivation and self-reported task  interest. 
Negative effects are found on  high-interest  tasks when  the rewards are 
tangible, expected (offered beforehand),  and loosely  tied to level of 
performance...  Overall,  the pattern  of results indicates that  reward 
contingencies do not  have pervasive negative effects on  intrinsic 
motivation.
Cameron, Banko, and Pierce (2001: 1)
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As predicted,  engagement-contingent,  completion-contingent,  and 
performance-contingent rewards significantly  undermined free-choice 
intrinsic  motivation...  as did all  rewards,  all  tangible rewards,  and all 
expected rewards.
Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999:  627)
Both groups suggest crowding out may  occur when an expected, tangible reward 
is provided for engaging in a  high interest  task. None of these papers, however, 
consider the effects of incentives on health behaviours.  Features of the 
behaviour being rewarded and the incentive on offer will affect the extent to 
which motivation crowding  is expected. For  example, key  factors will include 
the level of interest in the behaviour in the absence of a  reward; the type and 
size of the reward; who the reward is offered by; the time frame over which the 
reward is offered; and so on. It is thus difficult to extrapolate from the 
conclusions based upon experiments on different  behaviours in different 
contexts to predictions about  motivation crowding in the case of health 
incentives.
 Incentives would fall into the category  of ‘extrinsic’ motivators. However, 
so too would many  other reasons motivating health behaviour change, including 
those discussed earlier (thought  by  some to be the ‘right  reasons’ for  adopting 
healthy  behaviours). None of the reasons described look to motivate the agent to 
adopt healthier behaviours for  the sheer pleasure of so acting; all motivate the 
agent through the prospect of some ‘separable outcome.’ The question of 
pertinence, then, seems to be whether  incentives fall in with  the more 
autonomous forms of extrinsic motivation, or the less autonomous forms.
 If incentives are ‘less autonomous motivators,’ they  may  be perceived as 
controlling and liable to crowd out  other (more autonomous) motivations. Thus, 
agents who have normative reasons such as a wish to fulfil solidaristic 
obligations may  be less likely  to be motivated by  such reasons when ‘less 
autonomous’ motivators like incentives are introduced. However, if instead 
incentives lie at the supportive, ‘more autonomous’ end of the spectrum, they 
may  actually  crowd in  intrinsic motivation from  such already  present normative 
reasons, and make those reasons more likely to motivate the agent in the future.
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TRADE-TYPE AND AID-TYPE INCENTIVES
The different sorts of reasons provided by  trade- and aid-type incentives for 
agents to adopt  healthy  behaviours may  mean that they  typically  have different 
effects on agents’ motivation (and so, too, different effects on motivation 
crowding). Aid-type incentives operate as a  psychological aid to behaviour 
change in individuals who already  have normative reasons, which they  wish to 
be motivating reasons, to alter their  behaviour. Thus,  aid-type incentives are 
supportive of agents’ pre-existing, intrinsic / more autonomous extrinsic 
motivations to alter their behaviour. It seems more likely  that such a  form of 
motivation is quite likely  to crowd in, rather than crowd out, agents’ existent 
motivations.
 Trade-type incentives operate where the agent has little or no wish to 
alter her behaviour; she does not have or  does not acknowledge normative 
reasons to avoid unhealthy  behaviours. Trade-type incentives do not operate to 
support pre-existing reasons, but rather to provide a  new, normative and 
motivating reason for behaviour change. These incentives may  then be 
experienced as more controlling than supportive, and therefore more likely  to 
crowd out motivation. However, the overall reduction in motivation this results 
in  may  be minimal, considering by  their very  nature,  the agents we are talking 
about here have minimal motivation for behaviour change in the first place.
 The lack of empirical research in  this area makes it difficult  to predict 
what the effects of incentives on motivation will be, particularly  in the long term 
(weeks,  months, or years after the incentive is removed). It may  also be the case 
that a detrimental effect on motivation due to crowding can be compensated for, 
perhaps by  increasing the size of the incentive to further  boost the extrinsic 
motivation. Motivation crowding may  thus have inefficiency  effects, but these 
are not straightforward.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter, I have sought to explore the claim that health incentives can 
have a corrupting effect, that they  provide the wrong sort  of reasons for 
adopting healthy  behaviours, and that they  undermine agents’ pre-existing 
motivations to alter their behaviour.
 I began with the criticism  as presented by  Sandel, who argues that 
valuable social norms can be crowded out when incentives are used to motivate 
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behaviour in certain situations. This can lead to a decrease in the desired 
behaviour, and also to the degradation of things that we value. The first, 
efficiency  worry  about motivation is picked up later  in the chapter  where I 
discuss intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The second concern is that the 
commodification of certain things causes erosion of part  of their value. This can 
occur either because those things are incommensurable with monetary  value, 
and so characterising them  in these terms will always miss a large part of the 
value they  hold. It  may  also occur because the mere involvement of money  in 
some situations taints the thing of value and diminishes the value it holds.
 I suggested that an analysis of the agent’s reasons for acting  might help to 
fill out the criticism  that incentives can be corrupting, particularly  where it  is 
not  clear what is supposed to be ‘commodified’ or how  this takes place.  In acting 
for a reason, agents express particular  attitudes, about how the good towards 
which their actions are directed should be treated; about how they  wish  to 
present themselves to others; about what  appropriate justifications for action 
are; and so on.  The expression of indifference towards particular reasons for 
action, where those reasons are based upon values such as health,  avoiding 
harm, solidarity, and choice, may  corrupt those values by  indicating the agent’s 
lack of interest in being motivated to act by them.
 I argued that the values of health, avoiding harm, solidarity  and choice 
are not clearly  corrupted by  the introduction of incentives.  One overarching 
point is that, in the absence of incentives, such values would not act as 
motivating reasons for  agents anyway.  Thus, it is not clear that the addition  of 
incentives makes the chance of corruption more urgent. In both  the health and 
harm  avoidance cases, I argued that the instrumental value of these goods is 
more important  than the intrinsic value they  may  hold.  Thus, if incentives are 
able to boost contributions to whatever  valuing health  and harm avoidance 
would normally  contribute to (such as well-being), then this is likely  to 
compensate some loss due to the corruption of the intrinsic value of health and 
harm avoidance.
 Solidarity  and choice look more vulnerable to corruption via health 
incentives.  These goods derive value through the agent being motivated by  them 
(or perceived as being motivated by  them),  rather  than by  external rewards such 
as incentives. In the case of solidarity,  we might point to the fact that agents 
changing their behaviour  due to incentives are already  not motivated to adopt 
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healthy  behaviours due to solidarity, though there may  be some loss in the value 
attributed to solidaristic actions due to the public nature of incentives, and some 
individuals perceiving others as not acting solidaristically, and therefore giving 
up any solidaristic tendencies they might hold.
 The value of choice may  also be undermined by  the operation of 
incentives,  if agents are less able to make choices that reflect their  characters 
(though incentives could actually  help with this, where weakness of the will is at 
play), or  where agents are perceived as not competent decision makers due to 
being offered incentives, or  when they  feel as though they  are treated as less 
than fully competent in this regard.
 It  does seem  that incentives could corrupt some values, such as those of 
solidarity, and certain values derived from making decisions independently. 
However,  as with all the criticisms against  incentives and other health 
interventions, such losses must be fitted into a  bigger picture, and it must be 
considered how severe we feel those losses will be. For instance, if we refrain 
from using health incentives to encourage pregnant women to quit smoking on 
the basis that it  may  undermine solidaristic obligations or  detract  from  the 
symbolic value of choice, we are assuming that such losses are unacceptable, 
even when we consider the health benefits that would potentially  go to the 
unborn child (as well as further  benefits to the mother and wider society).  It is 
certainly  worthwhile to look outside the narrow parameters of well-being and 
cost harms and benefits, but  a sense of proportion must be maintained at all 
times.
 The final part of the chapter considered whether  incentives are likely  to 
have a  deleterious impact on motivation: undermining ‘intrinsic’ motivation by 
introducing ‘extrinsic’ motivators. First,  I qualified the claim that intrinsic 
motivations are always preferable to extrinsic motivations,  arguing that  there is 
nothing inherently  better  about motivations described as ‘intrinsic’ (or ‘more 
autonomous extrinsic’). However, where agents experience instrumental 
benefits from  acting from  intrinsic motivations rather than extrinsic ones, it 
may  generally  be preferable to encourage the former  motivations for  action 
rather than the latter.
 The main claim, however, is that extrinsic motivation can actually  have 
inefficient  effects by  crowding out intrinsic motivation and decreasing overall 
motivation. The evidence for this is scarce in the context of health  incentives, 
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and this makes it  very  difficult to judge what the likely  motivation crowding 
effects of incentives would be, as this is so dependent on context and the way 
incentives are experienced by the recipient.
 I did offer  some tentative thoughts, however. In particular, given that 
aid-type incentives motivate individuals who already  have a preference to 
change their behaviour, such  extrinsic motivation seems more likely  to be 
perceived as supportive than controlling, and thus to crowd in rather  than 
crowd out motivation. Trade-type incentives, on the other hand, seem more 
likely  to be perceived as controlling, and thus to crowd out. This may  be 
undesirable, but  the impact on overall motivation may  be limited because these 
individuals lack much intrinsic motivation prior to the offer of the incentive.
 The main points from  this chapter are that, once again, incentives that 
are intended to act as a psychological aid to behaviour change,  supporting 
agents who already  have a wish to alter their behaviour,  are less likely  to corrupt 
other things that we value (and that  might otherwise motivate behaviour), and 
are less likely  to have deleterious effects on agent motivation for  adopting 
healthy behaviours.
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CONCLUSION
I began this thesis by  describing the huge significance behavioural choices have 
for population health. Too much  food, alcohol and cigarettes, and not enough 
exercise,  combined with non-adherence to treatment regimens and a failure to 
utilise healthcare resources such as disease screening and vaccination 
programs, result in diseases which are both unpleasant for those affected and 
costly  to the state in general. Yet, some unhealthy  behaviours have historically 
proven to be surprisingly  resistant to change, with  many  efforts directed at 
informing people of the risks of unhealthy  lifestyles and encouraging healthier 
alternatives failing to deliver significant improvements in health. The challenge 
posed by  health behaviour change provides the context within which health 
incentives arise. Rewards for  healthy  behaviour  could provide another  means by 
which healthcare providers might reduce the disease burden and improve 
health.
 The proposal of using financial incentives to reward healthy  behaviour  
raises a  number  of hard questions,  some of which demand ethical analysis of the 
underlying  issues. It has been my  task, here,  to address some of these ethical 
issues, as part of the wider  project of CSI Health  to consider  the viability  of 
health incentives more generally. To this end, I began with  the public discussion 
of health incentives in the news media. Of interest to me were those arguments 
relating to health  incentives that could provide a  starting point for identifying 
those concerns that this thesis should address.
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 In Chapter  One, I discussed how the media can act  as a ‘source of 
arguments’ relating to health incentives, and some of the special features this 
source possesses. I emphasised that particular pressures operate on media 
content due to the interests of those parties responsible for creating copy. To 
some extent, these pressures are thought to cause media content  to resemble 
the opinions held by  its consumers.  For  this reason, it is proposed that media 
content can act as a proxy for Public Opinion.
 My  intention has not been to present an ethical analysis of those 
arguments most concerning to the public.  Rather,  I have sought to combine a 
sensitivity  to such arguments with a more conventional philosophical approach 
which tackles those principles of philosophical concern typically  arising in  the 
context of bioethical debates about healthcare interventions. In abstracting the 
specific tokens of arguments featuring in the media  from  their original settings 
and grouping these together into types of arguments (as done in the media 
analysis),  important contextual information is lost. ‘Public opinion,’ as 
represented by  the media  arguments, has been further  polluted by  splicing and 
combining these arguments into general themes, more amenable to 
philosophical discussion.
 The result is an analysis that  begins with the media but  swiftly  moves 
away  from it. I hope the end result,  with four  chapters relating to four  general 
themes of concern, still covers most of the arguments arising  in the media, 
although not in the form in which they  originally  arose. This has proved to be a 
more manageable way  of structuring the discussion, and I hope it has created a 
clearer narrative than might have been possible were the discussion to have 
focused more strictly on the discrete arguments in the media.
 Thus, the general themes relate to: issues of efficiency  and the capacity  
for incentives to effectively  promote well-being; the extent to which incentives 
are consistent with ideas of justice and the fair  treatment of people; concerns 
about the harmful effects on the recipient of pressuring,  perhaps coercing, 
people to change their behaviour; and finally, the harmful effect on values that 
we hold to be important that  might arise from the involvement of money. When 
looking at the philosophical implications of these themes in relation to 
incentives,  some aspects of concern seemed to fade away, whilst new  worries 
emerged.
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Chapter  Three, then, begins the substantive discussion of health incentives by 
taking up some of those issues that  tend to concern political philosophers about 
state action: ideas relating to efficiency, well-being and what the state ought to 
be promoting through healthcare, and the limitations of state interference. 
Although not the most obvious ‘ethical’ issue,  efficiency  was by  far the most 
frequently  referenced aspect of incentives in  the media analysis. I argued that 
‘efficiency’ should not be considered simply  a calculative problem  for 
economists to resolve (although this is certainly  one aspect of it). Rather, much 
of the difficulty  with determining the relative efficiency  of different 
interventions relates to the kinds of positive and negative effects that should be 
counted, and the importance and value of these effects given the healthcare 
context in which they  exist.  As such, much debate about ‘efficiency’ turns out to 
depend on numerous value-laden judgements, rather than on ‘objective’ 
calculations.
 I suggested that, sometimes,  efficiency  seems to be used as a 
smokescreen for other concerns which are typically  more moralised and involve 
assumptions about the ‘right’ way  to spend money. The apparently 
uncontroversial nature of a need for  ‘efficiency’ might  make this an appealing 
frame for  raising other arguments.  Moreover, in the case of incentives, the 
explicit  involvement of money  encourages a focus on the costs and savings this 
particular health intervention will involve. Such factors could explain why  there 
is a  strong tendency  to refer to efficiency-related issues when discussing heath 
incentives.  It is,  however, important to emphasise the complexity  of arguments 
taking place in this area.
 This chapter was therefore concerned with  some of the ways in  which 
these kind of disputed value judgements involved in ‘efficiency’ inform the 
acceptability  of health  incentives. In the context of what the state ought  to do,  I 
suggested that one of the clearest limitations on state interference is set  by  the 
requirement to respect agent  liberty. All state action, including efforts to 
improve public health, will therefore balance the desirable outcomes that may 
result from interventions affecting agent  freedom, and the need to maintain 
those freedoms. I went on to discuss this in  terms of the legitimacy  of 
perfectionist  and neutral state policy, arguing first, that  moderate perfectionism 
should be acceptable,  and second, that health incentives should be considered 
legitimate according to such a position.
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 I also went on to give a brief discussion of some allocative issues that 
arise in the context of state action, and in particular healthcare. The distribution 
of healthcare resources is a key  function of the state, and various theories within 
political philosophy  propose ways in which this distribution (or the distribution 
of social goods more widely) should be directed.  To give an indication of the 
distributive implications of incentives, without being able to properly  assess the 
actual impact incentives would have on resource distribution, I discussed a  few 
example theories: Rawlsian liberalism, luck egalitarianism, the capability 
approach, and communitarianism. My  aim  here was to indicate that incentives 
need not be ruled out by  these approaches (with the probable exception of 
communitarianism). As an intervention, incentives are flexible enough to direct 
resources towards particular  populations, and they  are consistent with efforts to 
ensure that the worst off are prioritised. This does,  however, come with  the 
caveat that more affluent individuals are generally  more likely  to benefit  from 
healthcare interventions: such an effect may  also be seen in the case of 
incentives.
In seeking to provide an efficient system of healthcare, public organisations 
such  as the NHS must balance the interests both of the public and of the 
individual. A focus on the rights of the individual is typical of medical ethics 
literature,  which  emerged from  a need to protect patients who were perceived as 
vulnerable in  the face of the expertise and power of physicians. Hence the 
preoccupation within bioethics with individual freedom, to find ways of 
delivering healthcare that ensure the individual may  exercise her  autonomy, 
whilst acknowledging the expertise of healthcare professionals, and also 
protecting the interests of society as a whole.
 Chapter  Four thus considered the influence incentives might have on the 
individual and her psychological freedom, beginning with one of the strongest 
forms of interference: coercion. This chapter was split  into three parts: Part One 
introduced the concept of coercion and discussed a number of different 
approaches to describing coercion in the philosophical literature. I sought to 
indicate the variety  of approaches to describing this concept, and the kind of 
features of the situation in which  proposals are made, and the features of the 
recipient of those proposals,  which are important to judgements of coercion. 
Two key  criteria linked to coercion, either in combination or independently, 
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were the thought that a  coercive proposal makes the recipient worse off in some 
way, and the thought that  a  coercive proposal places the recipient under a 
certain (significant) degree of pressure.
 In Part Two I then sought to apply  this theory  to the case of health 
incentives,  and consider if incentives can coerce. I described how particular 
psychological idiosyncrasies might be exploited to design effective incentive 
schemes, and how this could result in  individuals being made to experience the 
non-payment of an incentive as a ‘loss,’ and therefore, how they  might be made 
‘worse off’ by  an incentive proposal. Yet, as I argued, it still seems unlikely  that 
incentives will have sufficient pull over an agent’s will to be considered coercive.
 Finally,  in Part  Three I extended the discussion to include some other  
means of influence: persuasion, manipulation, and nudging. After briefly 
characterising these methods of influence I considered the extent to which 
incentives might be thought to utilise them in changing people’s behaviour and, 
importantly, whether this kind of influence should be considered unacceptable 
on the grounds that it interferes with agent liberty and autonomy.
 As with coercion, I argued that the analysis of other means of influence 
should give us little reason to think that incentives will have liberty-
undermining effects on recipients. However, sometimes it  seems that incentives 
could have autonomy-undermining effects where they  manipulate, through 
distraction, deception,  or by  encouraging action  based upon sub-optimal or 
faulty  reasoning. Yet the extent to which we should be concerned about these 
effects can only  be measured with a clear eye on the value of autonomy  in  these 
contexts.
 To further consider  the significance (and possibility) of ‘autonomous’ 
action, I provided a description of the reflective and impulsive determinants of 
behaviour developed in social psychological research. This describes how  much 
behaviour (including  in the domain of health-relevant activities) is not 
controlled by  reflective, conscious, value-sensitive mechanisms, but rather by 
impulsive, automatic, environmentally-cued processes. Considering what kind 
of autonomy  is possible when behaviour  is controlled in  this way  suggests that 
the effects of incentives might be less worrisome than at first it seemed.
 I placed a lot  of emphasis on the importance of agent experience and 
individual psychology  in determining the effect of incentives on agent 
autonomy, and when this will be harmful,  and when unjustified. Thus, 
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contextual information and facts about the particular agent under consideration 
will be fundamental to judgements of this sort. However,  certain generalisable 
‘risk factors’ for incentives more likely  to coerce, or otherwise negatively  affect 
autonomy, might be identified. I suggested these included incentives which 
target ‘vulnerable’ agents; where recipients have little money  or other  resources; 
where incentives are of a  large magnitude; where recipients experience the non-
receipt of incentives as a loss from the status quo; where incentives promote 
others’ interests above the agent’s; where incentives exploit faulty  reasoning 
processes or  employ  deception. In these instances, it seems more likely  that 
incentives could exert increased pressure on the recipient’s will, or  manipulate 
her in some unacceptable way.
Chapter  Five considered some issues relating to justice. Rather  than seeking to 
consider justice as a whole (a rather  daunting  prospect), I focused on the aspect 
relating to desert, and whether it  is fair  to furnish  individuals with rewards 
when they  have previously  failed to adopt healthy  behaviours (which some 
argue citizens are obliged to adopt in the first place). This is the concern often 
articulated as incentives ‘rewarding bad behaviour.’
 I discussed a number of ways in which the desert-based criticism  might 
be fleshed out, but suggested that  on the whole, these were unconvincing. At the 
very  least, far  more conceptual work on the part  of the critics would be needed 
to establish the bases for  such criticisms. In particular, I argued that evidence 
from research into the social determinants of health and the psychology  of 
health behaviour undermines common assumptions about the robust link 
between an agent and her (health-related) behaviour.  Generally, it  is taken that 
moral responsibility  is a  necessary  prerequisite for blameworthiness, and moral 
responsibility  is usually  taken to require control over  one’s actions. However, 
the empirical evidence I summarised suggests that health  behaviour  has less to 
do with  freely  chosen decisions,  expressing our preferences about how we wish 
to behave, and more to do with the circumstances we find ourselves in,  and 
factors external to our  control. This makes it problematic to identify  agents as 
morally responsible, and thus blameworthy, for their behaviour.
 Moral responsibility  can be tricky  to judge, and it  also has connotations 
that go beyond praise and blame (denying an agent is ‘morally  responsible’ may 
be to deny  her  the status of being a full  moral agent  in some sense). I used 
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Pettit’s theory  of freedom as fitness to be held responsible as another  means of 
identifying what features must be present in order  to consider agents fully  free 
and thus, fully  fit to be held responsible. Desert is generally  taken as a  feature of 
a particular individual, yet my  primary  concern here is with the desert of groups 
of people; those (potentially) in receipt of some form  of health incentive.  Such 
individuals are connected in the minimal sense that they  are candidates for the 
incentive, and they  may  share salient features due to being part of this group 
(for  instance, they  may  be smokers or  they  may  live in a particular area). Whilst 
not  all of those who possess such features will have their  freedom (in Pettit’s 
sense) undermined by  the kinds of forces described in Chapter Five, it  is 
possible that this may  happen some of the time; where incentives target agents 
with  particular features, the very  features they  hold in common may  detract 
from the extent to which they  should be considered fully  free. On the basis of 
responsibility-dependent desert,  then, it looks like withholding healthcare (in 
this case, health incentives) will not be justified.
In the final chapter, I considered those criticisms that propose that the use of 
health incentives to change behaviour - particularly  where this takes the form  of 
money  - is likely  to corrupt  values that  are important  to us. As discussed, this 
criticism  is rather diffuse, and often seems appealing without being very  specific 
about what, exactly, is corrupted, how this occurs, and why  this is undesirable. 
First of all, then, I sought to clarify  what the concern seems to be. As presented 
by  Sandel (one of the key  proponents here), the introduction of money  into 
certain areas of life results in commodification and, sometimes, corruption.
 Given the claim  that money  represents the ‘wrong’ reason for  acting in 
certain circumstances (such as adopting a  healthy  behaviour) I considered what 
it  means for something to be the ‘right’ reason for action, and outlined four 
values that could be candidates for providing us with  ‘good’ reasons for  acting, 
and which could plausibly  be corrupted via  the kinds of processes described. 
These were the intrinsic value of health; the need to avoid harming others; the 
value of solidarity; and the value associated with  choosing for  oneself. I argued 
that it  is not clear  that  such values will ordinarily  be corrupted by  the use of 
health incentives,  and that more would need to be done to show that  such 
corruption is a  real threat, and moreover, one that is worth avoiding (that is, 
that compensatory  effects of incentives would be insufficient). The social value 
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of solidarity  and being seen to be a free and competent ‘chooser’ may  be harmed 
by  the introduction of health  incentives as a  (perceived) motivator. Yet once 
again, the significance of this loss must be balanced against the corresponding 
gains.
 The final section considered the distinction between ‘intrinsic’ and 
‘extrinsic’ motivation. It is sometimes claimed that it is better for  agents to act 
from intrinsic motivation than from extrinsic motivation, both because extrinsic 
motivation can ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation and result  in overall lower levels 
of motivation, and also because intrinsic motivators are somehow preferable. 
The ‘preferable’ sense of intrinsic motivation seems to relate to features like 
those ‘good’ reasons discussed. Again, I argued that it  is problematic to evaluate 
the precursors of action in this way  without more conceptual work being  done. 
Further, there is little evidence to directly  support the assertion that health 
incentives crowd out  intrinsic motivation, with most research  being conducted 
in  different  contexts, making it hard to extrapolate to the health  behaviour case. 
Whilst it may  be that  ‘supportive’ external motivators should be preferred to 
‘controlling’ ones, it is not clear that incentives fall on the wrong side of this 
division.
 Having summarised the discussion in  the main part  of this thesis,  it is 
worth making a few more general points that have emerged from  this analysis. I 
will do this in the final concluding sections.
KEY FEATURES
Trade-Type and Aid-Type Incentives
There are a few general features that I have identified as making a scheme more 
or less likely  to look ethically  dubious.  Most of these seem to fall along the 
trade-type / aid-type distinction I have described. The former, trade-type 
incentives,  act by  providing an extra motivation that ‘tips the balance’ of 
preferences in favour of the incentivised behaviour. The archetypical recipient 
here is one who has no prior  interest  in  altering her behaviour, but who may  be 
induced to do so by  the offer  of an incentive. In this case, we may  think the 
agent is ‘paid to change her behaviour.’ In the latter case, aid-type incentives 
support an agent to better match  her behaviour to her consistent,  long-term 
preferences about how she wishes to act.
244
 These are the idealised versions of trade- and aid-type incentives, where 
both the recipient and the provider intend and experience the incentive in a 
particular way  (as either  a  trade or  an aid).  Yet in  the real life case,  things will 
rarely  be so neat: recipients’ preferences may  fluctuate, making it hard to assess 
if an incentive acts to induce or support behaviour change; those providing 
incentives may  misjudge the recipients, intending to offer a supportive, aid-type 
incentive but in fact offering something that  has the effects of a trade-type 
incentive; and so on. Still,  I think the distinction is helpful,  and there are some 
general remarks to be made about the ‘purest’ forms of these two types of 
incentive.
In the context  of the state’s role in promoting health efficiently  and justly, 
features of less or more permissible incentives may  match up with  features 
reminiscent of trade- and aid-type incentives. For instance, I suggested that a 
moderately  perfectionist  strategy  should be acceptable,  if a government 
intervention to promote health is to be deemed acceptable.  Interventions that 
respect agents’ conceptions of the good life, and support them to succeed in 
pursuing such lives will be more consistent  with  moderate perfectionism  than 
interventions which seek to alter  those conceptions, or to get people to act 
against them. The former, more acceptable form  of intervention sounds more 
akin to an aid-type incentive (supportive of prior preferences); the latter  style of 
intervention seems to operate as a trade-type incentive (indifferent  regarding 
agents’ initial preferences and interested only in the goodness of the outcome).
 When considering  worries about  the potential for  incentives to pressure 
the agent, to override her will, or  to manipulate her in  some way, we may  also 
think that aid-type incentives are more likely  to be benign. This is because aid-
type incentives are aimed at supporting the agent’s preferences, not altering 
them. The will of the agent is what  aid-type incentives are intended to promote, 
rather than the interests of some third party.
 In terms of their affect on autonomy, the features of aid-type incentives 
would appear more promoting than stifling: here the incentive helps an agent to 
act consistently  in ways she prefers. This may  relate to her  ability  to exert 
reflective control over her  behaviour, rather than being driven by  more 
impulsive desires which respond more to environmental cues than endorsed 
values. Trade-type incentives look more problematic, with the potential to 
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create, rather than resolve, conflict between an  agent’s two systems of 
behavioural control.
 Where the concern with incentives is whether  or  not the recipient is 
deserving of them, I argued the trade / aid distinction could be significant. This 
is because there is a moral difference between denying someone access to a 
trade that  she would prefer  to have access to, and denying someone access to a 
form of healthcare that she would otherwise be entitled to (this requires certain 
assumptions about the access to incentives prior to judgements about  desert). I 
argued that  in the latter case, the justification (based upon blameworthiness of 
the agent) must be stronger  than in  the former case. It  may  be that we should 
never accept blameworthiness as justification for removing someone’s 
entitlement to healthcare (even where we can reliably  judge people as 
blameworthy).
 Finally,  when considering corruption, the trade / aid distinction may  do 
the most work.  The main complaint here relates to the commodification of 
behaviour, which seems uniquely  applicable to the use of trade-type incentives. 
Where agents accept incentives only  as a form  of psychological aid, to help them 
achieve their behaviour change goals, they  do not appear  to ‘commodify’ 
behaviour in the required way. In  the trade-type case, it  may  be that  there is a 
monetary  exchange taking place whereby  the thing of value (and which, in this 
instance, is valued in terms of money) is the behaviour of the recipient. 
Commodification (and corruption) is more plausible here,  although this by  no 
means guarantees it will occur.
 I sought  to flesh out  this distinction a little more in  terms of reasons, and 
the different  role trade-type and aid-type incentives play  as explanations and 
justifications for  action. I suggested that, in the trade-type case,  incentives play 
a key  role in  both  explaining and justifying the agent’s behaviour  (they  provide 
both motivating and normative reasons). In  the aid-type case, however, 
incentives play  a smaller role in  motivating the agent’s behaviour,  and they  may 
not  be necessary  to justify  it; the story  we tell about why  the agent  changed her 
behaviour is more likely  to refer to her prior  reasons for  adopting a  healthier 
lifestyle than to the incentive. That  said, the complete picture would need to 
include reference to the incentive as well.
 In the context of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, it might further be of 
relevance whether incentives take a trade- or an aid-type form. Although, as I 
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argued, evidence on the applicability  of motivation  crowding theory  to health 
incentives is scarce, as a minimum we might expect that supportive, aid-type 
incentives are less likely  to result in the crowding-out of intrinsic motivation 
(and more likely  to crowd-in this motivation) than are trade-type incentives. 
The latter, where these are perceived as controlling, may  have the crowding-out 
effects that critics are concerned about.
 If aid-type incentives are less likely  to have morally  objectionable effects, 
then it may  be wise to try  to restrict  the use of health  incentives to this form, 
and to avoid the use of trade-type incentives where they  look likely  to be 
contentious. Yet it will not be straightforward to reliably  restrict  incentives to 
one or other type because of the importance of contextual factors, including the 
agent’s individual psychological experience. However, some basic guidelines 
might be feasible.
 Targeting agents with a prior desire to change their behaviour seems like 
a helpful way  of restricting the actions of health incentives to the aid-type form. 
This will emphasise the importance of processes of recruitment  of agents onto 
the incentive scheme. For instance, offering incentives to agents who have gone 
out of their  way  to seek assistance in quitting smoking will target those 
incentives towards people with prior preferences for  this behaviour change. 
Offering incentives to people one sees smoking on the street is less likely  to 
successfully target incentives towards those who already wish to quit.
 Such methods will not be infallible: word may  get out that an incentive 
scheme, initially  scrupulously  targeted at those already  wishing to change 
behaviour, is operating. This may  attract others who seek the incentives more 
than the behaviour  change, and it may  not be possible to screen such 
participants out. Thus, those who would experience incentives as trade-type 
(not aid-type) could become involved.
 Incentive type and size may  also play  a role here. Offering very  large 
incentives may  have the effect of attracting far more people, many  of whom 
have no prior preference to alter their behaviour but would very  much like to 
receive the reward for  doing so. Similarly, grocery  vouchers may  be less 
appealing to those with little interest in healthy  eating. It  is not clear  where the 
cut-off will be between aid-type incentives of a sufficient  size to effectively 
change recipients’ behaviour,  and trade-type incentives large enough to 
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indiscriminately  recruit people. More by  way  of empirical evidence will be 
needed here in order to draw the correct boundaries.
Beyond the Trade / Aid Distinction
Efforts to target  incentives carefully  and to pay  close attention to who is 
recruited, as well as to the design of incentive schemes, will have ethical 
significance beyond the trade / aid distinction. I noted in Chapter Four  that 
where incentives combine elements such as being very  large; offered to 
vulnerable agents (such as those suffering from mental illness); experienced in 
some sense as a  ‘loss’; offered by  powerful members of authority  (including 
physicians); and so on, they  may  be more likely  to place significant pressure on 
the recipient’s will. Such incentives could have undermining effects on agent 
liberty and autonomy.
 Incentive schemes may  also be used in isolation or alongside other  
methods of behaviour  change. The supplementation of an incentive scheme with 
a support  group, for instance,  may  increase success rates, and may  also foster 
the kinds of values that  critics of incentive schemes worry  get lost, particularly 
in  relation to the physician-patient  relationship (such as trust, benevolence,  and 
respect).  More work needs to be done to understand how  incentive schemes and 
other behaviour  change interventions could complement each other, but it  could 
be that  where these act in combination, the benefits are increased and the 
harms mitigated.
 I have not given  much consideration to the merits of promoting 
particular  behaviours. A  range of health-related behaviours have been 
discussed, and some more gestured at. I have allowed the assumption that most 
of these behaviours will be relatively  uncontroversial, and likely  to improve 
health (and very  unlikely  to harm  it).  This might be true for a very  general 
account,  but at  the level where a particular  behaviour  is described (such as 
quitting smoking or being tested for chlamydia) it  should be possible to be more 
specific about the likely  costs and benefits, both to the individual and to wider 
society, of that behaviour. Further than this, when we consider  the specific 
individual’s  likelihood of benefitting or  experiencing harm from a behaviour 
change intervention, both in terms of her health and other contributors to her 
well-being, the picture may change yet again.
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 We might also wish to identify  schemes which, for one reason or  another, 
attract particularly  hostile media coverage. In the analysis discussed in Chapter 
Two, those schemes targeted at improving the health  of pregnant women were 
described as attracting the most positive coverage, whilst  those aimed at  illicit 
drug users or overweight populations received more criticism in the press 
(Parke et al. [2011: 10]).  Whether or  not this hostility  appears warranted upon 
closer inspection,  it may  nonetheless prove obstructive to the effective 
implementation of particular incentive schemes, and healthcare providers 
would be wise to take such factors into account.
Differences Between Schemes and Individual Experiences Will Matter
It  is, thus,  highly  significant that, within the broad description of ‘incentives to 
encourage healthy  behaviour,’ a  huge range of variations exist. I have narrowed 
my  focus somewhat to consider  only  positive,  personal, conditional,  financial, 
health incentives. Yet even within  these limits incentives can still come in a 
variety  of different  forms: cash payments, lottery  tickets, luxury  goods vouchers, 
grocery  vouchers,  or  anything with a  discernible monetary  value. This value can 
be large or small, or represent a  small chance of a large reward, or large chance 
of a small reward. Incentives can be offered by  physicians, economists, 
psychologists, politicians, some alliance of these disciplines, or anyone else who 
wishes to change behaviour. They  may  target smoking cessation, diet, physical 
activity,  vaccination uptake, screening for STIs and cancer, adherence to 
medication, or  something else thought to promote health. The incentives may 
be transferred in a  lump sum, at weekly  or monthly  intervals,  or  may  even be 
repossessed if the agent fails to meet her  targets.  Schemes could last for any 
amount of time: days, weeks, months, or even years.
 All of these factors, and more besides, can affect  how incentives should be 
evaluated. At  times I have referred to different  sorts of schemes in  order to 
illustrate how a particular  scheme might look in whatever case I am  discussing. 
Sometimes it is useful to discuss the most controversial schemes, such as those 
which pay  pregnant women to quit  smoking,  or  mentally  ill people to take their 
medication. But  the way  we assess the fairness, or  coercive influence, or 
corruptive nature of one scheme may  differ  a  lot from  another. Hence, my  aim 
has been to give a more abstracted account, and to indicate what general 
249
features will be important, rather  than seek to evaluate individual instances of 
health incentive use.
Psychology  is also central to some of the discussion in this thesis. For  instance, 
when considering coercion,  I emphasised the importance of the pressure placed 
on the agent’s will. I argued that fundamental to the ethical significance of a 
particular application of (potentially  coercive) pressure on the agent’s will is the 
experience of the agent.  This will clearly  vary  between different agents 
depending on characteristics unique to those individuals.
 Other features important to this ethical analysis will also depend greatly  
on the psychological experience of the agent. These include well-being,  moral 
responsibility, freedom  to act,  and blameworthiness.  Such things may  be 
thought  to include subjective,  agential factors as well as independently 
identifiable factors,  and the degree to which each feature requires reference to 
agential and non-agential factors will  depend on the theory  adopted in each 
case. Yet it seems likely  that on  the majority  of accounts, at least  some 
information about the agent and some information about the situation  will be 
needed.
 Sometimes it is unhelpful to place an emphasis on what occurs within 
somebody’s head, as this can  be fiendishly  difficult  to measure. If, however,  this 
seems to be where the main action is taking place, then there is little to be 
gained by  avoiding this conclusion. It need not preclude assessment by  third 
parties: many  methods have been developed within psychology  precisely  for  the 
purpose of estimating what goes on within the human mind. Where it is difficult 
to know with much certainty  the experiences of an agent,  educated guesswork 
may  be necessary. It still seems preferable, however, to make uncertain 
assessments of what we actually  care about than to take accurate measurements 
of something that misses the point.
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
As with any  piece of research, the range and depth of issues covered within  this 
thesis is necessarily  restricted. I have only  been able to consider some of those 
criticisms of incentives of ethical interest, not all.  Nor does this consideration 
permit  one to draw conclusions about the overall permissibility  of using 
incentives to encourage healthy  behaviour: as described in the introduction, the 
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negative approach I have adopted here to responding  to certain criticisms is 
insufficient, lacking as it  does any  positive account in  favour of the use of health 
incentives.
 It  is probably  also the case that  any  one of the chapters in  this thesis 
might have been extended significantly, perhaps to the point of constituting a 
thesis in its own right. Most of the discussions have been necessarily 
circumscribed both in  their dealing with the philosophical background and 
development of theory, the implications of such theories for health incentives, 
and the normative conclusions we might draw from  these discussions regarding 
the practical implementation of incentives. The efficiency  of healthcare 
interventions and the relevance of well-being; the legitimate role of the state 
and the justifiability  or otherwise of perfectionist policies; the best theories of 
distributive justice and how healthcare ought to be allocated; the effect of 
incentives on liberty  and autonomy; the relevance of desert in determining 
healthcare; the extent to which  agents can be considered morally  responsible for 
their  behaviour; the processes thought  to result  in corruption through 
commodification; the kinds of reasons for  action that promote the proper 
valuation  of goods: all of these could be discussed more deeply  with relevance to 
the ethics of health incentives and perhaps philosophical research more widely.
 More use could be made of the media, and other methods for eliciting the 
attitudes towards health incentives held be members of the public. A closer 
consideration of the criticisms raised here could prove fruitful, coming up with 
issues that I have overlooked. A more sociological approach to this work might 
provide a  better understanding of how agents perceive themselves and others in 
relation to healthy  and unhealthy  lifestyles; what significance health  has in this 
context; how healthcare should operate here; the special significance of money 
and how  its operation is modified in different relationships; and many  more 
issues besides.
 Such a  discussion also suggests the opportunity  for  a more sociological 
perspective on the issues that have been covered here. The most obvious 
example,  to my  mind, is the discussion of how the influence of incentives might 
place coercive, or otherwise undesirable pressure on the recipient. My  focus has 
been undeniably  agent-centric and psychology-focused, yet the kinds of 
influences and pressures operating  on agents who exist in society  is manifold 
and complex. The kinds of power imbalances that  exist in every  interaction 
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create their  own pressures to act in particular  ways, and sometimes these will be 
experienced by  the agent (in that she feels pressure in some way), and 
sometimes they  will go completely  unnoticed.  Such a discussion would require a 
subtle analysis of the wider relations between incentive recipients and 
providers,  visible healthcare providers (physicians, nurses) and invisible ones, 
the media, family, friends and peers,  influential businesses, the state, and other 
actors.
 Another  worthwhile extension would be to consider  the use of health 
incentives in a  more global context. My  discussion has remained mostly  rooted 
with  the UK, yet incentives can (and are) used in countries all over the world. 
Different social, cultural, economic, and political situations will affect  the ethical 
consideration of incentives elsewhere. Different behaviours are likely  to be 
targeted depending on the healthcare needs of a  particular  country. Attitudes 
towards money  may  influence the acceptability  and efficacy  of incentives, and 
different sized incentives may  prove effective or  necessary.  It may  be that a 
structure roughly  similar to that  adopted in this thesis could be used in other 
global contexts,  or it  might be that  the consideration of similar  issues would 
prove unproductive for health incentives used elsewhere.
 I have shown that, on the whole, the criticisms of health  incentives 
considered here do not  quite hit the mark.  It has yet  to be shown, however, 
whether  health incentives possess the necessary  features to justify  their 
implementation. Are incentives even effective at improving health? Would they 
produce sustainable benefits? Could they  be practically  implemented? There is 
still a great deal that is unknown about the applicability  of health incentives, 
leaving further  empirical and theoretical work still to be done. It would be futile 
to implement ethically  benign interventions that have no clinical impact. Thus, 
more work in psychology, economics, sociology, epidemiology, and medicine, as 
well as philosophy  and bioethics will be necessary  in order to answer the final 
question of whether and when health incentives should be used.
Despite these limitations, I hope this thesis has served to shed some light on the 
ethical implications of using incentives to encourage healthy  behaviour. If 
nothing else,  I have shown that the ethical implications are complex here,  and 
that knee-jerk reactions of suspicion and hostility  should not be accepted 
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without further scrutiny  of the underlying moral principles at  work. When we 
apply such scrutiny, often, some of those concerns seem misguided.
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLE INCENTIVE SCHEMES
Below  are a few examples of incentive schemes that have operated in the past or 
continue to operate. This list is far  from  exhaustive, and is intended only  to be 
illustrative of the kind of forms schemes can take.
Give It Up For Baby
Ballard and Radley (2009); NSMC (2010)
This is a smoking cessation scheme targeted at pregnant women in  Tayside, 
Scotland. Women were offered an incentive of £12.50 per  week for  every  week 
they  didn’t smoke (as demonstrated by  taking a carbon monoxide breath test). 
The £12.50 was redeemable through a National Entitlement Card at ASDA 
supermarket, and could be spent on groceries but not alcohol or cigarettes.
 Women were enrolled on the scheme for  the duration of pregnancy  and 
for three months after the birth. Free Nicotine Replacement Therapy  was also 
provided to women, as was one-to-one support from a ‘Give It  Up For Baby’ 
Development Worker.
Financial Incentives for Adherence Trial (FIAT)
Priebe et al. (2009)
The FIAT scheme uses financial incentives to encourage mentally  ill patients 
(those diagnosed with schizophrenia, schizo-affective psychosis,  or  bipolar 
illness) to adhere to anti-psychotic depot  medication treatments. The 
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medication is given in the form of an injection, up to once a week, for a period of 
12 months. For every injection received, patients are paid £15 in cash.
 Individuals recruited onto this trial come from  a pool of previously  
poorly-adherent patients (missing 50% or more of prescribed depot medications 
over the last four months) for  whom all other  available methods of improving 
adherence have failed.  Those with learning difficulties or a  poor command of 
English are excluded,  and participants must be capable of giving informed 
consent to take part in the study.
Wee for a Wii
NHS Cambridgeshire (2009); Cambstakeatest (2009)
The ‘Wee for a  Wii’ campaign was run by  NHS Cambridgeshire and NHS 
Peterborough  and their respective community  services from  2009-2010 (other 
similar schemes have been run in other regions as well). People aged 16-24  were 
encouraged to provide a urine sample or swab to be tested for chlamydia. Tests 
could be obtained via text message or online for  free (from  the website 
freetest.me), and returned via post.
 Those returning a  completed test kit were entered into a prize draw to 
win either a Nintendo Wii games console, cinema tickets, or HMV vouchers.
Project Prevention
Project Prevention (2011); BBC (2010)
Not ‘health promoting’ as such, but nonetheless an interesting (and ethically 
contentious) case of incentive use, Project Prevention is a charitable operation 
originating in the United States which offers alcohol and drug addicts money  in 
return for complying with long term contraception  or sterilisation.  Those 
meeting the requirements of Project Prevention can  receive a  one off payment of 
$300 dollars in return for compliance with certain forms of birth control.
 In 2010, Project Prevention began operating in the UK as well.  Although 
the majority  of Project Prevention participants are women, the first person in 
the UK to be recruited was a  38 year  old man who underwent a vasectomy  in 
exchange for £200.
Pounds for Pounds (Weight Wins)
Relton et al. (2011); Weight Wins (2013)
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Weight Wins is a private enterprise that offers cash rewards to participants who 
successfully  meet weight  loss goals. The scheme is flexible, so participants can 
set their  own targets and time frame, and the rewards they  can earn will vary 
with  these factors.  Those joining up to Weight Wins must pay  a fee to do so,  and 
have monthly weigh-ins to show if they have lost, gained, or maintained weight.
 Pounds for Pounds was a  pilot scheme run by  NHS Eastern  and Coastal 
Kent, which  operated through Weight Wins. Eligible adults needed a body  mass 
index (BMI) over 22.5 kg/m2 (a BMI of 25 or over is considered overweight 
[NHS {2013}]). The maximum  length of plan  was 13  months, and rewards 
ranged from  £70 to £425 per year.  Payments were credited to participants on a 
monthly  basis, with a  bonus payment of 50% of the total maximum reward paid 
at completion if the individual achieved her final target weight. Participants 
were also provided with a booklet of weight loss tips.
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